EVA-2 Planning

Preparing the Rover for the EVA-2 Traverse

 

Preparations for EVA-2

Corrected Transcript and Commentary Copyright © 1996 by Eric M. Jones.
All rights reserved.
Scan credits in the Image Library
Last revised 26 September 2014.

[Dave's next transmission indicates that they are at about the middle of checklist page 5-10. After they finished getting Jim into his suit, they will repeat the procedures on 5-9 and 5-10 in getting Dave into his suit.]

140:06:07 Allen: Hadley Base, this is Houston.

140:06:15 Scott: Roger. Go ahead, Houston.

140:06:18 Allen: Roger, Dave. We'd like a rough idea of where you are in your EVA Prep at this time. And we'd like an OPS (pressure) readout at your convenience. Just a reminder. Over.

140:06:33 Scott: Okay, I'm zipping Jim right now and we'll call you in a little while.

140:06:37 Allen: Rog. Thank you.

[Very Long Comm Break]

[Jim's next transmission indicates that they are at the bottom of the left-hand column on 5-10, having nearly finished getting Jim into his suit]

140:35:15 Irwin: Houston, how do you read the LMP? (Long Pause)

140:35:33 Allen: Jim, this is Houston. Were you calling?

140:35:39 Irwin: Yeah. Just want a comm check, Joe.

140:35:42 Allen: You're 5 by.

[Comm Break]

140:38:08 Irwin: No, (they're) all plugged up, Joe.

140:38:14 Allen: Roger. Is it your biomed there that we're reading now?

140:38:24 Irwin: No. You're reading Dave's.

140:38:27 Allen: Okay. We're getting quite a noisy return down here. He may want to take a look at those sensors.

140:38:37 Scott: I'm all buttoned up, Joe.

140:38:40 Allen: Roger.

140:38:44 Scott: Is it usable data?

140:38:47 Allen: Stand by. And in the meantime, have you put tape over the canisters that are filled with water there (as per the discussion at 139:06:56)? And if so, we're a little worried down here that you may have taped it so well that it's making an airtight seal now, could you comment on that?

140:39:08 Irwin: We put the locks back on, Joe.

140:39:16 Allen: That sounds good.

[Comm Break]

[Scott - "I think the top of the canister is locked on by a band - that's an overcenter-latch kind of band. And it sounds like we just put that back on, so it wouldn't be airtight but it would hold it tight."]

[Jones - "You want the pressure to come out of there."]

[Scott - "But you don't want it to leak."]

[Jones - "You want it to be able to respond to cabin depressurization."]

[Scott - "I wonder why they didn't suggest that in the first place, instead of tape. If that is, indeed the mechanical case."]

[Jones - "So somebody did think about that in terms of your question earlier. It's just taken them a while to get to you."]

140:40:48 Allen: Roger, Jim. Copy 8024. Thank you.

140:40:56 Scott: And, Joe, mine's 5020.

140:40:59 Allen: 5020, Dave; thank you.

[Comm Break]

140:42:23 Irwin: Go ahead, Joe.

140:42:26 Allen: Jimmy, we're sitting down here scratching our heads about some data we're getting on your PLSS; and we'd like to know if the PLSS was vertical yesterday evening when you serviced it or if it perhaps were leaning sharply back against something when you serviced it. Over.

140:42:50 Irwin: No, when we serviced mine last night it was tilted aft about 30 degrees from vertical, and that's the long dimension was tilted vertical. (Pause) And we gave that information to Gordo this morning.

140:43:15 Allen: Okay. Thank you, Jim. Stand by a second; I'll be back with you in a moment here.

[Jones - "I gather that there was nobody from the EVA team listening when you were talking to Gordo."]

[Scott - "And they (the overnight team of controllers) didn't pass it through. They're supposed to pass it through when the new guys come on and say to the old guys, 'what happened last night?' And that (the PLSS servicing issue) was one of the only things that happened."]

140:43:49 Allen: Okay, Dave. Clear picture. Thank you. (Long Pause)

[See figure 8-1 from the Apollo 15 Mission Report.]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "When we charged yours (at about 130:00:41), we probably had to tilt it."]

[Irwin, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "We laid the PLSS on the suits, as I recall."]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "What we were trying to do, to save a little time there, was to charge water and complete the O2 charge at the same time. (By making) all the connections to the PLSS at about the same time would save a series operation. The high-pressure O2 line wasn't long enough to reach the PLSS unless you tilted the PLSS, and we found out later that the ground suspected some substandard water charge because of the tilted PLSS. We had to lean the PLSS over in order to get all the hoses connected to it simultaneously."]

140:44:37 Scott: Go ahead.

140:44:40 Allen: Roger, Dave and Jim. We hate to hold you up here, but we think we have a real problem with a bubble of air in your PLSS water, Jim.

[Scott - "Before (at 138:14:31 and following), it was not a problem. 'Press on'. And now, all of a sudden, it's a problem."]

140:45:15 Scott: Joe, rather than copy, let us get the PLSS up in position, and you just talk us through it. Okay?

140:45:21 Allen: I can sure do that, Dave. I'm ready to read when you're ready.

140:45:28 Scott: Stand by.

[Comm Break]

140:47 59 Allen: Okay, Jim. We hear you here. And we want to start first with the PLSS being cleanly vertical. And then, your first step is PLSS Aux water, Open.

140:48:19 Irwin: Okay. Stand by. (Pause) Okay, Aux water's Open.

140:48:32 Allen: Roger. Next step: LM descent H2O, Close. (Pause)

140:48:41 Irwin: Okay, Descent Water going Closed.

140:48:46 Allen: Next step: connect waste management system to PLSS Primary vent. (Pause)

140:49:02 Irwin: Okay. I'll hook the waste management system to the Primary vent. Stand by on that one.

140:49:08 Allen: Roger. (Pause)

MP3 Audio Clip ( 15 min 50 sec ) by David Shaffer

140:49:19 Scott: Say, Joe. Does this happen to be anything like the procedures we have on board already?

140:49:24 Allen: Dave, from here on out, they're going to be similar. I want to give you a step 4 here, when you're ready.

140:49:33 Scott: Go.

140:49:34 Allen: Roger. Step 4. Connect LM H2O to PLSS H2O Fill.

140:49:46 Scott: Okay. That's in work.

140:49:55 Allen: Okay, Dave and Jim. And from here on, there's...

140:49:58 Scott: It's connected.

140:49:59 Allen: Roger; thank you. It's going to be line 9 to the end of your checklist PLSS recharge procedures, and I'll read them to you if you want, I have them right here.

140:50:15 Scott: No, we can do it, Joe.

140:50:17 Allen: Okay, you should be starting with line "LM descent H2O, Open."

140:50:26 Scott: Give me a page.

140:50:30 Allen: Roger. Page 5-6.

140:50:36 Scott: Okay, I've got it.

140:50:38 Allen: Okay. And the line is LM descent H2O, Open.

140:50:45 Scott: Okay, we're right with you. Okay, we'll go ahead from there with the checklist, then.

140:50:50 Allen: Roger. Follow it right through to the end, Davy; thank you.

140:50:55 Scott: Rog.

[Comm Break]

[Jones - "Why the preference of reading it off the checklist, rather than having Joe do it?"]

[Scott - "We are familiar with it, and we do it as sort of a team, anyway. And it takes a lot of time for him to read up and we read back. It's easier to take a thing we're very familiar with and click it right off. We can save a lot of time that way."]

[Jones - "As opposed to 'We're finished with that step, Joe, what's the next one?'"]

[Scott - "We know it, we've done it, we've got it on board, so why not use the procedures we've already developed and practiced, rather than waiting for each step because we're anticipating something new. That's why the question. If we've got it on board, we know we're proficient in it and we can click through it with confidence that it will work, and quickly, 'cause the steps are familiar and we can go quickly. But if somebody is reading what you believe to be a completely new procedure, you've got to go very carefully and slowly. Even if it is, in fact, not a new procedure. If you think it is, then you're going to discount all that training you've had and take it very slowly."]

140:52:58 Allen: Okay, Dave. I guess you pick up business as usual then. And we're standing by. However, Dave, could you put pressure on the lower of your three EKG sensors? We think that may be the problem with our signal down here. And that's just pressure on that sensor from the outside.

140:53:22 Scott: Okay, the sternal?

140:53:25 Allen: I think that's the one. (Pause) And Surgeon tells me it's on the left side, Dave.

140:53:47 Scott: Okay, you've got pressure on it now.

140:53:53 Allen: Okay. Try pressure on one of the two upper ones, please.

140:54:02 Scott: Okay. (Long Pause)

140:54:22 Allen: Dave, which of the upper ones have you touched now? Both of them?

140:54:28 Scott: Yeah, that's the only way we can get to them right now, Joe. (Pause)

140:54:37 Allen: Dave, could you physically move...I guess maybe we've lost the signal or something. (Long Pause)

140:54:54 Irwin: Well, the pressure's removed right now, Joe.

140:54:57 Allen: Okay. Thank you, Jim. (Pause)

140:55:07 Scott: And, Joe, (as per checklist page 6-2) the OPS checkout has 5700 on mine and 5600 on Jim's.

140:55:15 Allen: Roger. Thank you.

[Long Comm Break]

141:00:09 Allen: Dave, the story on the biomed is essentially the following. We've got a good heart rate on you, or at least readable, when you're perfectly still. Otherwise, we're not able to pull the rate out of the signal return that we're getting. And we've talked it over here. You're going to be the pacing item on this. We're going to give you a go ahead and rely on your own good judgment to keep us posted on crew status. We're all aware that this EVA is physically a fairly easy EVA, with the exception of the drill work coming up towards the last. And we may have more information regarding your biomed sensors. We'll give to you then. Is that reasonably clear?

141:01:01 Scott: Rog; that's fine, Joe. I'll cool it all the way.

141:01:06 Allen: Roger, Dave. Thank you. And press on.

141:01:12 Scott: Okay. (Pause)

[Dave and Jim were the first crew who were given permission to remove their sensors during the rest period.]

[Jones - "Should I interpret this as (Flight Director) Gerry (Griffin) or Deke telling the doctors that it's okay to proceed with skimpy biomed data from you? Somebody who knew what they were doing?"]

[Scott - "Probably. Well, I also mentioned that we had to work pretty hard to convince him to let us do the sensors (as per the discussion following 109:58:36). In fact, part of the exercise on their condescending to let us take the sensors off and put them on was they wanted to mark on us where the sensors should go. So they wanted to tattoo us. And we said, 'No, we can learn where to put the sensors and how to put them on.' I mean, it's really not hard. It doesn't take a physician to stick these little dudes on there. Put the little goo inside 'em and put the tape on. It's not a real hard job. And, to put them in the same place every time is also not a very hard job. But the doctors were all worried that if they, themselves, or their people, didn't put them on and leave them on for the whole flight, they would not get any information. So, I can see them sitting over there saying, 'See, we told you. We shouldn't let those guys do this, 'cause they've screwed it up.' I don't think we did."]

[Jones - "So they had a little discussion about it and Gerry said, 'Oh, it's okay.'"]

[Scott - "Yeah. 'Let 'em go.' 'Cause, at this stage, we're fooling around. I'm not going to take the suit off. Everybody knows that. What should I say? They had some very good doctors."]

141:01:33 Scott: Yeah, he's switching now; take a look at it.

141:01:36 Allen: Okay. And it's important...

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "Was this, maybe, the first indication that they were concerned about Jim's heart?"]

141:01:39 Allen: Okay, that sounds good.

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "Jim must have changed his sensors."]

141:01:54 Allen: Dave, we may have dinged them when the suit went on. They looked real fine all night long.

141:02:02 Scott: Okay. (Long Pause) Houston, could you give us a hack on where we stand relative to the time, please?

141:02:41 Allen: Roger, Dave. Sure will. Could you give us a quick estimate of where you are on your EVA Prep Card.

141:02:50 Scott: Oh, Rog. We're halfway through LMP PLSS donning.

141:02:55 Allen: Okay, I'll be back at you in a minute with some numbers.

141:03:02 Scott: Rog. (Long Pause) I guess what I'm asking, Joe, is where are we relative to when you plan for us to come out? You know our mission timer isn't working; so I'd just like to know when you expected us to come out, so we know how to pace it. (Long Pause)

141:04:15 Allen: Dave and Jim, this is Houston. We estimate you should be climbing out of the LM about an hour from now, which would make it about a quarter to seven, Houston time. However, we're standing by and whenever you're ready to go, please press on. We are running a little bit behind the nominal time right now.

[Scott - "Just tell us when we're supposed to get out so we know whether or not we need to hustle.' It's a matter of the old standby of 'get ahead and stay ahead' or, 'if you're behind, catch up'. And if he said we had an hour to go to get out, should we stand there and twiddle our thumbs, or should we get going because we're behind? That's what I was trying to find out. We were behind because of the water stuff, but we didn't know how far behind."]

[They will actually start the EVA at 142:14:44, about an hour and ten minutes from this point.]

[Jones - "I gather that you had a watch set to Central Time."]

[Scott - "Part of the story is the circadian rhythm story. We set the whole mission so that we would be on Houston time and that's one reason why we did the SEVA. Apparently they don't do that any more. And, interestingly enough, we found out early on, in the beginning of the program, when we looked at different sleep cycles, that the best way to sleep is everybody sleep at the same time. As I recall, Apollo 7 and 8 rotated crew sleep with someone on duty all the time. On Apollo 9, we all slept at the same time. It was a better way."]

141:04:47 Slayton: You just went by it.

[Because of the water clean-up, the unscheduled PLSS water recharge, etc, they are about an hour behind schedule.]

141:04:53 Scott: (Responding to Slayton) Okay. Just wanted to know.

141:04:54 Allen: ...in front of us, you're climbing out of the LM right now. (Long Pause)

[Scott - "One of the things that was a bit surprising to me in getting ready for 15 was the lack of observation by management on what we were doing, so that they would understand some of our problems. We would run all these training exercises, and the only time we ever saw any management show up was when some of the fun things were going on, like driving the Rover. When we got into the grub work, hardly anybody was ever around except the guys who were training us. Which means that, when we get into these periods, it was hard for management to understand why it's taking so long to do these things, 'cause nobody came and watched. And, in the future, I think it would be useful for people to come and watch. As a matter of fact, we were the first flight to get our flight director to come out on a geology field trip. Gerry Griffin came out; and then all the other flight directors came out and then, on 16 and 17, they all went out. Because they found out that, by coming with us and watching us during the grub work, they learned an awful lot about what was going on. Gerry, in particular, thought it was invaluable; and he was lead flight director and had to make the decisions."]

["And that's why I think, hearing Slayton make a comment here...Slayton never, ever came and watched us work in the simulator. He never came and watched us work in a mock-up putting all this stuff on. So he really didn't have - maybe by osmosis he did - but he didn't have hands-on observation. Whereas Joe Allen saw a lot of this stuff. So you can see Joe's diplomacy in here, and sort of smoothing things along. Because he knows that this is real grub work."]

[Jones - "Did Gerry Griffin come down and watch any of this?"]

[Scott - "I don't know if Gerry watched any of this stuff. He was involved in all the simulations, though, which is another part of the big picture - the integrated simulations that we've talked about. There was a group of guys who would write a script for the simulation and put problems in, so that people would have to solve the problems. It was very formal and took a whole day. You run the mission and you solve the problems, and then there was a debriefing where the simulator people would tell the Control Center and the crew what they put in and how they should have solved the problems. And it was just superb training! And a lot of management would sit in on those kinds of things. Well, not a lot, but the loop was available throughout JSC, so they could listen to it. But, unless you're really in it, you don't pick up the subtleties."]

[I ran out of tape at this point.]

[Jones - "The gist of what you said while the tape was off is that, if management comes and watches sims, watches exercises where problems are thrown in, they have an opportunity to see how people work together, to see how the process can go, and make better decisions as a result."]

[Scott - "Yeah. They have a better perspective on how the system works, who the players are, how they work together, and how they solve problems. Because, ultimately, management - when you get into the flight and there is a big problem - had to make the decision. So, if they don't know how the system works - the system being the people and the equipment and whatever - it's going to be difficult to make an optimum decision."]

141:05:32 Irwin: Roger, Joe. (Long Pause)

141:06:29 Allen: And, Jim, this is Houston. I don't know if you copied my last transmission. Your biomed data is quite clean.

141:06:38 Irwin: Roger, Joe. I copied.

[Very Long Comm Break]

141:16:53 Irwin: Go ahead, Joe.

141:16:56 Allen: Jim and Dave, while you're working around there, I've got your morning science report. We've just learned here that the X-ray spectrometer people are about to generate a compositional map of the central belt of the Moon based on Al's data. You'll also be interested to hear that the pan camera has photographed - at high resolution - the landing site at Hadley Rille. And we're thinking that when we get those pictures analyzed, if it looks good, maybe we should try landing there. Over.

141:17:35 Irwin: We copy.

141:17:37 Scott: Sounds like a good idea.

141:17:39 Allen: Not half bad. (Pause)

141:17:46 Scott: There's lots more to do up here than we could ever handle.

141:17:50 Allen: I'm not so sure, Dave. (Pause) Looks like you're handling that pretty well.

[Comm Break]

141:20:28 Allen: Roger, Dave. We copy that.

[Very Long Comm Break]

141:31:07 Allen: Roger.

141:31:14 Scott: Okay. We'll start out, and give you a call in a minute here.

141:31:16 Allen: Roger, Dave.

[Comm Break]

[In the following, they are configuring Dave's comm. They are four lines from the bottom of the right-hand column on 6-3. Note that Jim does not start transmitting until 141:41:02.]

[Scott - "One of the things we've gone through quickly (during the mission review), is all these procedures that took a long time for people to develop - based on the systems, and how the systems work together. When you look to the future, I think one of the things in the beginning of Apollo that was fairly valuable was that you had people who flew airplanes, who were used to checklists and procedures. I mean, you couldn't take a physician or a chemist or a physicist and put them in this situation, if they hadn't had experience with developing and using procedures with hardware. And it took a long time in the beginning of Apollo to put a set of procedures together that would play together, interlocked with all the different systems. Just on Apollo 1 - and Jim (McDivitt) and Rusty and I were backing up Apollo 1 - we spent about a year on writing procedures to run the Command Module, so that the systems would all play together. And, as you mention, this hasn't changed much (from one Apollo mission to the next), which is good, but the amount of time and effort that went into this, by a lot of people so that it would go smoothly. And then, if you have an anomaly you can get into malfunction procedures, or emergency procedures - out of the normal procedures, without screwing up the rest of the system. That takes a long time."]

[Jones - "And by this time in Apollo, these procedures are fairly mature."]

MP3 Audio Clip ( 12 min 36 sec ) by David Shaffer

141:34:15 Scott: Yeah, cycle it back, and (is) your SE Audio closed? (Pause) You're not triggering. Are you reading me okay? Okay, your VOX isn't coming through at all. How about PTT? (Pause) No. (Pause) Okay, let's go back to VHF A Transmitter to Voice. A Receiver, On; B Transmitter to Off; B Receiver, On. Okay, give me a call now. (Pause) Nope (Pause) Okay, Houston. Don't seem to have any side tone or any transmission out of the LMP's PLSS on A.

141:35:24 Allen: Roger, Dave. We copy your comment loud and clear. We're receiving you clearly. We agree, we don't have anything from Jim yet; and we're looking at it now. (Long Pause)

141:35:53 Scott: (To Jim) Nope. (Long Pause)

[Scott - "The guys in the Control Room hear us say we have a problem, so they can reach several conclusions. One of which is, there's something wrong with the system. What's wrong? Two, we have a switch in the wrong place. Three, that the procedure is wrong. That, somehow, it was written or published incorrectly - (which is) unlikely because they're all verified and they're not changed. This particular document has been simulated and verified (repeatedly), so that's a low probability. But if we skip a line in the checklist and don't set a switch, it doesn't work. And the guys in the Control Center are sitting there wondering, did we put the switch in the right place? Did we follow the procedures exactly? But, if we did it right, what part of the equipment is wrong; and at which step in the procedures did it go wrong? Very difficult to figure out, unless you're really on top of that particular system."]

["That's why one guy reads it and the other guy verifies it, every time. 'Cause if you get out of sequence, or skip a step, then ten steps later, it doesn't work, and you have go all the way back...And sometimes you can't go all the way back to the beginning, because you have to reverse order some of the switches, because, if you don't cycle them in the right sequence, it'll reset something that can't be reset properly. So, in many cases, these switches had to be sequenced and, if they weren't sequenced right, then there would be a relay that didn't reset right and you could never get back into the position you were in, from a setup point of view, and you'd have to go back and turn everything off and go back an hour earlier and start all over."]

["I may be overkilling the procedures part here, but they are so important to the whole thing, in terms of time. If we had a week, no big deal. We don't have a week. We're already an hour behind. Don't want any glitches now. That's why you develop these procedures and you train and train and train, so that everybody knows."]

[It will be about seven minutes before the problem is solved.]

141:36:46 Scott: Okay, we'll verify it. Stand by. It's checked; but we'll check it again. (Pause) Yeah. (Laughing) Joe, Jim's reading you okay. So it must be connected. (Pause)

141:37:13 Allen: Dave and Jim, could you go back to the audio portion of your cue card there (on checklist page 6-3), Audio-LMP, and check those few steps for us, please?

141:37 25 Scott: All right. Okay. S-Band to T/R; ICS, T/R; Relay, On; Mode to VOX; VOX Sensitivity, Max; VHF A to T/R; B to Receive. Okay, and we've verified the A and B Transmitter and Receiver; Telemetry, Biomed, Off. (Pause) Okay; no luck, Houston. (Hesitant) Maybe cycling the circuit breaker (would fix the problem)?

141:38:14 Allen: Dave, I guess...

141:38:15 Scott: (To Jim) Why don't you cycle the circuit breaker?

141:38:15 Allen: ...we'll go back up one more step and verify the powerdown circuit breaker configuration, please.

141:38:29 Scott: Okay; Jim says you're coming in very weak, Joe. We'll verify the powerdown circuit breaker (card). (Long Pause)

141:38:48 Scott: Okay. Mine's verified. Jim, how's yours? (Pause) Okay. Both verified. (Pause) Houston, both of those are verified.

141:39:02 Allen: Thank you, Dave. We're thinking. (Pause) Dave and Jim, could you check the suit connector, please?

141:39:21 Scott: (Laughing) Okay. Jim's reading you so the suit connector must be connected.

141:39:29 Allen: Roger...

141:39:30 Scott: There's only one way, Joe. He can receive, but he can't transmit.

141:39:31 Allen: ...Roger, Dave. Roger. We agree with that; but we assume also that he is receiving us very weakly. Is that correct?

141:39:42 Scott: That's correct. (Pause) (Garbled) cycle that, Jim.

141:39:51 Allen: Falcon. Requesting that you unstow Jim's PLSS antenna, please (as per the note at the middle of the left-hand column on 6-4).

141:40:00 Scott: Okay. (Pause) Here. (Pause) Your antenna. (Pause) Okay, Joe. That was the problem. (Pause) I'm afraid - ha - to tell you, but Jim's antenna is broken, and it was broken yesterday when we got in. When we first started out on the operation, there was a big nick out of the antenna, which we subsequently taped. And now, just below that nick, it's broken off. And I don't know how it got there, but when we first looked at the OPS antenna, it had about half of it nicked out. We did tape that yesterday. (Pause) (To Jim) Okay. There we go.

141:41:00 Allen: Roger, Dave...

141:41:00 Scott: (To Jim) How's that?

141:41:01 Allen: ...We copy that.

141:41:02 Irwin: (To Dave) Yeah; I'm reading you loud and clear.

141:41:03 Scott: Okay.

141:41:04 Allen: Okay, Jim. We got your call then.

141:41:06 Scott: It looks like we'll have to do a little tape job...(stops to listen to Allen) Joe, what I'm doing now is holding Jim's antenna together.

141:41:18 Allen: Roger, Dave,...

141:41:19 Scott: I guess we'll have to think...

141:41:19 Allen: ...and when you hold it together, we can read you loud and clear. So that's the problem. I guess we need a tape job on that antenna.

141:41:28 Scott: Yeah. I hope I can get it taped for you.

141:41:33 Irwin: In other words, we'll have to tape it and leave it erect. (Coughs) Leave it erect.

141:41:37 Scott: You mean leave it up.

141:41:39 Irwin: Yeah.

141:41:39 Scott: Bring your volume down some. It's squealing.

141:41:40 Irwin: Okay.

141:41:43 Scott: Okay; let me get the tape out. See if I can't do...

141:41:52 Irwin: It's been a taping operation this morning.

141:41:54 Allen: Roger, Jim. And we're reading you 5 by, babe, when that thing's connected. Sounds like that's the problem.

141:42:04 Irwin: Yeah, no doubt.

141:42:05 Scott: Okay. Just stand there now. (Pause) Yeah, I know it, but I don't know how we're going to do that, because it's...

141:42:16 Allen: Jim could you go to Off on your Mode Select switch while you're taping?

141:42:25 Scott: Okay. He's off, Joe.

141:42:30 Allen: Okay, Dave. And we're standing by for progress, as to how that goes.

141:42:38 Scott: Okay, Joe. I think we're going to take the top inch off the antenna and use it as a splice.

141:42:45 Allen: That's the old splint trick, you mean.

141:42:51 Scott: Yeah, we'll give that a try, because, unfortunately, the antenna is broken right off at the root. (Long Pause) Fine; right there. (Long Pause)

[Scott - "The antenna's on the OPS up on top of the PLSS; it's top-of-helmet height, so I'm trying to reach up, with my suit on. And there's no room in that little locker. Here again, if you haven't seen two guys with their suits on - and PLSS and everything - inside the Lunar Module, it would be hard to appreciate the lack of volume and the difficulty in moving. 'Tape the antenna? Sure.' Here we sit, having a cup of coffee; and here, in this (2 meter by 4 meter conference) room, it would be easy. Get out the roll of tape, tape that dude up, and head on out the door. Right?"]

[Jones - "Now, it says here in just a moment that you're going to take the top inch off and use that as a splint over the break point. How easy was that antenna to tear? Just bend it over and flex it a little bit?"]

[Scott - "I don't recall. They're thin and flexible, and curved so that they'll stand up straight. It's much thinner than an (automobile) oil dip-stick, and it has curvature to it to keep it rigid. Like a small, metal tape measure. About 3/4 inch wide."]

[I raised the possibility that they used the scissors to make the cut.]

[Scott - "Probably not. I don't believe the scissors would have cut the antenna. We probably flexed it at one point several times."]

141:44:34 Scott: Okay, Joe. Let's let Jim come back up on comm and lay the antenna across here, and let's see how it works.

141:44:43 Allen: Okay. And...

141:44:44 Scott: Okay come back to...

141:44:46 Allen: ...and, Dave, while you have the tape out there, from the sound of things, maybe you'd better put...

141:44:51 Scott: (To Jim) Wait a minute.

141:44:52 Allen: ...some of it in your pocket for later.

[The Apollo 16 and 17 crews each took a roll of tape out with them and put it to use several times during their EVAs.]

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "There was a comm link directly with the LM - bypassing the LCRU - for which the antennas were required."]

141:44:58 Allen: Roger.

[Scott - "Jim's moving around. I'm trying to get him to the position where I can reach the antenna. So the (comm) overlap isn't because Joe's talking, it's because we're in this little volume up there trying to get into position. And when I talk to Jim, Joe hears it because I'm on VOX."]

[Jones - "And this is also a nice example of the way you were able to work with Joe. There is a little bit of overlap. Very calmly, you say 'Standby a minute, Joe.' And Joe butts out. You get your business taken care of, and then Joe comes back on with a suggestion."]

[Scott - "We spent lots of time working with Joe."]

141:45:07 Irwin: Joe. (Pause)

141:45:12 Allen: Okay, Jim...

141:45:13 Scott: (Lost under Joe)

141:45:13 Allen: I got one word there. Don't forget your Mode switch.

141:45:20 Scott: Yeah, we're okay. Think of something here. (Long Pause) (Garbled) (Long Pause) Dropped the tape. (Long Pause)

[Jones - "Do you have any idea how you got down to that roll of tape on the floor?"]

[Scott - "No. I could have used the tongs."]

[Jones - "I don't think so. They're outside, on the Rover."]

[Scott - "Beats me. I don't know. Depends on where I dropped it. You assume I dropped it on the floor."]

[Jones - "You had to be able to bend down to get the hatch, even when you were pressurized."]

[Scott - "Yeah, might be able to get down there alright, because I'm not pressurized here."]

141:47 39 Allen: Roger, Dave. We agree with that. And Dave and Jim, you should be advised that there's very good reason to believe that when you get out on the surface near the LCRU, Jim, you'll be able to transmit as well as receive. Over. Even without the antenna. Over.

141:48:01 Scott: Okay, that sounds good. (Long Pause)

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "The ground then informed us that we would not have to have Jim's antenna up, anyway, because his comm was so good, so we left it down. I would say that's probably a pretty good nominal procedure to leave the antenna down it you don't really need it up."]

[Irwin, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "I don't know why they subsequently asked for your antenna to be up, because it looked like we had great comm with it down."]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "Yes, that's right. I think that would be for one of the systems people to think about because it would surely prevent any possibility of knocking that antenna off somewhere along the way - hooking it on the high-gain antenna on the LCRU, or the LM, or something. It also saves time."]

[The Apollo 16 and 17 crews always raised their OPS antennas once they were out on the surface, albeit without a noticeable change in comm quality at any of the times the antennas were raised.]

141:49:59 Irwin: (Radio squeal)

141:50:02 Scott: Too loud. Yeah.

141:50:04 Scott: Okay. You're loud and clear.

141:50:06 Irwin: (Squealing) Houston, how do you read the LMP?

141:50:08 Allen: LMP, you're loud and clear.

141:50:13 Irwin: Okay, very good.

141:50:15 Scott: Okay, you're still too loud. You got a squeal.

141:50:18 Irwin: Yeah, I'll turn it down a little bit. How's that?

141:50:20 Scott: That's better. Okay. (Reading) "CB(11) Comm, CDR Audio, open, and connected to PLSS comm." In work. (Long Pause) Okay, I'm in B, I have a Press flag and an O; O2 Momentary. Pressure gauge, and how do you read, Jim?

141:51:20 Irwin: I read you loud and clear.

141:51:21 Scott: Okay, you have to check with Houston.

141:51:24 Irwin: Houston, how do you read?

141:51:25 Allen: Dave and Jim, we read you both loud and clear.

MP3 Audio Clip ( 19 min 30 sec ) by David Shaffer

141:51:33 Irwin: Okay, they read me loud and clear.

141:51:35 Allen: Roger. Go on to next step.

141:51:37 Scott: PLSS mode for you to B and me to A. (Pause)

141:51:46 Scott: Okay, how do you read, Jim?

141:51:47 Irwin: Loud and clear.

141:51:49 Scott: Okay, you're loud and clear to me, and Houston, how do you read the CDR?

141:51:52 Allen: Roger. You're both 5 by.

141:51:58 Scott: Okay. Let's both go to AR.

141:52:02 Irwin: AR.

141:52:03 Scott: Okay, AR. You're loud and clear to me; how me to you?

141:52:05 Irwin: Same.

141:52:06 Scott: Okay, Houston. How do you read the LMP and the CDR again? And how's your TM?

141:52:13 Allen: Okay, Dave. We're loud and clear on both, and we're Go for the next step.

141:52:23 Scott: Okay. My PLSS O2 quantity is 90 percent. How about yours, Jim?

141:52:29 Irwin: Reading 92.

141:52:30 Scott: Okay. "CB(16) ECS, LCG Pump, close."

141:52:33 Irwin: Closed.

141:52:34 Scott: Okay. "LCG, cold as required."

[Once they turn off the LM LCG pump, they won't have cooling until they have depressurized the cabin and have started PLSS cooling. Here, they are taking one last opportunity to cool down before shutting off the pump and disconnecting the LM water hoses. Pete Conrad and Al Bean added this cool-down step, on their own, during the preparations for their first Apollo 12 EVA. See the Apollo 12 Lunar Surface Journal at 114:53:38 and following.]

[Scott - "An example of procedures evolution."]

141:52:40 Irwin: Verified.

141:52:41 Scott: "Suit Fan Delta-P, open."

141:52:43 Irwin: Open.

141:52:44 Scott: "Suit Fan 2, open."

141:52:45 Irwin: Open.

141:52:46 Scott: Okay. "Verify ECS caution and H2O SEP component lights on, about a minute." (Pause) And there they come. (Pause) Oop, got a tone. Yeah; okay. (Pause)

[They are now on checklist page 6-5.]

141:53:01 Irwin: That's verified.

141:53:02 Scott: "Cabin Gas Return (Valve), Egress; verify."

141:53:05 Irwin: That's verified.

141:53:06 Scott: "Suit Circuit Relief (Valve), Auto; verify."

141:53:08 Irwin: That's verified.

141:53:10 Scott: Okay. "OPS connect; LMP first. Suit Isolation (Valve) to Suit Disconnect."

141:53:15 Irwin: Suit Disconnect.

141:53:17 Scott: Okay. Why don't you slip around here? (Pause) (I'll) get your OPS. (Pause) That water is cold, isn't it? (Pause) Okay. "OPS O2 hose to PGA blue to blue." (Long Pause)

141:54:16 Irwin: I'll turn off the LCG Pump. (Dave laughs, probably because he is getting quite cold) (Pause)

[Scott - "When my water started going through...I mean, it was a great system. Your whole body, all of a sudden, got cool!"]

141:54:36 Irwin: Okay. "Retrieve purge valve, verify closed; and lock pin, In and Lo. Install purge valve red to red."

141:54:46 Scott: Okay. (Yawns; Long Pause) Okay. Purge valve is in, and locked, and locked.

141:55:13 Irwin: Okay, (PGA) diverter valve's going vertical. (Pause) Okay, repeat on you.

[As shown in Figure I-23 in the EMU Handbook, the diverter valve is part of the oxygen inflow connector and gives them the option of directing the PLSS oxygen flow entirely into the helmet (the vertical position) or partly into the suit torso (the horizontal position). Generally, the astronauts put the diverter valve to horizontal only when they were in the cabin and were trying to dry the suits out a little. In the hoizontal position, used in the cabin, all the incoming oxygen stream is divided between a duct leading to the helmet vent and a duct leading the vents in the torso. In the vertical position, used outside, all the oxygen goes to the helmet vent. Figure I-10 from the EMU Handbook shows the layout of the ducts.]

[Now they will connect Dave's OPS.]

141:55:22 Irwin: Suit disconnect...

141:55:23 Scott: Get...My O2 hose has just sort of drifted up there.

141:55:25 Irwin: Okay. (Pause) Okay.

141:55:29 Scott: Okay.

141:55:30 Irwin: Okay, I'll disconnect your (LM O2) hoses. (Pause) And we'll connect the PLSS O2 hose. (Pause) In (and) locked.

141:55:57 Scott: Okay.

141:55:58 Irwin: Okay. The purge valve. (Pause) Very low. (Pause) Okay, all locked, and the pin's in. (Long Pause) Okay. And it's locked.

141:57:02 Scott: Okay. "PGA diverter valve to vertical." Take a little drink. (Pause) Did you turn the Descent Water off? (Pause)

141:57:24 Irwin: Hose (garbled) last... (Pause)

141:57:37 Allen: Dave, that Descent Water was turned off on your PLSS recharge exercise.

141:57:45 Scott: Rog. We figured that out. It's working okay.

141:57:48 Allen: Roger.

141:57:49 Scott: Okay.

141:57:52 Irwin: Descent water closed. And stow that hose properly.

141:57:56 Scott: Yeah, man.

141:57:57 Irwin: Put it in the holster and I'll...

141:57:59 Scott: Okay.

141:57:59 Irwin: ...(get the) cable stowed (Long Pause)

141:58:14 Scott: Okay; it's stowed. (Pause) Okay, helmet and gloves donning. (Pause) Okay. "Position mikes, both. PLSS fans on, Right. Vent flag clear." (Pause) Okay, my fan's coming on. Got a tone. Vent flag's clear. (Pause) (Looking at Jim's RCU) Okay, your vent flag's clear. Let's get your LEVA. (Pause)

141:59:00 Irwin: That's yours.

141:59:02 Scott: Yeah. (Pause)

141:59:07 Irwin: Put the flaps...

141:59:08 Scott: Yeah. (Pause) Okay; let me get your water (that is, the in-suit drink bag). And your food stick. (Pause)

141:59:42 Irwin: Here, I'll line it up.

141:59:44 Scott: Yeah, you line it up and I'll push it.

141:59:46 Irwin: Okay, it's lined up.

141:59:49 Scott : Okay. Wait, let me get this...(Long Pause)

142:00:12 Irwin: That did it.

142:00:13 Scott: (Chuckles) (Pause) There. Closed and locked. Let's get the back flap. (Long Pause) Okay; front flap. My turn. (Pause)

[Next, they will get Dave's helmet on.]

142:01:06 Irwin: Yeah. (Pause) Okay.

142:01:15 Scott: You may have to push it some.

142:01:18 Irwin: Yup.

142:01:19 Scott: Get it? That was easy!

142:01:21 Irwin: Yeah.

142:01:22 Scott: Get the back flap first?

142:01:23 Irwin: The LEVA (flap)?

142:01:24 Scott: Yeah.

142:01:24 Irwin: No. (Brief Pause) You'll have to rotate the helmet, too. Shift it just a little bit. (Pause) No; too much. Shift it back. A little bit more. A little more to the right. A little more. A little more. That's good. Back a little to the left. That's right on.

142:01:42 Scott: Okay. (Long Pause) Okay; secure the self-doffing straps. (Pause) Helmets. (Pause) (Garbled) (Pause)

142:02:27 Irwin: Left. (Pause) And right.

142:02:33 Scott: Okay. (Pause) Okay, LCG is cold. Yeah.

142:02:36 LM Crew: That's for sure.

142:02:39 Scott: Okay; "CB(16); ECS; LCG pump, Open." (Pause)

142:02:43 Irwin: Okay. (Pause)

142:02:51 Scott: Get back to your little corner.

142:02:54 Irwin: LCG pump (circuit breaker) coming open. It's open now.

142:02:57 Scott: Okay. "Disconnect LM water hoses and connect the PLSS water hoses."

142:03:04 Irwin: Okay, in work. (Long Pause)

142:03:21 Scott: Okay; mine's closed and locked. (Pause)

142:03:33 Irwin: Mine's closed and locked.

142:03:35 Scott: Okay; secure the LM hoses. (Pause)

142:03:49 Irwin: In work. (Pause)

142:03:55 Scott: Yeah.

142:03:58 Irwin: Push them just as far back as you possibly can, Dave.

142:04:00 Scott: Yeah, I will. (Long Pause) Yeah, they're snapped in the ECS handhold. I think they'll hold today. (Pause) Okay. You got your hoses stowed?

142:05:22 Irwin: Hoses are stowed.

142:05:23 Scott: Okay. Do a 180 here, and we'll check all the connectors.

142:05:25 Irwin: Okay. (Pause)

142:05:31 Scott: Okay, read to me.

142:05:33 Irwin: Okay. "Helmet and visor aligned and adjusted."

142:05:36 Scott: Rog.

142:05:37 Irwin: "O2 connectors, three, locked."

142:05:41 Scott: Okay. Locked, locked, and locked.

142:05:47 Irwin: "Purge valves, one, locked."

142:05:49 Scott: Okay. Let me put the booties (that is, the connector dust covers) on here. (Pause) The purge valve is locked.

142:05:55 Irwin: "Water connector, locked."

142:05:56 Scott: Water connector's locked.

142:05:57 Irwin: Comm connector?

142:05:59 Scott: Comm connector's locked.

142:06:00 Irwin: "PGA diverter valve, vertical."

142:06:02 Scott: Vertical.

142:06:03 Irwin: Okay, read to me.

142:06:04 Scott: Okay. "Helmet and visor, aligned and adjusted."

142:06:06 Irwin: It is.

142:06:08 Scott: Okay. "O2 connectors, three, locked." (Long Pause)

142:06:23 Irwin: Okay; three are locked.

142:06:24 Scott: "Purge valves, one, locked."

142:06:27 Irwin: Purge valve is locked.

142:06:28 Scott: "Water connector, locked."

142:06:29 Irwin: Water connector is locked.

142:06:30 Scott: "Comm connector, locked."

142:06:33 Irwin: Comm connector is locked.

142:06:35 Scott: And "diverter valve, vertical."

142:06:37 Irwin: Diverter valve is vertical.

142:06:38 Scott: Okay. Let's take another look at the circuit breaker configuration.

142:06:42 Irwin: Okay.

142:06:44 Scott: "White Dots out plus EVA decals." (Long Pause)

[They are checking to make sure that the circuit breakers and switches conform to the chart on Surface Checklist page 1-7. Circuit breakers marked as white in the diagram should be open (pulled out) while marked as black should be closed (pushed in).]

142:07:08 Scott: And mine are configured.

[Next, they will start the glove-donning procedures on checklist page 6-6.]

142:07:11 Irwin: In work. (Long Pause)

142:07:55 Scott: That old graphite makes the hands slide in pretty easy, doesn't it?

142:08:00 Irwin: (Laughing) It doesn't do too good on the wrist connector though, does it? It makes it a little bit...(Pause)

142:08:24 Scott: Okay, I got two (gloves) on and locked. Come over and check mine when you get through. (Pause)

142:08:33 Irwin: Still working.

142:08:36 Scott: Okay. Gimme a call if you want a hand.

142:08:46 Irwin: Just a little stiff. (Pause) ...

142:08:54 Scott: Okay?

142:08:57 Irwin: Yeah. (Pause) Okay; yours are locked.

142:09:01 Scott: Okay. (Garbled) there. (Checking Jim's glove) Okay; got a lock and a lock. Okay. (Pause) Okay. Cuff's up. Okay. "PGA Diverter to Min; verify."

142:09:31 Irwin: That's verified.

142:09:33 Scott: Okay, and "PLSS Pump, On, to the right."

142:09:35 Irwin: Pump going On.

142:09:36 Scott: Okay, mine's running.

142:09:38 Irwin: Mine is too.

142:09:39 Scott: Okay, "Press Reg A and B to Egress."

142:09:42 Irwin: A and B going to Egress.

142:09:45 Scott: And we need a pressure integrity check. So next step is "PLSS O2 to On".

142:09:50 Irwin: PLSS O2...

142:09:52 Scott: I can get it. (Pause)

142:10:00 Irwin: Okay, my PLSS O2 is On.

142:10:02 Scott: And mine's On. (Pause) Okay, and the press flag should clear at 3.1 to 3.4 (psi). (Pause) I'm coming up. (Pause)

142:10:18 Irwin: Mine's clear. (Pause)

[Apparently, Jim's O2 flag cleared almost immediately.]

142:10:26 Irwin: No, I'm sorry; no; I didn't clear the (tone)...

142:10:27 Scott: Yeah, there's your tone; yeah, mine too. (Long Pause) Okay, I'm off the peg.

142:11:01 Irwin: Okay, my flag's cleared. (Long Pause)

142:11:15 Scott: My flag's clear. (Pause) Okay, I'm stable at about 3.8. How about you?

142:11:29 Irwin: Same here.

142:11:31 Scott: Okay, if I can get that old O2 valve. Let's turn them off and do a little check.

142:11:39 Allen: Okay, Falcon. We're marking a minute.

[Joe means that Houston has started timing the one-minute pressure check.]

142:11:51 Irwin: Mine's Off.

142:11:52 Scott: Okay. (Pause) And, Houston, we'll take your call when the minute's up.

142:12:09 Allen: Roger. (Long Pause) Okay, Falcon. Mark 1 minute. Mickey's big hand went above his head.

[This is a reference to the Mickey Mouse watches and clocks that many children grew up with in the 1940s and 50s.]

142:12:55 Irwin: Okay, 3.7.

142:12:57 Allen: Outstanding.

142:12:59 Scott: "O2 back On."

142:13:09 Irwin: O2 is On.

142:13:10 Scott: Okay. "Verify the O2 flag is clear." Mine is clear.

142:13:15 Irwin: Mine's clear.

142:13:16 Scott: Okay, Houston. How do things look to you down there?

142:13:19 Allen: Okay, Falcon; you're Go for depress.

142:13:25 Scott: Roger. Go for depress. Okay, Jim, "CB(16) ECS Cabin Repress, open."

142:13:31 Irwin: Okay. Cabin Repress is open.

142:13:33 Scott: "Cabin Repress Valve to Close."

142:13:35 Irwin: Cabin Repress, Closed. Closed.

142:13:41 Scott: Get it?

142:13:42 Irwin: Yeah.

142:13:43 Scott: Okay, overhead...I've got a little tone. (Pause) Okay, "forward dump valve, Open, and then, Auto, at 3.5." (Pause) Okay, keep my eyeball on the cabin pressure. I've got it. Okay; you can open it. (Pause)

142:14:06 Irwin: Okay, I'm going open.

142:14:08 Scott: Okay.

142:14:09 Irwin: Open.

[The sound of depressurization can be heard.]

142:14:17 Irwin: Okay; back to Auto.

142:14:20 Scott: Okay.

142:14:20 Allen: Mark; 3.5

142:14:22 Scott: "Verify cabin at 3.5." Okay, cabin's at 3.5. Suit circuit's locked up at about 4.4. My PGA is coming through 5 and decaying. And let's slip on a watch.

[Dave may have had his watch hanging from the instrument panel and, in any event, he is now putting it on and is probably starting the stopwatch function.]

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "I do not recall ever having looked at my watch after egress. In the cabin after EVA-2, I noticed that the crystal of my Omega had popped off sometime during the EVA. Therefore, on EVA-3, I used my backup watch (which was) of a similar type. It worked just fine during the even higher temperatures of EVA-3."]

[In Dave's 1996 letter to me, he said that the back-up watch was a Waltham. After further researching the issue for an article on watches, Dave wrote in early 2014, "Frankly, back in 1996 I just made a mistake -- it was a Bulova, not a Waltham. When you asked in '96, things were a bit hazy after 25 years, and I hadn't fully researched many of the ancillary parts of the mission. However, more things are coming into focus these days as more people are researching Apollo." Dave has documentation that tells us that the backup watch he wore on the lunar surface was a Bulova Chronograph, Model #88510/01. The Part Number on the wrist band was SEB12100030-202.]

[Ken Glover has provided a video frame frame EVA-3, showing the watch Dave was wearing at that time. See, also, AS15-88-11863.]

142:14:44 Irwin: Okay, going Open.

[The EVA has started.]

142:15:50 Irwin: I'm reading 5.1.

142:15:52 Scott: Yeah, so am I. (Long Pause) And, we're about down to 0.2. Still reading about 5.1. (Pause) Are you at 5.1, also?

142:16:34 Irwin: Coming down [to] about 5.

142:16:36 Scott: Yeah.

142:16:37 Irwin: We'll breath it down. (Pause)

142:16:44 Allen: And, Falcon...

142:16:45 Scott: Take a while at this rate.

142:16:46 Allen: ...the PLSSs look right on.

142:16:50 Scott: (Responding to Joe) Okay! Thank you.

142:17:00 Allen: Jim, your PLSS water recharge cured that problem we had yesterday completely, it looks like.

142:17:10 Irwin: Good.

142:17:13 Scott: Yeah, it was worth the effort then. (Pause)

142:17:18 Irwin: Those tones are a little disturbing. (Pause)

142:17:28 Scott: Okay. Well; " partially open the forward hatch." Maybe I can get that if you'll slip over there...

142:17:35 Irwin: A bit tight.

142:17:36 Scott: ...about as far as you can go. Careful not to get hooked. (Pause) That's it. Okay. (Long Pause) Okay, got a tone. (Long Pause)

142:18:29 Scott: Can you reach around and hold the hatch so it doesn't blow shut? I got it. No sweat. It's a little easier today.

142:18:37 Irwin: Getting in practice.

142:18:38 Scott: Yeah. (Pause)

[During the mission review, Dave returned to the subject of inward-opening hatches versus outward-opening ones.]

[Scott - "They wanted hatches that opened inward, so that the pressure in the spacecraft would force the hatch against its seating. In the Command Module, before the (Apollo 1) fire, the hatch was just a plate that was locked on to the inside of the vehicle. And there's just no way you could get it open quickly. It was very heavy, especially lying on your back. Ed White and I (two of the strongest people in the Astronaut Corps) worked the procedures to open the hatch from the inside, and you had to be fairly strong to get the dang thing off, because people were over-compensating for the necessity of internal pressure. And, finally (after the fire), they figured out you could build a hatch that opened outward, and you could seal it alright. The LM, on the other hand, was originally designed with the hatch opening inward, and they felt that was better because of the landing, etc. But it made it difficult for the crew, obviously, 'cause you had to open the hatch in to where you were and then go around to get outside. You would say, why didn't you design the hatch to open outwards? Well, that would mean you would have to close it against pressure. (There was) lots of discussion about hatches outward or inward. And, why would you ever want to get out of the LM in a hurry? You wouldn't. And weight was another thing."]

[The question of weight then led Dave to consider whether or not legs were necessary to all lunar landers.]

[Scott - "That (meaning weight)'s an interesting subject in what's going on today. The people at JSC designed the Artemis (unmanned) common lander. It's got legs on it. And, when they get it to the lunar surface, they shut it down. Now, think about it. The only reason you would want legs on an unmanned vehicle when you land it is if you want a lunar base. (In Apollo) we had a lunar base, necessarily. But if you want to send something to explore the Moon, or gather data, then you don't need legs. And, for some reason, people aren't (currently) addressing the capsule idea that the Russians used. The legged lander is restricted to 12-degree slopes and 0.2-meter obstacles - as opposed to the capsule approach, which is essentially unrestricted, unconstrained by surface conditions 'cause you can bounce it, roll it, or whatever. And it has these petals that open up and align it and (then) it's a platform on the surface. The amount of mass that you have to put into a legged lander (is greater), plus the constraints that you have on the surface - and then they shut it down (and never use the legs again). And you know what, it uses the LM landing radar. Not efficient compared with today's laser rangers and stuff, but cheap."]

142:18:50 Irwin: (Grunting as he tries to reach his feedwater valve) Oh! (Pause)

MP3 Audio Clip ( 2 min 46 sec ) by David Shaffer

142:18:55 Scott: Let's see. Let me see if I can get around the hatch here and give you some more room.

142:19:00 Irwin: Well, maybe I can get my arm back there. (Pause) Yeah. I've got my arm back there. No sweat, Dave.

142:19:09 Scott: Oh, good.

142:19:12 Irwin: Find the control. (Pause)

142:19:19 Scott: Okay. Mine's Open. (Long Pause) Get it okay?

142:19:37 Irwin: Just a minute. I think it's on. Yeah. It's on.

142:19:44 Scott: Okay. I'll tell you, my gloves feel a lot better today.

142:19:48 Irwin: (Laughs) Stretched them a little bit yesterday, Dave.

142:19:51 Scott: Yeah. I think you're right. (Pause) Okay. "Rest until cooling sufficient", after we get the water going. And "verify the CWEA status". We might do that. The ECS and PREAMPS. Okay. (Pause) And I got a tone and a clear water flag. How about that? (Long Pause)

142:20:43 Irwin: Your water flag's clear, huh?

142:20:45 Scott: Yeah.

142:20:47 Irwin: Mine hasn't cleared yet. (Long Pause)

142:21:32 Scott: Okay. Let me get that (piece of duct) tape up by your left elbow.

142:21:36 Irwin: Yeah. Why don't you take both?

142:21:38 Scott: Yeah, I will; in case I drop one. Stick it right on my cuff checklist. (Long Pause)

[At 138:51:57, Gordon Fullerton asked Dave to take some tape outside to secure the high-gain cable to the mast to keep it out of the way of the TV camera and suggested that he wrap a piece around his camera. Less specifically, at 141:44:46, Joe suggested that Dave put some tape ""in your pocket for later". The EVA-2 cuff checklist is the only clean surface on Dave's suit and, therefore, is the only surface the tape will stick to. Dave will do the taping job before 142:32:52.]

[Jones - "You had separate checklists for each day, right?"]

[Scott - "Yeah. And it's not regular paper (but, rather, a photographic paper called cronopaque), so you can stick tape on it pretty well."]

142:22:10 Scott: Okay. (Pause) Okay, Houston. How does everything look to you down there? (Pause)

142:22:32 Allen: Stand by, Dave.

142:22:36 Scott: Okay. (Pause)

142:22:44 Allen: Okay, Dave. Be advised you're Go for EVA.

142:22:51 Scott: Okay. Thank you.