Post-landing Activities

"That may have been a small one for Neil..."

 

Preparations for EVA-1

Corrected Transcript and Commentary Copyright © 1995 by Eric M. Jones.
All rights reserved.
MP3 audio clips by Ken Glover.
Last revised 26 September 2014.

MP3 Audio Clip (27 min 19 sec) Starts at about 114:01:47.

114:02:06 Conrad: Houston; Intrepid. In case you want to know where we are. We'll be with you with the PLSS comm checks in just about 2 (or) 3 minutes.

114:02:14 Gibson: Roger. Intrepid. Standing by.

[Long Comm Break. They are on Surface 28 in the checklist and will start the comm check at about 114:08. The PLSS comm check begins 39 minutes before the planned start of the final depressurization. This would get them out at about 114:47, only 27 minutes behind the planned time. They will actually get out at about 115:08 - about 48 minutes late - with the additional loss primarily due to problems they have yet to experience with the comm system. Gerry Griffin is the EVA Flight Director. The NASA Public Affairs commentator optimistically notes, paraphrasing Griffin, that, in the past, comm checks didn't take all of the allocated time.]

[Note that they have done all of the PLSS donning procedures without any transmissions to Houston. What they don't realize is that, while getting Pete into his PLSS, they did not get his PLSS oxygen hoses connected to his suit. This is the third item in the lefthand column on Sur-28.

114:07:55 Conrad: (Starting the PLSS comm check) Houston, we're going to modulate FM and coming up with Comm: the TV (circuit breaker) closed; and we'll be coming at you in a minute.

114:08:04 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid. Standing by. (Long Pause)

[At Pete's next utterance, we will pick them up in the middle of the section "Audio (CDR)" on the right-hand column of page Surface-28. CDR is "Commander". VOX is the voice-activated comm mode. Note that only Pete is audible. After he changes some switch settings on his audio panel, Al will reset switches and circuit breakers on his side.]

114:09:20 Conrad: (Now on Surface 29) Get ready for the Comm. VHF Voice On, Off, On, Off, High; Range, Off/Reset; Squelch A and B noise threshold, plus 1-1/2. (Long Pause) How you doing? (Pause) Okay. (Tape) recorder, On.

[The unedited transcript of the on-board recording was used in April 2009 to add Al's portion of the dialog.]

114:10:20 Bean (on-board): EVA.

114:10:21 Conrad: Uplink Squelch, Enable.

114:10:22 Bean (on-board): Uplink Squelch, Enable.

114:10:23 Conrad: LMP connect to PLSS Comm, CB (circuit breaker) audio.

114:10:26 Bean (on-board): Okay. (Long Pause)

[There is no further on-board transcript until about 114:27:56.]

114:11:48 Bean: (Faint) (Garbled)

114:11:49 Conrad: I hear you loud and clear.

114:11:51 Bean: (Faint) Okay.

[The Vent flag on Al's RCU shows a "P" when his suit is unpressurized and the "O" flag indicates that his PLSS oxygen supply is turned off. Having turned his RCU on, he checks to make sure that his oxygen quantity gauge is working and is indicating that his tank is at least 85% full.]

[They are using cue cards rather than the checklist; but both contain the same material.]

[Very Long Comm Break with numerous brief, unintelligible transmissions.]

[Pete is changing two switches on the audio panel on his side of the cabin and is then changing settings on his RCU. These steps are listed in the first paragraph at the top of the right-hand column on page Surface 29. It is during this period that they get into trouble with the comm check. During the long wait for the LM crew to come back on the air, Ed has a conversation with Dick Gordon who, for the second time since the landing, is flying over the landing site.]

114:22:28 Gordon: Houston, I have Snowman. And I believe I have the Surveyor (means the LM) on the northwest side of the Surveyor Crater. (Pause)

114:22:54 Gibson: Clipper, Houston. We copy that...

114:22:56 Gordon: And, Houston, it casts a shadow that looks like it's about, oh...It's hard to distinguish; it looks like about a third of a crater diameter just in front of it.

114:23:14 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. Copy you...

114:23:15 Gordon: (Garbled) west side. I have Intrepid. I have Intrepid.

[As he approached the landing site, Dick picked out Intrepid's long shadow and now has seen the spacecraft itself. At 112:07, Houston gave the crew an estimated shadow length of 230 feet. The solar elevation at that time was 6.0 degrees. Now, 2 hours 15 minutes later, the Sun is at an elevation is 7.1 degrees at an azimuth of 91.1 degree, and the shadow length is about 185 feet. Surveyor Crater has a diameter of about 650 feet so the shadow length is about 28 percent of the crater diameter, in reasonable agreement with Dick's estimate of one third.]

114:23:33 Gordon: Negative. He's on the Surveyor Crater; he's about a quarter of a Surveyor Crater diameter to the northwest.

114:23:44 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. Well done.

114:23:49 Gordon: I'll tell you, he's the only thing that casts a shadow down there.

114:23:55 Gibson: Roger.

[Ulli Lotzmann has provided a composite image (22k) from a short DAC film (at the end of Mag C) that Dick shot thru the sextant during the Rev 17 pass over the landing site, at about 116:24 or about 12:46 UTC on the 19 November 1969. At that time, the solar elevation was about 8.2 degrees and the LM shadow length was about 160 feet. See, also, a labeled version. Ulli created this composite by adding 5 frames together to reduce noise and improve resolution. Despite the 16-mm frame size, a bright dot with a dark area in contact to the left can be seen in the known LM location. Note that, in the mission report, Dick described the LM as having a "long, pencil-thin shadow", so we should not expect its full length to be discernable with at the modest resolution of the 16-mm image.]

114:24:14 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. (Long Pause)

[This could be any one of several small craters in the area.]

[Not surprisingly, Dick's description is consistent with the post-mission estimates of Intrepid's location.]

114:24:59 Gordon: The Intrepid is just on the left shoulder of Snowman - if he's looking at me.

[Here, Dick means that, if one imagines the Snowman lying face up on the lunar surface, with his legs extending east, Intrepid is on the Snowman's left (north) shoulder.]

114:25:15 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. Good eyeball. Well done.

[Comm Break. Although the ground around the Surveyor is still in shadow, the spacecraft is tall enough that the sun is shining on the top of it. In detail, the solar panels on the top of the spacecraft are about ten feet above the ground and the spacecraft is about 120 feet inside the eastern rim of the crater. With a solar elevation of 7.1 degrees and a crater slope of 10 degrees, from the crater rim the shaodwed part of the Surveyor subtends about 3 degrees. At a distance of 120 feet, the shadowed portion is about 6.3 feet and the portion in full sunlight - primarily the solar panels - is about 3.7 feet. See a sketch by Journal Contributor Thomas Schwagmeier.]

114:26:29 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. (Long Pause)

114:26:43 Gordon: Let me know when you have your data. (Long Pause) Houston; Clipper. Do you have your data?

[Apparently, Dick is giving them data on the sextant pointing which will help them further pinpoint the LM location or, at least, compare the sextant data with the known location.]

114:27:44 Gordon: And, Houston, I'd like to do that again on the next pass. You might think about putting the camera on the sextant.

MP3 Audio Clip (45 min 19 sec)

114:27:56 Gibson: Roger, Clipper. That sounds good. (Long Pause)

[Dick is suggesting that on the next pass he try to put the 16-mm DAC camera on the sextant and photograph Intrepid, which he did successfully. See the discussion above, immediately after 114:23:55. On the last three missions, the landed LMs were also photographed from orbit. On those missions - Apollo's 15, 16, and 17 - the CSMs carried a high-resolution panoramic camera which could easily capture the LM and its shadow.]

[Gordon, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "The P22 for the first REV after landing has some excellent maps for the landing site for use during orbit operations. I was completely familiar with Snowman, the four or five craters that formed an arc downrange right in front of Snowman (see the landing movie), so that when I came up for landmark tracking in P22, there were no problems in this regard at all. I had used the landmark 193 for the Rev before DOI and first Rev after landing. And that was just as easily done command-module-only as it was with the LM on. The landmarker was easily recognized. There was no problem in tracking the landmark at all. The difference between the weight input with the LM docked as opposed to the Orb Rate torquing with the LM undocked, caused no significant difference in technique."]

["The P22 on the next pass was to be at the landing site. Through most of the conversation, I wasn't really sure where it was. I had an update for the LM charts, giving the coordinates for what the ground at that time thought was the landing site of the LM, near Head Crater. The targeting was pretty close to the actual spot where the LM had landed, but on the second pass after landing, when P22 came up, I found Snowman and I was actually looking at the Surveyor Crater. Lo and behold, right there on the northwest edge of that thing was a bright shiny spot, a long shadow, and it was the only shadow in the area that I saw and as I got closer, it may be my imagination, but I thought I could see details of the descent stage and the landing gear extending from it. As I approached overhead where the Surveyor Crater was at the nadir, right in the center of that crater, and the dark shadow was one shiny bright spot that I knew had to be the Surveyor, this excited me quite a bit. I was pretty surprised that we were able to see that and I actually gave the coordinates on Surveyor back to the ground, which I thought was the LM landing site and it turned out to be exactly where they were."]

["So, once you know the general area, I should say pretty precisely the area in which they landed, anyone could find the LM itself in the sextant. Now, there is a technique involved here. That is, first of all, not to search for the LM in the sextant. This is something I don't think can be accurately done because of the rate at which you're traveling over the surface and the field-of-view of that sextant. I had a good idea from their landing where they were. So, my technique was to find the area in the telescope. And when I found the Snowman on the telescope, I concentrated on the Surveyor Crater itself, and positioned the telescope on the Surveyor Crater; then transferred to the sextant. At that time, the alignment between the telescope and the sextant was outstanding. When I did go to the sextant, it was already pointed at the LM. The next pass around, realizing there would be a certain amount of skeptics about the ability to see the LM on the surface, I drug out the sextant bracket, put the DAC on the sextant and on the third time overhead, I tracked the landing site with the telescope, hoping to capture the LM and Surveyor with a 16-millimeter DAC - which I hope turned out."]

[David Woods, Senior Editor of the Apollo Flight Journal, writes, " The Command Module sextant was a 28-power device with a pretty narrow angle of view. It had two lines-of-sight; fixed and moveable. The telescope was a 1-power device intended as a wide-angle finder for the sextant's moveable line-of-sight. A photo of Apollo 11 Command Module Columbia (taken by Woods at the US National Air and Space Museum) shows the external aperatures of the two instruments. The sextant is a slit and disc affair to accomodate the instrument's moveable line-of-sight (its trunnion angle) and the need for the whole instrument to turn (its shaft angle). An Apollo 17 training photo, KSC-72-PC-503BW, shows Ron Evans with his eye at the sextant eyepiece in a simulator. The telescope eyepiece is on his right."]

[The following is taken from Apollo 12 Mission Report Section 9.12.1, Lunar Module Location - "On the first revolution after lunar landing, simultaneous tracking from both spacecraft was conducted to enable the ground to determine the exact location of the landing site. Lunar landmark 193 was tracked from the Command Module, and the Lunar Module tracked the Command Module using the rendezvous radar (LM-9 photo by Randy Attwood). One the next pass, the Lunar Module was tracked from the Command Module using the latitude and longitude of the landing site as supplied by the ground. The technique involved finding the 'Snowman' in the telescope and locating the Lunar Module through knowledge that the vehicle had landed on the northwest side of the Surveyor Crater. The telescope was positioned as close as possible to the landing site, and the sextant was then used to find the Lunar Module, which appeared as a bright object with a long, pencil-thin shadow. Recollections after the flight included the fact that the entire descent stage was observed in the sextant. As the command module passed through the zenith, the Surveyor was observed as a bright spot in the shadow of the Surveyor crater. On the next pass, the 16-mm sequence camera was mounted on the sextant to obtain pictures of the landing site."]

["In the Command Module orbital revolution before lift-off (at about 140:05:50), the Lunar Module could not be acquired in the Command Module sextant either by using auto-optics, which did not point the sextant axis at the Lunar Module, or by manually positioning the sextant. The telescope should be used as the searching device, rather than the sextant, which has a much smaller field-of-view. Once the target area is found in the telescope, sighting can be transferred to the sextant. Just prior to lift-off, a second attempt was made (at about 142:01:59)to locate the Lunar Module, and this time the vehicle was observed in the sextant once the Surveyor Crater and associated 'Snowman' were found by means of the telescope."]

114:28:14 Conrad: (Garbled) Did you? Hey, all of a sudden I'm getting all kinds of comm. Do you hear me?

114:28:20 Bean: Yeah.

114:28:21 Gibson: Intrepid; we read you loud and clear.

114:28:28 Bean: (Faintly) You been reading us all along, Houston? (Pause)

114:28:37 Conrad: Hello, Houston; Intrepid. How do you read?

114:28:40 Gibson: Intrepid; Houston. We read you loud and clear.

114:28:46 Conrad: Okay; do you read Al?

114:28:50 Gibson: Negative.

114:28:56 Conrad (on-board): (To Al) Could be your radio.

114:28:57 Gibson: Al, we read you very weak in the background. (Pause)

114:28:59 Bean: (Faint) Houston, how do you read me now?

114:29:01 Gibson: Al, give us a short count. (Pause)

114:29:10 Bean: 1 (garbled but undoubtedly '2, 3, 4') 5. 5, 4, 3, 2, (garbled).

114:29:13 Gibson: Al, we read you partially on the last part of that count, with a loud hum in the background.

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "This is one place that we made a mistake. We were a little behind and we started to hustle a little bit faster than we should have - to get out. We made several mistakes because I allowed us to get off the checklist a little bit. That cost us another 10 or 15 minutes figuring out goofs that we made by simply not staying with the checklist. The checklist covered all items. My hat's off to Scott Millican and everybody else that had anything to do with any of our checklists. We didn't find any mistakes in the checklist. The checklists with respect to the Command Module and the LM were excellent."]

[More discussion of this incident follows 114:46:32. Interested readers should also note the discussion at 121:31:06 when, during the post-EVA debriefing, Al tells Houston that they didn't have a proper switch setting on Pete's RCU. They are still on the right-hand column of page Sur-29.]

114:29:24 Gibson: Loud and clear, Al.

114:29:34 Bean: (Garbled) (Pause) I accidentally hit your (garbled). (Pete laughs heartily) Let's go.

114:29:38 Conrad: You got to be kidding.

114:29:39 Bean: That's right.

[They were supposed to check the PTT setting one line up from the bottom of the lefthand column of Sur-28. Either Al didn't do so or, as he may have been saying at 114:29:34, he accidentally moved the switch when he was mounting the RCU on Pete's suit.]

114:29:42 Bean: Okay; we're going to complete this comm (check)...

114:29:45 Conrad: Go to A.

114:29:47 Bean: That's what it was, Pete.

114:29:48 Conrad: Yeah. Go to A.

114:29:49 Bean: Loud and clear, babe!

114:29:56 Conrad: Loud and clear. Go to B.

114:29:58 Bean: Loud and clear.

114:29:59 Conrad: Okay.

114:30:01 Bean: Okay; go AR.

114:30:04 Conrad: AR.

114:30:07 Bean: How do you hear me?

114:30:08 Conrad: Loud and clear. How do you hear, Houston?

114:30:10 Gibson: Intrepid, we read you loud and clear. And, for your info, Clipper got a visual on you. And he also picked up Surveyor.

114:30:22 Conrad: Hey, ask him: 'Where are we?' (Laughs)

114:30:30 Bean: Houston, my O2 quantity is...

114:30:34 Conrad: Mine's 90, Houston.

114:30:36 Bean: 90 percent.

114:30:38 Conrad: Okay, CB Comm: TV, open.

114:30:40 Gibson: Copy; 90 both.

[They have now completed the comm check and are about to start the Final Systems Prep on the top of page Surface 30. Now that they have recovered from the switch problem the comm is excellent. Indeed, compared with some of the other missions, Apollo 11 in particular, the comm while they are in the cabin on PLSS comm is excellent.]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "The lunar surface communications both inside and outside the LM on the PLSSs and on the LM (Comm system) itself were just like having Houston outside the door right next to us. They were really good."]

[Bean, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "I always thought that somebody was located in a building about 5 miles away and, if we would just look back over there behind the LM, we would see Jerry Carr and Ed Gibson standing there talking to us. It was beautiful."]

114:30:56 Bean: Go ahead and read it (the checklist) to me, Pete.

114:30:59 Conrad: ECS (Environmental Control System) Cabin Repress (circuit breaker), closed.

114:31:00 Bean: Okay; it is.

[They are verifying that the circuit breaker is in the closed position. Next, they will turn off a sensor which determines if there is a pressure difference across the fan which drives oxygen through the ECS.]

114:31:02 Bean: Open.

[Next, they will turn the ECS fan off.]

114:31:04 Bean: Open. Suit Fan 1 (breaker is) on your side (of the cabin). (Pause) Okay; read me (garbled)

[An overlapping engineering conversation between Ed and Dick is omitted.]

114:31:14 Bean: It's Pulled/Egress.

[They are closing a push/pull valve which, when open, lets oxygen flow out of the ECS suit circuit into the cabin. Next, they will close a valve which, when open, lets oxygen return from the cabin into the suit circuit.]

114:31:17 Bean: Cabin Gas Return, Egress.

[Next, they will position a relief valve which will prevent overpressurization of the suit circuit.]

114:31:22 Bean: Circuit Relief, Auto.

114:31:25 Conrad: Verify ECS Caution (and) H2O SEP(arator) component lights come on. Okay? (Pause) Don't have anything, yet. (Pause)

[With the fan off, the ECS Caution light and the H2O separator lights should come on. It takes about a minute for the fans and the centrifugal water separators to spin down enough for the lights to come on.]

114:31:55 Bean: Well, the Sep won't be...You know it runs down. It takes a little while.

114:31:58 Conrad: Oh; okay. Very good. OPS connect. LMP first.

[Pete will now hook up Al's Oxygen Purge System hose. The OPS sits on top of the backpack and contains an emergency oxygen supply. This can be activated by moving a lever mounted on the side of the chest-mounted Remote Control Unit (RCU).]

114:32:04 Bean: Okay.

114:32:05 Conrad: Slowly.

114:32:08 Bean: How do you want it? I thought you were going to undo it.

114:32:10 Conrad: Oh, well. I can't do it from this side.

[Conrad - "We were facing each other but I needed Al to turn. We're free in there; but, don't forget, we've got the PLSSs on now. So we had to be careful of moving around."]

114:32:14 Conrad: Stay still. Right there.

114:32:15 Bean: Boy, these PLSSs are nice in one-sixth g. (Pause)

[Each PLSS weighs 84 pounds on Earth, but only about 14 pounds on the Moon.]

114:32:35 Gibson: Intrepid; Houston. Go ahead.

114:32:41 Conrad: Roger. Did Yankee Clipper have us both (that is, the LM and the Surveyor) in the sextant at the same time? Over.

[From an altitude of 60 miles, the sextant shows a patch of ground about 1.5 kilometers across. They are about 200 meters from Surveyor III.]

114:33:05 Conrad: That's where I figured we landed. Okay. (To Al) Turn around slow.

114:33:11 Bean: That's all I can do, Pete, with these hoses on.

[Because of the ECS oxygen and water hoses he is still wearing, Al can't turn very far.]

114:33:23 Bean: Okay.

114:33:25 Conrad: Easy does it, babe.

114:33:26 Bean: Ohh. (Pause)

114:33:29 Conrad: Good shape. I've got to be careful or I'm going to jump right through the cabin overhead every time I want to do something (because of the low gravity). Wait a minute.

114:33:39 Bean: Okay.

114:33:41 Conrad: Got it. Just a second; I'll be right with you. (Pause) Think you could carry this PLSS around for 29 hours. (Pause) Almost feels good. (Hearty Laughter)

114:33:55 Bean: Relatively speaking, it feels great. (Pete laughs)

114:33:59 Conrad: Okay; I got one more snap (to close). Can you bend over? That's it. Easy. Okay. I got you. Oop! (Laughing) An O2 hose and a(n activator) cable.

[In an emergency, the OPS is activated by moving a lever which they are now mounting on the side of Al's chest-mounted Remote Control Unit (RCU). After moving the lever from its OFF position to ON and locking it in place, Al would open a purge valve which they will shortly mount on the right side of his chest. The OPS provides regulated flow of oxygen into the suit, but at a rate determined by the outflow through the purge valve. An illustration made by Thomas Schwagmeier from AS11-40-5903 shows the purge valve ane OPS actuator.]

114:34:20 Conrad: Yes. I ... You got it?

114:34:22 Bean: Got that one.

114:34:23 Conrad: Okay. Now...Turn...turn...Can you stand up straight?

114:34:27 Bean: Yeah; but I can't turn any further, see those...

114:34:29 Conrad: Now, wait a minute. Yeah. (Pause) Okay. Now you want this (hose) under this one flap, don't you?

114:34:43 Bean: Yup.

114:34:44 Conrad: Okay. Under the flap. Snap; crackle.

114:34:52 Bean: It's on.

114:34:54 Conrad: There you go. Now, where are we? Back to the checklist.

114:34:58 Bean: Okay; let me get yours now.

114:35:00 Conrad: Wait a minute. (Pause) No; let's get you off...

114:35:09 Bean: Okay.

[Pete needs to connect Al's OPS hose to his suit and then install the purge valve. On page Surface 30, they are still in the first paragraph of 'OPS Connect'.]

[Pete has now isolated Al's suit from the ECS suit circuit, closing a valve to shut off the flow of oxygen.]

114:35:31 Conrad: I'll get them. Let me get them; they're easier (for me to get).

114:35:33 Bean: Okay.

114:35:35 Conrad: Oh, boy; look at the water...

114:35:36 Bean: (Finishing the thought) ... in the suit loop.

114:35:38 Conrad: Where's all the water coming from?

114:35:40 Bean: It's coming right out of the inlet hose.

114:35:42 Conrad: It sure is. (Pause)

[According to the Apollo 12 Mission Report, "During post-flight tests, condensate was observed to bypass the water separators because the separator rotational velocity was excessive as a result of the suit-circuit flow being higher than the specification value. For Apollo 13 and thereafter, a (flow limiting) orifice will be placed in the suit circuit to reduce the flow and (that design change) should decrease the separator velocity to within expected ranges." A more complete discussion can be found at 121:25:00. The problem did not arise on later flights, an indication that this fix was adequate.]

114:35:47 Conrad: Okay. (Pause) Now you want to connect the oxygen.

114:35:50 Bean: Okay; just a second. I want to ... (Pause)

114:35:54 Conrad: I kind of thought I was getting some water in my suit. It's just cold air.

114:35:57 Bean: Okay; it's connected and locked.

114:36:01 Conrad: Okay. What else we got?

114:36:02 Bean: Purge valve.

114:36:04 Conrad: Okay; one purge valve coming up. (Pause) Wait a minute. Get the safety (on the purge valve) locked.

114:36:17 Bean: Is it locked?

114:36:18 Conrad: Yes, sir. That's locked. (Pause) "PLSS centered at the proper height." Okay.

114:36:27 Bean: Okay; same thing. Lean over and let me get your gear.

114:36:28 Conrad: Hang on. I'm going to squat down like this and you can get all of it.

114:36:37 Bean: Okay. That's a good way to do it.

[Evidently, the OPS hose and actuator are Velcroed to the OPS. Al is getting those off Pete's OPS as per the first item under OPS Connect on Surface 30.]

114:36:43 Bean: Great. (Pause)

[Starting on Apollo 13, the crews will have drink bags mounted on the inside of the suit neck ring. A short straw will give them a chance to get an occasional drink during an EVA. On this mission, as on Apollo 11, Pete and Al don't have drink bags and must, like camels, load up on water before getting their helmets on. Neither of them remembered feeling thirsty or having any problems with dehydration. They weren't out long enough. On Apollo 15, Jim Irwin's drink bag malfunctioned and he never did get a drink while he was out on the surface. The lack of water during each of the 6-plus hour EVAs caused him some serious dehydration problems.]

[The drink bags planned for Apollo 13 are described on pages 92 and 94 in the Apollo 13 Press Kit (6Mb PDF).]

[Pete may have given Al a drink.]

114:37:17 Bean: Okay; stand up.

114:37:19 Conrad: (Garbled)

114:37:20 Bean: Not a lot of room.

114:37:22 Conrad: Yeah.

[Bean - "There was plenty of room to do the job."]

[Al has just connected the OPS actuator to Pete's RCU and has attached the OPS hose to the side of Pete's PLSS. ]

114:37:37 Bean: Just a second. Okay; let me disconnect your (LM O2) hose. That's done.

114:37:42 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

[Evidently, Al has set Pete's Suit Isolation Valve to Disconnect, thereby isolating Pete's suit from the ECS Suit Loop. He doesn't mention that step, which is the forth under OPS Connect on Sur- 30.]

[If, by the word "exhaust", Al means the purge valve, then he has also done the step "Connect OPS O2 Hose to PGA (Pressure Garment Assembly, NASA-ese for the suit)" without comment.]

114:38:08 Gibson: Intrepid; Roger. We copy your comment on water in the hoses.

114:38:15 Conrad: Yeah; it's just that the (ECS) air seems to be extremely cold coming in. At least, the inlet hose is quite cold and some moisture's condensed out in it. Everything else seems okay.

114:38:31 Gibson: Roger.

114:38:36 Bean: Okay, that's tricky. That looks... It's locked.

114:38:40 Conrad: (Responding to Bean's remark) What's that?

114:38:41 Bean: That OPS position right there. (Pause) Okay; that's good.

114:38:47 Conrad: Want me to check that (possibly Al's purge valve) again?

114:38:49 Bean: Yeah; check mine to make sure it's locked.

114:38:50 Conrad: Yeah; it's locked.

114:38:51 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

114:38:55 Conrad: (On Sur-30) "Drink."

114:38:56 Bean: Okay; let's do that.

114:38:58 Conrad: Pass the (water drink) gun around; and we'll shut off the descent H2O. (Pause; hearty, sustained "Pete Conrad" laugh)

114:39:07 Bean: Uh-huh. (Long Pause)

[They are just above 'Helmet/Glove Donning near the top of the righthand column on Sur-30. After drinking their fill, they will stow the water gun (photo by Mick Hyde) and close the valve on the line from the water tank in the descent stage. One of them may have had his face sprayed accidentally with the water gun.]

114:39:37 Conrad: Okay. Position mikes.

114:39:39 Bean: I did. (Pause)

114:39:40 Conrad: (Having checked his own) Yup.

114:39:41 Bean: PLSS fan on.

114:39:42 Conrad: Yup.

114:39:44 Bean: Okay; mine's on. (As per the sixth line on the righhand side of Sur-30) Vent flag (P) oughta clear. (Reading) "Don helmets and visors." Okay; let me get your helmet for you. Stay right where you are. (Pause) Okay. Watch your head. (Sound of Pete's helmet clacking) (I'll make sure to) watch the snaps. That sounds pretty good. (Pause) It's locked.

114:40:07 Conrad: Get your... (Pause)

114:40:13 Bean: Everything is so light up here. (Garbled) helmet.

[Because of the upcoming problem caused by the fact that Pete's PLSS O2 hoses aren't connected, they won't get Al into his helmet until 114:49:03.]

114:40:28 Conrad: But my fan is running.

[This is the point at which they discover that something is wrong with Pete's oxygen flow. It will take them about six minutes to figure out that they hadn't connected his oxygen hoses at the time they were getting him into his PLSS at about 114:02:06. Here, Pete is noticing that his helmet is fogging up, despite the fact that his PLSS fan is on and, therefore, that the oxygen stream should be passing over a wick in the PLSS which would remove the excess water and prevent fogging.]

114:40:32 Bean: My vent (flag)'s off.

114:40:33 Conrad: Mine's not. (Long Pause)

[Pete's Vent window is still showing a 'P'.]

[We have not been able to figure out what "that thing" is.]

114:41:34 Conrad: (Garbled) I can hear it (the fan).

114:41:34 Bean: You hear it spin up? (Pause) Yeah. Remember when we talked about that one?

114:41:39 Conrad: Yeah. (Pause)

114:41:48 Bean: Maybe when I put my helmet on it won't... That water in your suit's making your helmet fog a bit.

RealAudio Clip (7 min 30 sec)

114:41:56 Conrad: (Let's) take my helmet off a minute.

114:41:57 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

[The clacking sound of Pete's helmet being removed can be heard.]

114:42:12 Conrad: No, no; right over the back of the neck ring. (Long Pause)

114:42:37 Bean: Can't feel my own either, though.

114:42:41 Conrad: I can feel air blowing out of yours. Can't you feel air blowing out of that?

114:42:47 Bean: No. Is there any of it (the air flow) hitting your neck?

114:42:50 Conrad: Huh?

114:42:51 Bean: Is it hitting your neck at all?

114:42:53 Conrad: No. (Pause) That P-flag (in the Vent window) goes out, huh?

114:43:00 Bean: Yeah; mine's out.

[At 114:46:38 once they get Pete's hoses properly connected, the "P" in his Vent flag window will disappear or clear.]

114:43:08 Gibson: Intrepid, that's affirmative. Go ahead and button up. Put the helmet and gloves on; and turn the fan on and the Vent flag should go out.

114:43:19 Conrad: (To Al) That helmet's blurry.

114:43:21 Bean: It's never... It's not wiped enough. (Garbled) It's just got that on... Probably (from) blowing all this moisture out of your suit.

114:43:29 Conrad: Yeah.

114:43:30 Bean: Want to wipe it again (with anti-fog agent)?

114:43:31 Conrad: Yeah; (we'd) better. Hold that. (Pause) I'll tell you one thing, let's turn this valve right here up a little bit. (Pause) Where's the helmet bags (spelling is correct)?

[They are at the end of the first paragraph of Helmet/Glove donning on Sur-30. The helmet bags are made of loosely webbed beta-cloth and were used to hold the helmets between the EVAs. At this point, the bags are back behind the engine cover.]

[Conrad - "Right. But I think they also had the anti-fog stuff in them and all that stuff."]

114:44:05 Conrad: I got this sneaking suspicion that that fan is not running like it should.

114:44:13 Bean: You'll have to wait until you get your gear on (the helmet and gloves) and see.

114:44:16 Conrad: Yeah; I know. It happened to me once before. Somebody left a piece of paper in the PLSS LiOH canister.

114:44:26 Bean: It'd shut down if it did.

[The PLSS contains a canister of Lithium hydroxide to remove excess carbon dioxide.]

[Bean - "The paper was in there to keep the lithium hydroxide from floating out, and one time (in training) you stuck the canister in (the PLSS) and the paper was still on..."]

[Conrad - "So nothing would flow through it. It had the paper on there because you didn't want to have it working until you wanted it to work. It was sealed."]

[Bean - "Yeah, but I thought that was only in storage (prior to use)."]

[Conrad - "That's what I mean. So, what happened is that somebody put one in (Pete's PLSS) and left one of the pieces of paper in it, and so nothing would flow through it."]

[Jones - "Did you do any training for one-man EVAs?"]

[Conrad - "I don't remember that we specifically did individual training."]

[Bean - "What we probably did was practice getting ready and going through the procedures to make sure that it was safe. But we probably never really did it. And I'm not sure we didn't do one in the altitude chamber, just to make sure that it worked, with one guy on a PLSS (and the other one hooked up to the LM system)."]

[Conrad - "We usually went through everything, that's true."]

[Bean - "But we probably didn't practice going out and doing anything."]

[Jones - "Were the PLSSs interchangeable?"]

[Bean - "Yeah. Everything was the same."]

[Jones - "Who was going out if one of the PLSSs didn't work?"]

[Conrad - "If mine crapped out, he'd go out; if his crapped out, I'd go out."]

[Bean - "And then the next time out, the other guy'd go out."]

[Jones - "You'd each do one EVA with the other guy watching from the window?"]

[Bean - "That's right. But we had a lot of options before that. But I can remember being worried."]

[Conrad - "I don't remember this (incident) at all."]

[The PLSSs were identical. The OPSs were not. There was a difference in the communications circuitry in that the LMP's OPS could talk only to the CDR's OPS whereas the CDR's OPS could also talk to the LM and, therefore, served as a relay station for the LMP's comm with Earth. In the event of one-man EVAs, whoever went out would wear the CDR OPS.]

[Bean - "And I can remember that, in Skylab, I got (suited up) with Owen Garriott and his suit didn't check out. And I remembered back to this (Apollo 12 incident). And I said 'let me check all your connectors'. And, sure enough, one of his connectors wasn't in. And I pushed it in and it locked, you know. And that solved it and then it all checked out. It's good they got all these checks, because you can very easily do (something like) this. You're in the suit and you're in a hurry, especially if you're already behind a little (the planned timeline). But we had a lot of ways to look (to figure out what was wrong), so we weren't thinking about that (one-man EVA) yet - other than just a comment like Pete's ('I'm going to be mighty unhappy.')"]

[Pete is applying more anti-fog to the inside of his bubble helmet.]

114:44:47 Bean: Put another one of those on?

114:44:54 Conrad: Yep.

114:44:55 Bean: Okay. Turn this way and let me check that LiOH canister.

[Al is unbuttoning a flap so that he can remove Pete's canister from the side of his PLSS.]

114:45:14 Bean: Okay.

114:45:15 Conrad: That's exactly what happened the last time.

114:45:18 Bean: Not a thing. Clean and neat.

114:45:20 Conrad: Put the canister back in; lock the door. (Pause)

114:45:26 Bean: Locked.

114:45:27 Conrad: That a boy. (Pause)

114:45:30 Bean: Just a second. (Pause) Locked good and tight now.

114:45:44 Conrad: Okay. (Pause) Okey-doke. Okay; I'm going to do this the other way around, Al. I'm going to get my gloves on first; helmet last (so that it won't fog up). (Pause)

114:46:10 Bean: See how it runs this trip. Try it this way this time. (Pause) Pretty good. Look pretty good. (Pause)

114:46:31 Conrad: Okay.

114:46:32 Bean: See how it works this trip. (Pause)

[They have found the problem and, without telling Houston, have gotten Pete's hoses properly connected.]

[Bean - (Laughing) "There's no point in worrying those people on Earth. They're liable to decide something else is screwed up. Don't tell anybody things they don't need to know."]

[Conrad - "Al probably noticed the hoses when he was screwing around with the canister. (Laughing) Found those hoses just hanging off the back, somewhere."]

[Bean - "Were they? Is that what we said (in the tech debrief)?"]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "The work and thermal load in preparation for egress were very low and they were not fatiguing. We got off the checklist in two places. One place it goes through a very detailed explanation of how to hook up the PLSS for the LMP (checklist page Surface 27). It has a statement to do the same thing for the CDR. We forgot to hook up my hoses and, when it came time to turn on my PLSS fan, we got into trouble thinking my fan was either clobbered (broken) or out. It turned out my hoses weren't hooked up. The next goof on our part (but the first they realized they'd made) was when we hooked up our RCUs. There was one switch check that we didn't make. The main switch was in the Off position and not in the Main position. We thought something was wrong with our Comm."]

[See, also, the discussion at 121:31:06 where Al tells Houston about the switch error.]

[Bean, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "Another thing that brought this about is that the gear used down at the Cape (for training) have the Comm switches on them but you don't have to use them at all for Comm. The Comm is controlled by the simplex on the back of the OPS (which is) on top of those practice PLSSs."]

[Conrad - (1991 comment) "In training, we always just read it in the checklist and kept on going (without having to reconfigure the RCU switches)."]

[Bean, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "Here's an example of the gear we're using (on the Moon) not being configured precisely like the gear we use in practice; and that cost us five to ten minutes. That's going to come up again when we start playing with the TV camera."]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "That's right. There are only two places (where) we got into any trouble, and one was getting off the checklist. The couple of occasions that we got off it, we ran into trouble. The other place we ran into trouble was when we didn't have the gear available. We either didn't have the gear available in the proper configuration or the gear wasn't available (at all). The TV camera was not made available to us, and I'm afraid (that) that's what cost us the TV camera. We were not familiar with it and we'll point out what happened later. Those are the two places we got into trouble. They are places I knew we'd get into trouble, and I'll bite the bullet (that is, take the blame) on the first one. It was my fault for getting off the checklist and hustling, although all it did was cost us time (about 7 minutes for the hose error). We'll both bite the other one (that is, the other bullet) on the TV camera."]

[Bean - (1991 comment) "They realized people would make accidental mistakes and developed procedures and techniques to overcome it, so you didn't step outside and have one of these problems. The checks and double checks overcame the fact that human beings do make mistakes. And you'll never change that. You have to design things to accept that and still be successful. And that's what all this is doing. So it shows how really well thought out these things were when they designed them. Saying 'what'll happen if these guys leave out their hose.' I'm sure they took into consideration every possible thing like that. 'Will they find it in time?' "]

114:46:38 Bean: Hey; your Vent flag went out. Look at your (RCU).

114:46:40 Conrad: Oh, yeah. Okay.

114:46:41 Bean: Everything's working.

114:46:42 Conrad: Crazy. (Pause)

114:46:46 Bean: Everything looks good, Houston.

114:46:48 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid.

[Clacking sounds can be heard as they get Pete back into his helmet.]

114:46:55 Bean: You bet. It's not locked. (Now it's) locked.

114:47:01 Conrad: Okay.

114:47:02 Bean: Get your gloves out.

114:47:04 Conrad: Okay. Wait a minute. (Pause) Okay.

114:47:08 Bean: Here's yours. Get this out for you. (Pause) It's right over here. Must be yours. Yours's right there.

[Simultaneous conversations between Yankee Clipper and Houston are omitted.]

114:47:26 Conrad: You want to get your EV gloves out of the way, or do you want to leave them right where they are?

114:47:29 Bean: Oh, might just as well leave them right where they are. (Garbled), Pete, the (LM) windows are beginning to fog up.

[With the ECS shut down, the water separator is no longer removing exhaled water vapor from the cabin.]

[Jones - "Were these heaters added after 11 because of the cold cabin contributing to Neil and Buzz's lack of sleep?"]

[Bean - (Answering my question) "No. They were added to keep frost off of the windows. And, also, it seems to me the windows were stronger with the heaters on. And you had to keep the heaters on for landing and other times critical. And then, like now, you could turn them off."]

114:47:39 Conrad: We'd better put them on for a while; (and) pull them (the heater circuit breaker) before I can get out.

114:47:42 Bean: Okay; that's what I'll do.

114:47:44 Conrad: Never get any pictures that way. Hey, Houston? (No answer)

[Pete is noting that fog on the windows would interfere with the 16 mm movie camera which will record the early stages of the EVA at one frame per second.]

114:47:48 Bean: That's yours.

114:47:50 Conrad: (Garbled) on your head. (Garbled)

114:47:54 Bean: Okay.

[They are now going to put on Pete's LEVA (Lunar Extravehicular Visor Assembly) which contains thermal covers, visors, and sunshades which slip over the bubble helmet.]

114:47:58 LM Crew: (Unintelligible under the Yankee Clipper/Houston conversation)

114:48:48 Conrad: Okay; now let me put my PLSS up... (Garbled)

RealAudio Clip (8 min 23 sec)

114:48:54 Bean: Will do, Pete. Will do.

114:48:55 Conrad: I'll get you all buttoned up. (Pause)

114:48:58 Bean: Looks fine. Let me pull your visors down a little bit.

114:49:00 Conrad: Yeah; that a boy.

[Jones - "If you put the (gold-coated) visor in some position between all the way up and all the way down, it would stay there?"]

[Training photo 69-HC-1037 shows Pete with his inner, protective visor about 1/3rd down and the gold-coated sun visor not quite so far.]

[Conrad - "Yeah. I think the only reason we pulled it partly down was to have it ready whenever you wanted to pull it the rest of the way down. And they came up with some kind of fancy side shields later."]

[Bean - "A lot of it was because we talked about the problems we had running up-Sun. You couldn't see very well and it was just a big pain. The Sun was so intense. They needed something better than what we had. We had little side visors, because several pictures show us with them partway down, just down (enough) to cut out down to the horizon. (See AS12-47-6914 showing Pete.) It (meaning the intense sunlight) didn't hurt your eyes, but it wasn't pleasant. And you notice they did use their other visors - a lot - on 15, 16, 17. 14 had 'em too. 13 had 'em too but they didn't land. So it was the very next flight."]

114:49:03 Conrad: Okay; let's leave my gloves off while I get your helmet and visor on.

114:49:06 Bean: All right.

114:49:08 Conrad: Your helmet. Hand me that (LEVA) and I'll hold it for you. (Pause)

114:49:13 Bean: There you go. Let me slide that on my head. (Pause; helmet clacking noises) I'll hold it up if you'll...

114:49:32 Conrad: Locked.

114:49:33 Bean: No, no.

114:49:35 Conrad: Oh, wait a minute.

114:49:38 Bean: Okay?

114:49:39 Conrad: Locked.

114:49:40 Bean: Looks good. Everything looks...

114:49:44 Conrad: Hold everything just a second. (Pause) Okay. (Pause) Wait a minute. Yeah; I checked that for you.

114:49:59 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

114:50:06 Conrad: Okay.

114:50:07 Bean: Super. (Pause)

114:50:12 Conrad: There you go.

114:50:13 Bean: Okay. Oh, look; (garbled).

114:50:17 Conrad: Hold up your PLSS and...Wait a minute; let me get all of this out first. (Pause) Out and about. (Pause) There you go.

[They are probably putting on Al's LEVA.]

114:50:38 Conrad: Now we need a set of gloves.

114:50:39 Bean: Okay.

114:50:40 Conrad: Now, let me just turn real slow. (Pause)

114:50:48 Gibson: Yankee Clipper, Houston. One minute to LOS. And we'll be giving you a P22 Pad at AOS. (Long Pause) Yankee Clipper; Houston. 30 seconds to LOS.

114:51:25 Gordon: Roger. See you next pass.

[Comm Break. Dick Gordon is just about to go behind the Moon. Pete and Al are about to put on their gloves and, once again, they are ad-libbing. They had not planned to don the gloves until after they had finished disconnecting the LM water hoses and connecting the PLSS water hoses. The steps related to the water hoses are at the bottom of Sur-30, while the glove steps are at the top of Sur-31.]

[Conrad - "We had two sets of gloves. We had our rubber gloves with us, our regular Command Module rubber gloves that we used when we went down (for the landing) and when we went back up (to lunar orbit). The EV (Extravehicular) glove was a whole separate glove from the Command Module glove."]

[Jones - "The EV glove had, as an integral part of it, an internal pressure bladder and the external gauntlet?"]

[Conrad - "Yeah, but it also had all this stainless steel (reinforcing) mesh and big rubber finger tips. So the EV glove's an entirely different glove (from the IV - Intravehicular - Command Module glove). It had a covering that went from the fingers all the way back (over the wrist). And you could open that covering up. There was a strap that you could tighten the palm fit."]

[Jones - "And it was an integral assembly, rather than a gauntlet that went over the IV glove?"]

[Conrad - "The Command Module glove became the basis of the EVA glove. The inner thing was the same glove that we had molded for our hands."]

[Bean - "When you looked inside, it looked the same. But if you looked outside, it looked different. I'd bring those EV gloves back if we had another shot at it."]

[Conrad - "Yeah, I think we left them on the lunar surface."]

[Bean - "I'm sure we did, because we didn't need them (after the second EVA). And we left our boots. I'd bring those back, too."]

[Conrad - "We threw the boots, the PLSS(s), and the OPS(s)."]

[Bean - "No, the OPSs we kept for transfer (from the LM to the Command Module) in case we couldn't dock."]

[Conrad - "We left the PLSSs (on the Moon)."]

[Bean - "But we had to do (the jettison) with the IV gloves."]

[Jones - "Do you remember any wear and tear on the EV gloves?"]

[Conrad - "We didn't work very much with the kind of stuff that would have worn them. I don't think ours were worn at all. But if you had the guys messing with big tools and drills and all that stuff (on the later flights), and they were screwing around with the Lunar Rover, I can see where they would have used their hands a lot more than we did."]

[Bean - "You remember how hard they had to work to get those drill stems out, on 15. Well, they had cover gloves, from 16 on, over the EV glove. Remember that? Like little golf gloves that the fingers stuck out. But some of them would wear 'em and some of 'em wouldn't. They take 'em out (onto the surface), wear them a while, and then they'd toss them. So you see photos of the guys both ways. We didn't have that. I always thought that was for thermal, though, not for wear."]

[Jones - "It was for wear. Gene and Jack both said that they were primarily for wear, particularly for the drilling."]

[Bean - "I'll be darned."]

[Conrad - "The stainless steel thread had to be pretty thin stuff to be as flexible as it was. So that doesn't surprise me."]

[Bean - "Beta cloth never did wear good. That would fray in a minute. I don't think we had a problem. Our fingers hurt. I remember my fingers hurting and being tired. That was the most tired thing about me."]

[Conrad - "That's because I made you work harder. I don't remember being tired. (Laughs)"]

114:52:28 Bean: Okay; just a second. (Pause)

114:52:35 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

114:52:42 Bean: Okay, how's that look to you, Pete. These are locked?

114:52:47 Conrad: Just a minute. (Pause)

114:52:56 Bean: Let me see it. (Pause) That looks good.

114:53:00 Conrad: Let me look at you. (Pause) Okay.

114:53:09 Bean: Good enough. Okay. You're okay, Pete. Okay; let me see that. Okay; it's on there. (Long Pause)

114:53:32 Conrad: Okay; now, hold the phone. (Probably scanning the checklist to see where they are) Let's see.

114:53:35 Bean: Give you a shot of cold water, here.

114:53:38 Conrad: Yeah. (Pause)

[They are ad-libbing here - adding a step that isn't in the checklist - and are circulating LM water through their Liquid Cooled Garments (LCGs) to get themselves as cool as possible before disconnecting the LM water hoses as per Sur-30. Once they connect the PLSS water hoses they will be able to circulate water through the LCGs again, but won't get any significant cooling until they turn on the PLSS sublimators. Because the sublimators won't work with any significant external pressure, they won't be turned on until the hatch is open. Later crews will have this cool-down step in their checklists, "LCG - Cold, as required".]

114:53:45 Bean: Okay.

[Jones - "SRC is the Sample Return Container, the rock box."]

[Conrad - "That must be the area in which we were going to stow them when we got them. The boxes were outside on the MESA."]

114:53:49 Bean: Okay. (Pause) Here it comes.

114:53:59 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

114:54:06 Bean: A little chill down.

114:54:08 Conrad: Yeah, leave it on for a second. (Long Pause)

114:54:21 Bean: That it?

114:54:22 Conrad: That's it.

114:54:23 Bean: Okay.

114:54:24 Conrad: (Reading) "CB(16), ECS LCG pump (breaker), open"

114:54:29 Bean: Open.

[CB(16) (Circuit Breaker panel 16) is on Al's side of the cabin, at his right shoulder. Panel 11 is in the corresponding position on Pete's side of the cabin.]

114:54:35 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

114:54:40 Conrad: Now, you'll have to turn this way. (Pause) There it is.

114:54:46 Bean: Okay. Just a second; let me get yours. (Pause) Okay; just hold that a second.

114:55:00 Conrad: Yeah; now, I got to hook up yours. (Pause).

114:55:04 Bean: (Positioning the PLSS water hose fitting to mate with the connector on Pete's suit) Fit it right over the top. (Pause) It's in.

[Examination of a diagram of the A7-L umbilical connectors provided by Karl Dodenhoff with a detail from Pete's Halo Crater portrait of Al (AS12-49-7281) suggests that Al's use of the word 'top' refers to lining up the fittings, perhaps because this connection may have been a bit more awkward than the others.]

114:55:17 Bean: It's in, babe.

114:55:19 Conrad: Okay; thank you. Hang on to your (LM) water hose, here. (Pause) No; your right hand. That a boy.

114:55:24 Bean: Okay. (Pause) Now, rotate...

114:55:34 Conrad: Huh? (Pause) It's in.

114:55:38 Bean: (Did the) locks go in?

114:55:42 Conrad: Yes, sir.

114:55:43 Bean: Okay.

114:55:44 Conrad: Both locks are in.

114:55:46 Bean: Okay, let's stow these (LM) hoses. Just a second. (Pause) You've got to route yours up there on the wall.

114:55:58 Conrad: Yeah.

[The LM oxygen and water hoses come to them from the ECS cabinet behind Al's station and they are stowing the hoses out of the way on the forward face of the cabinet.]

114:56:01 Conrad: I'm afraid I can't do it with you standing there. I'm going to have to wait until you turn around.

114:56:06 Bean: Okay.

114:56:07 Conrad: Get yours in there.

114:56:12 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

[A portion of the dialog is lost under a Public Affairs statement about Dick Gordon's sighting of the LM on the northwest rim of Surveyor Crater.]

114:56:37 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

114:56:48 Conrad: Can I get up on the step a little bit?

114:56:50 Bean: Yep. (Long Pause)

[Pete is probably referring to the decking that surrounds the ascent engine cover. This midsection deck is eighteen inches above the cabin floor where the astronauts stand and the front part of the midesection deck - and the transition between the two areas - is called the midstep. The front part of the decking on Pete's side of the cabin is clear and, with the suits still unpressurized, he may be talking about partly sitting or kneeling on the midstep so he can reach across to the ECS cabinet. In stowing the hoses on the front of the ECS cabinet, Pete is going to try to reach across and save Al the trouble of facing the rear of the spacecraft and leaning back to get room to use his hands.]

114:57:13 Conrad: Can you hold these (LM water) hoses?

114:57:15 Bean: Sure. (Long Pause)

114:57:33 Conrad: Turn around.

114:57:34 Bean: Okay. (Long Pause)

114:58:03 Conrad: I wonder if I need to get the water (hoses?) in there? Maybe you could do that.

114:58:08 Bean: Okay.

114:58:09 Conrad: Everything else is in.

114:58:11 Bean: Will do it.

114:58:12 Conrad: Wait a second. Got it.

114:58:15 Bean: Okay. (Long Pause) You got the window heater on over there? Pete?

114:58:50 Conrad: No. I'll have to wait until you turn around. (Pause) How you doing over there?

114:59:04 Bean: Good. Just about got it done.

114:59:08 Conrad: Okay. I'll turn on your window heater in just a second.

114:59:10 Bean: All right; that's it.

114:59:12 Conrad: Get in your corner again. (Pause)

114:59:17 Bean: Okay.

114:59:19 Conrad: I don't know about you, but my suit is collapsing around me. How about you?

114:59:23 Bean: That's right.

114:59:24 Conrad: Huh?

114:59:25 Bean: Yeah; so's mine. Cabin pressure must have pumped (up) a little.

[They have their helmets on but haven't turned on the PLSS O2. Later crews ascribed the collapse of the suits during this phase of the EVA preparations to breathe-down. That is, they are using up the oxygen in the suits and, as they exhale carbon dioxide, it is being removed by the lithium hydroxide canisters. The net result is a pressure drop in the suits which, consequently, are being squeezed around them by the cabin pressure. In 1991, Al speculated that the suit collapse might, instead, have been due to any increase in cabin pressure due to PLSS exhaust. During the 1969 Technical Debrief, Pete ascribed it to breathe-down. See his comment after 115:01:08.]

114:59:35 LM Crew: Okay.

114:59:36 Conrad: Now,...

114:59:37 Bean: (Reading) "Verify..."

114:59:38 Conrad: (Reading) "Don EV gloves"...Wait a minute.

[They already have their gloves on. Al is at the right place in the checklist, at the beginning of the last paragraph on Sur-30. Pete is on the top of the next page. Readers should note that, as per Sur-21, Pete and Al are using a cue-card version of the checklist which they have mounted on the panel in front of them. It has a different layout from the book form reproduced here.]

114:59:42 Conrad: (Reading at the right place) "Torso tie down"

[They are verifying the results of the previous steps, making sure that the helmets, visors, and hoses are properly connected and locked. The torso tiedown is a strap that lets them adjust the length of the torso and get proper neckring position.]

114:59:45 Conrad: All O2 connectors locked.

114:59:47 Bean: Check mine; I'll check yours. (Pause) I'll look at yours again. (Pause) It's locked; that one's locked. It's locked. They're vertical. And that diverter valve's vertical.

114:59:59 Conrad: Yes, sir; your diverter valve's vertical. Everything looks locked here. (Pause)

[As shown in Figure I-23 in the EMU Handbook, the diverter valve is part of the oxygen inflow connector. The valve has two positions. In the Open (horizontal) position, used in the cabin, all the incoming oxygen stream is divided between a duct leading to the helmet vent and a duct leading the vents in the torso. In the Closed (vertical) position, used outside, all the oxygen goes to the helmet vent. Figure I-10 from the EMU Handbook shows the layout of the ducts.]

115:00:11 Conrad: You don't have a lock on your water...(garbled)

115:00:13 Bean: (Garbled) gold pins go in.

115:00:14 Conrad: No; it's locked.

115:00:16 Bean: (Garbled) have a lock-lock. (Garbled)

[Each of the connectors is fitted with a ring lock which, in turn, is fitted with a small slide lock that keeps it in place. Hence the name, "lock-lock".]

115:00:20 Bean: And, let's give it a sweep (of the circuit breaker panels).

[They have skipped the steps after glove donning - namely, verifying the PLSS diverter, turning on the PLSS pump, and setting the Pressure regulators to Egress. They seem to be on the step "Verify EVA CB (circuit breaker) configuration". Pete's next statement suggests that he is trying to turn to check his circuit breaker panel ( CB(11) ). See his comment after 115:01:08.]

[Bean - "You forget how fast we were working at all this. We were working at the maximum speed that we thought we could get away with. That's one of the things that doesn't come across when you're just listening and reading. 'Cause we're going as fast as we think we can safely go. And that always makes things difficult, too."]

115:00:25 Bean: Okay. Go ahead.

115:00:28 Conrad: I think we ought to get over here (on the cue card) where we turn on the oxygen.

115:00:31 Bean: That's right. Got a warning tone for Press(ure), or something.

115:00:35 LM Crew: (Garbled)

115:00:39 Conrad: PLSS O2 on. (Pause)

115:00:42 Bean: That what it says (on the cue card)?

115:00:44 Conrad: Yeah. No, wait a minute. (Realizing that they have skipped a couple of steps) Excuse me. (Reading) "PLSS diverter Min."

115:00:49 Bean: Okay.

[The control for the PLSS diverter valve is located on the bottom-right-front corner of the PLSS and controls the rate at which cooling water flows through the heat exchanger in the PLSS sublimator. They won't start the separate flow of sublimator feedwater until the hatch is open, because the sublimator will only function in a very high vacuum.]

[They will now circulate cooling water through a network of tubes woven into the Liquid-Cooled Garments (LCGs) which they are wearing over their underwear.]

115:01:08 Conrad: Come on, let's get the oxygen.

115:01:09 Bean: Okay.

[Because his suit has collapsed around him, Pete is eager to turn on the flow of PLSS oxygen and get the suit inflated.]

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "There's one other thing that should be added to the checklist. When we went over completely on (to) the PLSSs, there was a period of time when you reconfigured the cockpit before you turned on your PLSS O2. The reason you don't turn on your PLSS O2 is that you are going to pressurize your suit (and that would restrict your movements). What happened was that I suddenly realized that both Al and I were in the grip of a great octopus because both our suits started to suck down around us, and we started hustling on the checklist again so we could get to the point where we could turn on the O2. In retrospect, I think what we needed to do was to put a little note in the checklist that, as soon as you get ready to go over on the PLSS system and you completely hook up on it, you cycle your O2 once and put half a pound - or something above cabin pressure - in your suit and then shut your O2 off. I think we were breathing it down and we were being very careful to go through our circuit breakers and ECS configuration in the LM, and the suits got tighter and tighter and tighter. We finally got to the point where we could pressurize the suits and we did. That happened on both occasions (that is, during both EVA preps), and all I think we need is a little change there to cycle the O2 and to put a positive pressure in the suits."]

[A step reading "If PGA (Pressure Garment Assembly) biting, PLSS O2 - On/Off" was added to all subsequent checklists immediately following glove donning.]

[This pump circulates water from a closed-loop supply through the LCG. Flow of the separate supply of sublimator feedwater won't be started until the hatch is open.]

115:01:22 Conrad: Okay.

[Oxygen is provided to the cabin either through the Suit Gas Diverter Valve in the ECS suit circuit or through a redundant pair of demand regulators. With the regulators set in the Egress position, there will be no flow of oxygen through them into the cabin when the dump valve is opened. Note that Al has taken over the task of checklist reading.]

115:01:27 Conrad: Okay. Now, "PLSS O2, On".

[In his eagerness to get his suit inflated, Pete has skipped the step "Verify EVA CB Configuration".]

115:01:47 Conrad: Okay; I got an O-flag (and) a tone on.

[Before depressurizing the cabin, they will inflate their suits to check for leaks. At first, they will get a warning tone and a warning flag on the RCU. The pressure flag, which should have been showing all this time, should clear at 3.1 to 3.4 pounds per square inch (psi). The oxygen flag and tone should clear at 3.7 to 4.0 psi. Once those clear, Pete and Al will turn their PLSS oxygen off and watch the rate of pressure decay. They expect a decrease of less then 0.3 psi in one minute due to breathe-down (carbon dioxide removed by the PLSS LiOH canister), oxygen flow into nooks and crannies in the suit, and minor leaks. If they get less than a 0.3 psi decrease, they will turn the oxygen back on and continue with preparations for the EVA. If they get more than 0.3 psi, then there is a leak and they will have to find it before they can continue. There was never an excessive pressure decay during this check in any of the Apollo missions.]

115:01:59 Conrad: I don't think we can both turn around at the same time.

115:02:02 Bean: Okay, go ahead and check yours and then I'll check mine. (Pause)

[Among other reasons, they are checking the circuit breakers to make sure that nothing got accidentally hit with the corner of a PLSS. This was a recurring problem, despite the fact that the switches and circuit breakers were protected with guards. There wasn't much spare room in the spacecraft when they both had their PLSSs on.]

115:02:18 Bean: It's clearing up. (Pause) Okay; looking good. Run my suit press(ure) up. (Pause) (The pressure is) coming on up. (Pause)

115:03:30 Conrad: You wanted to do the (pressure integrity) check now?

115:03:32 Bean: Yeah.

115:03:33 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

115:03:38 Bean: It feels good in this one-sixth g, doesn't it?

115:03:45 Conrad: Yeah, except I notice that, with the slight slope we're standing on, I keep falling in the back.

115:03:49 Bean: Uh-huh.

115:03:51 Conrad: I think I got my oxygen off. (Pause)

115:03:57 Bean: Coming up. (Pause)

[They are doing the one-minute pressure integrity check but, unlike later crews, will not report the results to Houston.]

115:04:20 Conrad: Think so, huh?

115:04:21 Bean: (Laughing) Let's go grab a few.

115:04:22 Conrad: (We've got to) get an ALSEP out first.

115:04:26 Bean: (Laughing) Okay. (Garbled) the old (pressure) check.

115:04:35 Conrad: Okay; mine's holding real good. (Static; pause)

115:04:43 Bean: You got a good tight suit?

115:04:45 Conrad: Yep. (Pause) And the tone came off, so I really did have the oxygen off. I've got a good tight suit.

[Although Pete is referring to a good pressure check, his suit actually is too tight and the fit will cause him problems, particularly during the sleep period. See the discussion after 122:37:27.]

115:05:05 Gibson: Stand by, Intrepid. We'll be right with you. (Pause)

115:05:14 Bean: (Acknowledging Gibson) Okay.

115:05:15 Conrad: "Stand by?"! You guys ought to be spring-loaded.

115:05:19 Gibson: Intrepid. You're Go for EVA.

115:05:24 Conrad: Roger. (To Al, reading) Cabin Repress valve - Closed.

115:05:27 Bean: Okay. Just a second.

[The final means by which the cabin can be repressurized is through the repress valve. Al has to turn to reach the valve, which is at about waist height on the front face of the ECS behind him.]

115:05:32 Bean: Cabin Repress (pause), Closed.

[They are now ready for cabin depressurization.]

115:05:44 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

[Al is reaching down to get the dump valve. There is also a dump valve in the overhead, rendezvous hatch. Although the checklist calls for use of the hatch valve, the choice of which valve to use for depressurization is up to the crew. Because it is a bit of a stretch to reach the overhead valve, only relatively tall people like Charlie Duke (183 cm) on 16 and Gene Cernan (183 cm) on 17 used it. Neil Armstrong (180 cm) opened the Apollo overhead valve for the depressurization prior to the post-EVA equipment jettison. During final preparations for Apollo 14 EVA-1, Ed Mitchell suggested to Al Shepard that they use the overhead valve. Both of them were 180 cm tall. However, Shepard preferred to use the forward valve and did so for both EVAs.]

[Jones - "The checklist explicitly calls out using the forward dump valve."]

[Conrad - "I don't remember ever talking about using the one in the overhead."]

[Pete and Al were on the back-up crew for Apollo 9 until the end of that flight on 13 March 1969. The Apollo 12 Crew Training Summaries indicate that they started training for Apollo 12 immediately. As Pete mentions after 117:20:11, until the Apollo 11 crew was safely back on Earth, Pete and Al were scheduled to launch in September. With the Kennedy deadline having been met, on 29 July 1969, NASA slipped the Apollo 12 launch to November. Two weeks later, on 10 August, the Interagency Committee on Back Contamination " agreed that a postlanding ventilation filter would not be required on Apollo 12". Pete is the shortest (169 cm) of the moonwalkers and, although Al (177 cm) is taller, he is still 3 cm shorter than any of the three astronauts known to have used the overhead valve. He and Pete may have decided to leave the checklist as it was prior to the decision to remove the bacteria filter from their flight.] [Al will open the forward dump valve and vent oxygen until the cabin pressure has reached 3.5 psi. He will then put the valve in the Auto position which, at 3.5 psi, means the valve is closed. As the cabin pressure decreases, the pressure difference between the suit and cabin increases and, as another check that the suit is behaving normally, they will watch the cuff pressure gauges to make sure that they go up to at least 4.8 psi.]

115:05:53 Bean: Nope. (Pause)

115:06:05 Conrad: What do you need?

115:06:06 Bean: Just need to move a little bit.

115:06:08 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

115:06:17 Bean: Kind of give me a push back, Pete. (Pause)

[The handle on the hatch is on the lefthand side and the dump valve is on the righthand side. With his suit inflated, Al is having trouble reaching the valve in the crowded confines of the LM. He seems to be saying that, while he can get down low enough, he is overshooting his mark and needs Pete to push his shoulders toward the right side of the spacecraft so that he can grab the valve.]

115:06:27 Bean: I got it. The lock (means "handle")'s in the way again.

115:06:32 Conrad: Yeah. Why don't you...Wait; you're going to tire yourself out doing that. (Pause) Let me get it. (Pause) That a boy. (Sound of depressurization can be heard) Okay. That's it. (Watching the pressure gauge) Cabin going down. Okay.

115:06:49 Conrad: Mark. 3.5. Okay?

115:06:53 Gibson: Copy 3.5.

115:06:56 Conrad: Let me see. "(Reading) Verify cuff gauge does not drop below 4.8."

115:07:02 Bean: Sure doesn't.

115:07:03 Conrad: Man, mine's up in the overhead someplace. (Pause)

[Pete means that his suit pressure is very high. Prior to the partial cabin depress, they had inflated their suits to a relative pressure of about 3.7 psi. Now that they have dropped the cabin pressure from 5.0 psi to 3.5 psi, the relative suit pressure has increased to about 5.2 psi and will now decrease due a combination of (1) the suit pressure relief valve which opens at relative pressures above 5.0 psi and closes again at 4.6 psi, and (2) breathe-down.]

115:07:12 Conrad: You got a foggy visor?

115:07:14 Bean: No.

115:07:16 Conrad: No? (Pause) (Reading) "Verify cabin at 3-1/2, suit circuits at 3-1/2 to 4.5", and it's up there at 4.2.

115:07:31 Bean: Okay.

115:07:35 Conrad: PGA's greater than 4.8, and it's decaying.

115:07:37 Conrad: Okay, Houston. We're Go to open it (the dump valve) all the way here. How about you?

115:07:43 Bean: They said Go.

115:07:44 Conrad: Okay.

115:07:45 Gibson: Roger, Intrepid. Looks good here.

[For record keeping purposes, EVA starts at this point. NASA Public Affairs gives the time as 115:08:02. That time is probably more accurate than the approximate times that accompany this transcript.]

115:07:58 Conrad: (Garbled) (Pause)

[Conrad, from the 1969 Technical Debrief - "The first cabin depressurization was pretty interesting because, as soon as Al opened the depressurization valve after our 3.5-psi check, everything (loose) in the spacecraft disappeared out the valve. There was much outgassing, which is not unusual. I had seen it in Gemini. All loose particles that happened to be floating around disappeared from the spacecraft. It gives the spacecraft a real flush."]

[Later crews noted, however, that depressurizations and hatch openings after the first EVA failed to clean out the accumulation of dust on the floor.]

115:08:03 Bean: Just as soon as we get this thing (the cabin pressure) down real low.

115:08:09 Conrad: I've got a tone.

115:08:10 Bean: That's right.

115:08:13 Conrad: And an H2O flag.

115:08:14 Bean: That's good. Both suits. (Pause)

[The warning system is telling them that their sublimators aren't working, an indication that the warning system is in good shape.]

[They won't be able to open the hatch until the pressure drops to about 0.1 psi.]

115:08:59 Conrad: Shows about two tenths (0.2 psi).

115:09:02 Bean: Let's give it a go.

115:09:03 Conrad: Okay. (Pause)

115:09:10 Bean: Not quite.

115:09:12 Conrad: Just let it sit for a while.

115:09:13 Bean: Yeah. (Long Pause)

115:09:44 Conrad: On about a 0.1 now.

115:09:46 Bean: Okay. Give me a little push down.

115:09:48 Conrad: Down?

115:09:49 Bean: Yeah. (Long Pause)

[Al is trying to get down to open the hatch. This is more difficult than usual with the suits well above the normal operating pressure of 3.8 psi.]

[Conrad - "Remember, we didn't have suits that bent at the waist. Neil (and Buzz), ourselves, and Shepard and Mitchell didn't have those suits. (Suits with flexible waist joints were introduced on Apollo 15 so that the crew could sit on the Rover seats.) So, he's probably now (leaning) over on my side and I'm probably pushing him down so he can get the latch."]

[Bean - "That's what's happening, and I need you to push me down. That's right. We found out you could get my side (that is, the dump valve on the right side of the door) better; I'm over there (that is, leaning down to reach the left side of the door) trying to get the latch undone."]

115:10:12 Bean: Oh, I'm doing great; just waiting for the pressure to get low enough to open the hatch.

115:10:16 Conrad: You can reach that upper left-hand corner, and you can peel it. (Pause)

[Conrad, from the 1969 Tech Debrief - "The cabin went right down to 0.2 and then the spacecraft outgassed for about another minute, I guess, and we finally got down to 0.1 and Al peeled the cabin door open. You have to do this, or it just stays stuck until you push it open. It doesn't hurt the door or the seal or anything."]

[Jones - "Did you literally mean grab a corner of the hatch and peel it back?"]

[Conrad - "That hatch had some ribbing that you could get a hold of. You realize this whole vehicle was pretty tinny (that is, light weight and flimsy). So this thing was very easy to...He could actually pull a little corner open."]

[Bean - "And that let the rest of the air out, and then it would open. I remember we never could pull it open with the handle and we were worried about pulling on it too hard."]

[Jones - "So you just grabbed a corner and literally peeled it off like a band-aid."]

[Bean - "You're making a little crack."]

[Conrad - "Just bending the corner. Except, I think there was structure, stiffeners. So there was something he could grab a hold of something and pull it back."]

[Bean - "Just a little."]

[Jones - "And that was easier than the handle, itself?"]

[Bean - "Well, yeah, it's like opening anything that's under pressure. When you're pulling the handle, that makes you open all this surface area against 0.1 psi. But, when you're pulling back the corner, you're only moving a little bit of it. And the thing was so flexible. It was one piece, machined titanium or something, and so thin that it was ridiculous."]

[Conrad - "The stuff (that is, the LM wall material) was only twenty-five thousandths (of an inch) - and, as the Sun moved slowly up, the thing oil-canned all night. You could hear it."]

[Bean - "Creaking and banging and making noises."]

[Conrad - "You could hear the structure oil-can and you could hear the pumps run; and, then, when the heat exchanger ran a little bit more or a little less, that sombitch'd change tone."]

[Bean - "That (tone change) woke us up. That was the (suit loop) water problem. Water would get down in there and slow down the fan or something."]

[Al is refering to water they discovered coming out of the suit loop at 114:35:35.]

[Jones - "Did you ever get to try to open the hatch in vacuum chamber training exercises?"]

[Bean - "In the altitude chamber, when we did it with one g helping, I could lean over easily and get the valve and Pete got the door. But then, at one-sixth g, without gravity helping you, you couldn't get down there so easy. So we traded jobs and then it worked okay. (The altitude chamber training is) how we knew about peeling the door."]

[Jones - "NASA had an aircraft which would fly parabolas that could give you a half minute or so of either one-sixth g or zero g. Did you two ever get to try the hatch in the one-sixth-g aircraft?"]

[Conrad - "No, we didn't do anything to speak of in the aircraft."]

[Bean - "Because we found out long ago that you can do anything in the cabin that you want. As long as you're restrained, you can do anything."]

[Conrad - "We decided to train for everything at one g, including the outside work."]

115:10:33 Bean: Got it, babe.

115:10:35 Conrad: Okay. The hatch is open, huh? Okay.

115:10:38 Bean: Let me reset the valve (to Auto).

115:10:40 Conrad: Okay.

[With the valve in the Auto position, they could open the valve from the outside if necessary.]

[The hatch has swung shut.]

115:10:49 Bean: I think I got it.

115:10:51 Conrad: Okay. I got the hatch. Go ahead and reset the valve. (Pause) Okay. Now what I need to do is get some (sublimator) water going after you stand up.

115:10:59 Bean: Okay. Good shape.

115:11:02 Conrad: All right. Lean in against me?

[Al is facing Pete from behind the open hatch and needs to lean forward to reach his own feedwater valve.]

115:11:18 Conrad: Mine's on.

115:11:20 Bean: Mine's on, too.

115:11:23 Conrad: Okay.

115:11:24 Bean: Let's just stand here and cool.

[They haven't had any cooling since they gave themselves a shot of LM cooling water at 114:54. As called for in the checklist, they are going to wait until the sublimator is fully functional, about four minutes according to the estimate in the checklist. The H2O flag on their RCU's will clear when the sublimator is running properly.]

115:11:34 Bean: Good grief.

115:11:35 Conrad: No wonder I can't move.

115:11:37 Bean: (Talking to the pressure gauge) Go down!

[Neil Armstrong has described wearing the suit as being like wearing a Macy's Thanksgiving Parade balloon. Any change in position requires bending the suit against the internal pressure, a hard enough job at 3.8 psi, let alone 4.3 psi. One of the reasons for waiting for the cooling system to start working is to let the suit pressure decay due to breathe-down.]

115:11:43 Bean: Good.

115:11:44 Conrad: I mean 4.3. (Reading) "CWEA (Caution and Warning Electronics Assembly) status..." You should have an ASC (ascent) PRESS (warning)light, a PREAMP(LIFIER)S (caution light), and an ECS (caution light).

[The caution-and-warning lights are discussed in the Grumman LM News Reference.]

115:11:52 Conrad: And "H2O Sep(arator) Component Light, On."

115:11:54 Bean: Okay.

[The LM Caution-and-Warning System is confirming that the ECS is shut down. Next, they will dim the cabin lights to conserve power and, then, will close the TV circuit breaker.]

115:12:00 Bean: Okay.

115:12:02 Conrad: (Reading) "CB(16) TV, Close."

115:12:04 Bean: All right.

[The TV camera is mounted inside the Modular Equipment Stowage Assembly or MESA. The MESA is a table-like device mounted in the descent stage to the left (north) of the ladder. It is hinged at the bottom and, when Pete pulls a lanyard at the top of the ladder, it will swing down about 120 degrees and, among other things, put the TV in position to look at the ladder as Pete and Al climb down to the surface. To prevent overheating the MESA cavity and to conserve electric power, the TV is normally off. CB(16) (Circuit Breaker Panel 16) is on Al's side of the spacecraft.]

115:12:06 Bean: When I turn around.

MP3 Audio Clip (3 min 41 sec)

115:12:07 Conrad: Okay. (Long Pause)

115:12:21 Bean: (TV breaker) Closed.

115:12:23 Conrad: Now, if you'll just hold still a minute...No, you're going to have to turn around and get in the corner.

115:12:29 Bean: Okay.

115:12:30 Conrad: And bend over and I'll get your antenna up.

115:12:31 Bean: All right.

115:12:33 Conrad: Easy.

115:12:34 Bean: Easy does it.

115:12:35 Conrad: Yeah. Okay. Bend over. Can you...

115:12:36 Bean: Okay.

115:12:37 Conrad: ...bend over? (Long Pause) One antenna up.

115:12:53 Bean: Okay. (Long Pause) Yours (Pete's antenna) is up.

115:13:13 Conrad: Okay. Wait for it to cool. (Long Pause)

[The PLSS sublimator provides cooling through the direct sublimation of ice to vapor in a porous-plate heat exchanger. Specifically, feedwater is fed into the sublimator where it absorbs heat - by heat exchange with the water circulating in the closed-loop LCG system - and seeps through pores in the sublimator's sintered nickel plates. These plates are exposed to a passageway where the external vacuum has been allowed to enter. The water freezes as it encounters an ice layer which has formed across the plate. At the surface of the ice layer, the ice is sublimating directly to vapor, carrying away the excess heat and providing cooling. Pete and Al are waiting for the ice layer to form. Until it does, the water escapes too rapidly to pick up enough heat in the exchange process to provide any significant cooling.]

115:13:27 Bean: Why don't you put those Lighting Annunciators to Dim?

115:13:30 Conrad: Okay. If you'll back into your corner so I can turn around.

115:13:33 Bean: All right. (Long Pause)

[To get out through the hatch, Pete has to face the left rear of the cabin so that he can then get down toward a kneeling position with his feet out the hatch. Al has to get as far back as he can into the corner formed by the right bulkhead and the ECS cabinet.]

115:13:50 Bean: Okay. (Pause)

115:13:54 Conrad: I'm finding it (easier) the other way around. In the airplane, I walk flat-footed. Here, I'm standing on my toes all the time. (Pause) A pretty good vacuum. Wonder how long it's going to take this boiler (the sublimator) to get going. (Pause)

[Conrad - "That's right, we did do one (practice session in the one-sixth-g airplane). But that was it; I don't ever remember doing any more than the one. I don't remember if we were wearing the suits. They had another deal where they had a surface that was inclined and they hung you from your side and you got one-sixth. We played with that thing once."]

[Bean - "That was up at Langley or somewhere?"]

[Conrad - "Nah, it was at Johnson, as I remember."]

[Jones - "How about the vertical harness, which I've heard called the POGO."]

[Conrad - "Yeah, somewhere we did that where we fall down and they had a slope and we tried getting up."]

[Bean - "Oh, yeah. I remember that. We did some of these in the centrifuge with the POGO and then they put the POGO on the truck and they'd drive along out there on one of those roads."]

[Conrad - "But it all came to the (fact) that everything was such claptrap, as I remember it, that we gave it up, early on. I mean, we did that to start with and then - zip - filled that square. And (after that) we got on to doing everything else in one g."]

[For readers unfamiliar with the expression, "fill the square" generally means checking off a task completed. More specifically, it is an aviation term referring to completion of a day's training activities.]

115:14:29 Bean: Nope; same as yours.

115:14:32 Bean: Some of this cool air and it'll be okay. (Pause) There goes the hatch.

[They have bumped the hatch closed.]

115:14:41 Bean: Let's get that baby. Get it.

115:14:45 Conrad: Okay; I'll hold it open.

115:14:46 Bean: Yeah, because that water (garbled)...

115:14:49 Conrad: Yeah, I know.

115:14:50 Bean: ...will tend to keep it closed.

[The sublimator does not operate with any efficiency except in a very good vacuum. Therefore, they want to keep the hatch open and prevent the vapor produced by the sublimators from building up in the cabin and, thereby, shutting the sublimators down. The pressure, small as it would be, would also tend to hold the hatch shut. This will actually happen at 115:28:23.]

115:14:54 Conrad: Wait a minute. That a boy. (Long Pause) Hey, my boiler's on the line.

115:15:30 Bean: Yeah; mine's coming up, too. Feels real good.

115:15:33 Conrad: Let's see. I can go to intermediate flow, huh?

115:15:39 Bean: Yep. Soon as she starts.

[They can select one of three flow rates of LCG water through the heat exchanger: Minimum, Intermediate, and Maximum. With these settings of the PLSS diverter valve, the circulating water left the PLSS at temperatures of 75-80, 60-65, or 45-50 degrees Fahrenheit, respectively. (At the mid-ranges, the Celsius equivalents are 25C, 17C, and 9 C, respectively.) At maximum cooling, the sublimator could handle about 2000 BTU (British thermal units or 2 MJ) per hour. They will use maximum cooling only rarely; and then, only for a few seconds at a time.]