Post-EVA-1 Activities

Planning Discussions for EVA-2

 

Wake-up for EVA-2

Corrected Transcript and Commentary Copyright © 1996 by Eric M. Jones.
All rights reserved.
Last revised 2 December 2014.

MP3 Audio Clip ( 5 min 53 sec ) by David Shaffer

[At 131:43, NASA tells the press that the biomedical data on Irwin indicated sound sleep]

[At 132:53, NASA tells the press that the higher-than-expected oxygen consumption during EVA-1 may limit the EVA-2 duration.]

[At 134:53, NASA tells the press that LM cabin pressure is 4.8 psi and the temperature is 56 F.]

[At 135:58, NASA tells the press that Dave and Jim are due to be awakened in 2 hours 1 minute.]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "The night went all right; but at some point along the way, in one of the nights, we got a call for Endeavour. Did you hear that one?"]

[Irwin, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "No, I didn't hear that one."]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "You didn't hear that one. Yes, the Endeavour called one night (Dave probably means 'the Endeavour was called') which made me think a while about where I was. Was I on the Endeavour or the Falcon or where? I think it might behoove (the overnight) CapCom to be sure they punch up their right key when they are talking to the different spacecraft, because that can make you come out of the hammock pretty fast."]

[The wake-up call comes 7 hours 7 minutes after the last "good night". Wake-up was scheduled at 137:55, as shown on LM Lunar Surface Checklist page 5-8. The Flight Director at wake-up is Milton Windler.]

138:03:43 Fullerton: Good morning, Falcon. This is Houston. Over. (Pause)

138:03:56 Scott: Morning, Houston. This is Falcon.

138:04:00 Fullerton: Roger, Falcon; Houston. Loud and clear. And when you're up and ready to converse, let me know.

138:04:11 Scott: Okay, Gordo. Will do.

[Scott - "Want to know one of the interesting coincidences? Gordon Fullerton now lives in a house I lived in in Lancaster (California). When he went to Edwards, he bought the house that I'd sold to another guy, who sold it to Gordy. Every once in a while, some mail will go to that house and I'll get a note from Gordy."]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "When we woke up the next morning, I was surprised how clean the spacecraft was. I think most of the dust had been removed. That's right. It surely had."]

[Irwin, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "That night (after EVA-1), it was fairly clean, you know, when we went to sleep. I don't know how all the dust got out of there."]

[The primary LiOH canister in the Environmental Control System has a 'debris trap' in its upstream cover. Oxygen is drawn out of the cabin through the Cabin Gas Return Valve, and then flows through the debris trap before going into the LiOH canister. The debris trap would probably have collected any dust that became airborne.]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "Yes, the ECS does a pretty good job of cleaning the place out. The smell was gone. When you took the helmet off (right after repress), you could smell the lunar dirt. It smelled like - the nearest analogy I can think of is gunpowder. But that had all cleaned out. By the time we got up the next morning, things were in pretty good shape."]

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "Or did we just get acclimated to the smell?"]

138:05:08 Scott: Okay. There was some on the floor and the midstep, and we just never took the time to take a look in the back, but we will.

138:05:16 Fullerton: Okay. If you find any water back there, we have some suggested procedures to clean it up, and we'd like to do that before depressurization.

138:05:33 Scott: Rog. Will do.

[Long Comm Break]

[Scott - "If we had a problem, they should have awakened us early, to take care of the problem...if you want to stay on the timeline. Cause, if you ever get behind, you get behinder. You know, the old saying, 'Get ahead and stay ahead.'"]

[Jones - "Otherwise, you might lose the North Complex or something."]

[The reason for cleaning up the water prior to depressurization is to prevent sublimation in the vacuum which would not only cool the cabin but might also lead to ice formation on the hatch seal and/or various cabin systems. Indeed, the fact that there is, indeed, a considerable amount of liquid water behind the engine cover suggests that the bacteria filter was broken at the end of the EVA and that much of the leakage occurred after repressurization.]

[If none of the 25 pounds of water had sublimated, the puddle would contain a bit over 11 liters. As can be inferred from the quantity of water involved - and Dave's statement during the post-flight Technical Debrief - Dave's "little puddle" is undoubtedly an understatement.]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "Sure enough, there was a great big puddle back there."]

[Irwin - "I don't know if we'll ever get around to talking about that water leak that occurred. We had that slope, and the attitude of the Lunar Module, and it seemed like it was providential that we had that particular angle because, when we had the water leak, the water went into kind of a neutral corner. If the slope had been the other way, or even if it had been level, the water might have pooled around electrical connections and perhaps have interfered with the firing mechanism. We had some connections right down next to the floor, and I realize that they're probably treated to be waterproof, but there was never any thought, you know, that they'd ever be immersed in water. So it was just an ideal attitude to protect those essential connectors."]

[The netting is designed to keep things from falling behind the engine cover where they would be difficult to retrieve. See Figure 14-25 from the Mission Report.]

138:12:01 Scott: Okay. We'll do our best.

138:12:05 Fullerton: And if one of you is not busy, I do have a Pad with the lift-off times for rev 32 to 37.

138:12:20 Scott: Stand by. (Long Pause)

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "The ground suggested using a food bag and LiOH canister to get it all up, and they wanted all the water cleaned up before we depressed. That was probably a pretty good idea because, immersed in the puddle of water, were a couple of glycol lines and some wires. Thereupon, we entered into another mopping operation. We took one of the large meal-container bags and cut it out like a scoop. And Jim passed me the canister cans. I scooped up the water, and then we took towels and dried up the rest of it. I think we got it completely dry."]

[Scott - "I have a totally irrelevant comment. I recently met a guy who worked on the ascent engine for Rocketdyne. And he informed me that one of the interesting things to those people - the engineers who worked on it - was that Apollo crews had been the closest human beings to live rocket firings. Nobody has ever been that close to a rocket when it was going off. And I'd never thought of that before. (Chuckling) But, yeah, we're sitting right on top of that thing. One of the old timers. He built that ascent engine, and he sure was proud of that ascent engine! And I was glad he was proud."]

138:12:36 Fullerton: Okay, Jim. One more tidbit on the water problem. According to our figures here, that ETB bag that has the cameras and film you are going to use on the next EVA may be back there where the water is, and we suggest you get it up out so it won't get wet. Over.

138:13:00 Irwin: No. That's taken care of. (Long Pause while Jim waits for Fullerton to start reading the Pad) Okay, Gordo. I'm ready for the Pad.

138:13:20 Fullerton: Oh, okay, Jim. T-32 is 140:10:24; T-33, 142:08:33; 34 is 144:06:40; 35 is 146:05:03; 36 is 148:02:57; and 37 is 150:01:04. Over.

138:14:11 Irwin: Okay. 140:10:24; 142:08:33; 144:06:40; 146:05:03; 148:02:57; and 150:01:04.

138:14:31 Fullerton: Okay Jim. Your readback's correct. (Pause) And, Jim, one other question. If you can remember back to before you went to sleep; this is in reference to the problem you had with the (RCU warning) flags at the start of the EVA-1, and we're figuring that that was probably caused by an air bubble that was in your PLSS feedwater system. We're wondering if, when you recharged the PLSS feedwater here after EVA-1, were you holding the PLSS in a vertical position? That would eliminate any possibility of a bubble and we wanted to verify if that was the case or was it tilted over somewhat. Over.

138:15:29 Irwin: It was tilted over slightly when we recharged after EVA-1.

138:15:37 Fullerton: Okay. Stand by, and I'll see if we want to recharge it or something. We'll check on what they want to do. Can you give us a rough idea of what sort of angle it was tilted at and in which direction? (No answer) (Long Pause) Jim, this is Houston. Over.

138:16:34 Scott: Go ahead, Gordo.

138:16:36 Fullerton: Did you copy my last question about...I'll repeat it. Can you give us an estimate of how far off of vertical the PLSS was in degrees, roughly, when you did fill it? Over.

138:16:53 Irwin: It was about 30 degrees off vertical when we charged it.

138:16:59 Fullerton: Okay. Thank you.

[Comm Break]

138:18:47 Irwin: Go ahead.

138:18:48 Fullerton: That 30 degrees is probably enough to cause the problem you saw at the start of EVA-1; and we may - depending on how you do with cleaning up the water and so forth - want you to top-off the water and maybe the oxygen also on both PLSSs. We'll have more on that later.

[Jones - "Had you practiced charging the PLSSs?"]

[Scott - "Yeah, we simulated charging a lot. In fact, I think we charged them in a (vacuum) chamber at some point. We have to have done that."]

[Jones - "Did you then wear the PLSSs that you recharged?"]

[Scott - "Probably not."]

[Jones - "So this air bubble business could have come up but you wouldn't have known it."]

[Scott - "And this is a new PLSS. And the one-sixth g would change the sensitivity to angle. One g would hold the water down, right?"]

[Jones - "And the relevance here is that the multiple tones caused some concern and some loss of time."]

[Scott - "Mostly loss of time, though; because you stop the music and you take your mind off of what you're doing. Yeah, concern; but, one of the good things about the system is that, once we got the life-support system going, we never thought about it."]

["You really are never conscious (of the PLSS), until you have a flag or a tone that tells you that something isn't working right. There were enough cues built into the system that, if there were a problem, you would get some signal or the ground would say something. And that's good, because it allows you to relax, mentally, relative to systems and concentrate on the geology or whatever else you're doing."]

[Jones - "Let me tell you a quick little Apollo 12 story and see if it makes sense to you. Pete and Al are running from one place to another, carrying the Hand Tool Carrier and what have you. Al says he may have brushed his relief valve with his hand or the carrier or something and felt a little bit of a pop, a little bit of air goes out of the suit and he feels it in his ears. It gets his attention immediately. He stops, looks at his pressure gauge. Pete's running along behind, sees him, stops. They watch the pressure gauge without telling Houston. It's all okay, and they continue."]

[Scott - "I don't know. The relief valve should be designed so that it could be hit and nothing would happen. Boy, if it were susceptible to contact, it wouldn't be a very good relief valve, would it? I mean, if your body was going to bleed if you touched something, it wouldn't be a very good body. If you had a relief valve that was susceptible to that kind of glitch, you would not want that - or, you would have to train yourself not to hit the relief valve. And you would be conscious of it, all the time. 'Uh-oh. I shouldn't do this.' And you don't want that on your mind, because that takes away from your focus. So I doubt the relief valve would have been susceptible to that kind of contact."]

["This sounds like something I've heard about. It would have been in character (for Pete and Al) not to say anything on the Moon, and it would have been in character to discuss it when they got back."]

138:19:14 Irwin: Stand by. (Long Pause)

138:19:37 Irwin: Okay. Go ahead, Gordo.

138:19:38 Fullerton: Okay. RCS Alfa, 85 percent; Bravo, 85; descent O2 number 1, 71.5; number 2, 68.4; ascent O2 number 1, 99; number 2, 99; descent water, number 1, 42.3; number 2 is 40.2; ascent water, number 1, 100 percent; number 2, 100 percent; and descent amp-hours (remaining) are 1157; ascent amp-hours, 572. Over.

138:20:35 Scott: Roger. I copied all that.

138:20:37 Fullerton: Okay.

[Very Long Comm Break]

[Jones - "Didn't you have gauges in the spacecraft to check a lot of this stuff? Why read it up?"]

[Scott - "Yeah, but it verifies what the ground is seeing, which I think is a good policy. And, also, it calibrates your gauges on board. And besides, I would always like to know what the ground thought. To reaffirm everything's cool. They've got a lot of telemetry down there; why not compare notes?"]

[Jones - "I presume it didn't take too terribly long to get the cabin reconfigured after the sleep period. What did you have to do? Basically just get the hammocks rolled up?"]

[Scott - "Yeah. It was pretty simple."]

["We ran a simulated night in the simulator before we went - and got a lousy night's sleep. When you get to one-sixth g, it's just terrific; but you try to sleep in those hammocks in one g: not terrific."]

["They cleaned everybody out of the simulator building and we went through end to end. Started with taking the suits off. Went through the whole procedure, ate the food, slept the night. The whole nine yards. It was a very good exercise. And I recall, when we got to the Moon, how pleasant those hammocks were. I mean, they really were comfortable! And how lousy they were in one g."]

[Journal Contributor Harald Kucharek suggested that an explanation of the expression 'the whole nine yards' was needed. Initially, Dave Scott and I thought it might derive from American Football but, then, I found a school of thought on the Internet saying that the expression refers to the capacity of cement trucks - nine cubic yards - in an era when it was rare for the 'whole nine yards' to actually arrive at a building site, some having been diverted to an illicit project along the way. Dave replied "I believe that this is absolutely correct; now that you found it!! Disregard the other interpretation!!!"]

[Returning, now, to the discussion of the practice sleep that Dave and Jim did in the LM simulator.]

[Jones - "Do you remember when that was in the training cycle?"]

[Scott - "The training cycle ran from November '69 to July '71. I'd say it was probably in the late fall of '70 (but, accoring to the training log which became available a few years after this discussion, actually 30 March 1971.) It was a very good exercise and I think it was one reason we were pretty comfortable sleeping, because we knew it worked. Nobody had ever taken their suits off, and I know we were the first ones to take the biosensors off and put them back on, 'cause that was one big exercise with the medics."]

["The hammocks were really soft."]

[Jones - "Especially when you only weigh 30 pounds."]

[Scott - "Yeah. It's terrific."]

138:49:52 Fullerton: Falcon, Houston. Over.

138:50:00 Irwin: Go ahead, Houston.

138:50:02 Fullerton: We've got some conversation to come up to you regarding to some updates to the EVA prep and also about the EVA traverse plans. And if that would fit in with what you're doing, let us know and we'll go ahead and give those words to you. Over.

138:50:26 Irwin: Well, Dave is off comm right now, so I don't want to talk about the EVA plan or the traverse plan; but maybe EVA prep, I can talk to you about.

138:50:36 Fullerton: Okay, Jim. If you get a piece of scratch paper here, I'll give you the camera magazines that we figure should be in the ETB and on the cameras at the start of this. They've changed slightly from what you loaded last night. Over.

138:50:59 Irwin: Okay. Did Dave tell you what we had loaded last night?

138:51:03 Fullerton: I'm not sure; I'll have to check on that.

138:51:06 Irwin: I don't think we...(Pause) We have the ETB loaded, and let us tell you what we have in ETB.

138:51:20 Fullerton: Okay, fine. (Long Pause)

138:51:36 Irwin: Okay. The ETB is loaded per checklist (page 5-7) and the additional Mag is Mag Papa.

138:51:45 Fullerton: I understand. That's Mag Papa, is that correct?

138:51:54 Irwin: That's affirm.

138:51:57 Fullerton: Okay. (Pause) Let me cross-check that here and see if we can get any more words on that. Let me give you one other suggestion and that's for securing the high-gain antenna cable on the Rover (to prevent snags such as occurred at Station 2). We'd like to suggest that you get the roll of tape out, strip off about 1 foot, and fold a 1- to 2-inch tab on one end of it and wrap that piece of tape around the CDR camera so that after you get down to the Rover you can use it to secure the high-gain cable to the high-gain antenna mast and keep it from flopping around. Over.

138:52:46 Irwin: (Very faint) Okay. (Long Pause)

138:53:08 Fullerton: Jim, this is Houston. Did you copy that about the tape?

138:52:15 Irwin: Yes; we copied.

[Without mentioning the need to secure the high-gain cable to the mast, at 141:44:46 Joe Allen will repeat the suggestion that the take some tape out with them. At 142:21:32, Dave decides to stick some strips of tape to his checklist - perhaps because it's cleaner than his camera ; and does the taping job before 142:32:52.]

138:53:36 Irwin: Oh, yes. We've already put that in the ETB.

[]

138:53:51 Irwin: Well, we both slept for the full time, and we'll get the PRD readings, if required, in a little bit.

138:54:00 Fullerton: Okay. Understand.

[Long Comm Break]

138:58:31 Irwin: Go ahead.

138:58:33 Fullerton: On the ETB-load camera stuff, we'd like you to add Delta Delta - 16-millimeter Mag Delta-Delta - to the bag, and also, if you have your camera loaded with Kilo-Kilo, we'd like you to take it off, put Kilo-Kilo in the bag, and put Papa-Papa on your camera. Those are the only two changes that we see from what we figure you have right now. Over.

[Magazine KK, or AS15-87, is a color mag that was partially used prior to descent and during the SEVA. Magazine PP, or AS15-90, is a fresh black & white magazine.]

138:59:19 Fullerton: Okay, Jim. Add 16-millimeter Mag Delta-Delta to the bag load, first of all; and then on your 70- millimeter camera, that's the LMP 70-millimeter camera, take off...We assume that Kilo-Kilo is on it now. We'd like you to take that off and put Papa-Papa onto your camera. Over.

138:59:50 Irwin: You're suggesting we take 16-millimeter Delta out(side), and take Mag K off my camera and put Papa on my camera; but probably carry Kilo out with us.

139:00:08 Fullerton: That's affirmative, Jim. Carry Kilo-Kilo with you - and I think you said it right - but take Delta Delta along, also, in the bag. Over.

139:00:23 Irwin: Understand.

[Long Comm Break]

139:05:08 Scott: Hello, Houston; Hadley Base.

139:05:11 Fullerton: Okay. A couple of questions. First of all, we wondered if you have brought up the LGC (LM Guidance Computer) and cycled it through program 6 there (as per checklist page 5-9). We haven't got high bit rate and we haven't been able to tell. The other one was how is the water clean up going and can you estimate how much you're able to scoop up there? Over.

139:05:34 Scott: Okay, Gordo. Two answers. Yes, the program...Your computer's been cycled. And all of the water is cleaned up and we got two full LiOH canisters plus about 1/8th of the CSM helmet bag.

[Dave and Jim each have a "Helmet Stowage Bag" (HSB) which is used to transport a LEVA and a pair of EVA gloves during flight operations. The HSB is listed in the Apollo 15 Stowage List ( 3Mb PDF ) by that name, the Dave and Jim know it as the LEVA bag, which is its designation in the LM Lunar Surface Checklist. At 139:24:23, Dave confirms that he is not refering to a LEVA Bag. They also have a "Helmet and LEVA Interim Stoage Container", which they know as the "hemlet bag" and use in the LM between EVAs. However, since it is made of an open mesh weave and is used only in the LM cabin, that can't be the "CSM helmet bag, either. What comes to mind is a bag designed to slip over the pressure helmet, but there is nothing of that description in the stowage lists associated with the helmets.]

[Scott, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "We got two full LiOH cans...and we got another half can, at least, in the helmet bag."]

[Jones - "Could you describe the jettison bag for me?"]

[Scott - "Great big sack. Beta cloth sack with a draw string, as I recall. About the size of a trash bag or garbage can bag, I think. As I recall. It couldn't be too big, 'cause you have to get it out the door."]

[Fullerton's statement suggests that the total volume of water recovered would fill 2.5 LiOH cans. Each of the cans is roughly 30 cm long with a diameter of 15 cm and, therefore, a volume of 5.3 liters. Two-and-a-half cans would hold 29 pounds of water, close to the amount of leakage estimated from telemetry.]

[They want to close the cans enough that the tops won't come off at depressurization, but not so securely that the pressure in the can remains elevated. See also, the discussion at 140:38:47.]

139:07:37 Scott: I guess we just want to make sure that the tops don't come off the LiOH cans when we get ready to jettison.

139:07:45 Fullerton: Okay. Fine.

139:07:50 Scott: And the buddy SLSS bag will just barely hold one cartridge plus the other debris we have. So I think we're going to have to use a jettison bag to put in the other cartridge, the two LiOH canisters, and helmet bag with the water, and I think the helmet bag will hold the water okay. It seems to be fairly waterproof. And I just did the urine storage as we have it.

139:08:17 Fullerton: Okay. That sounds good to us. (Long Pause)

[See a discussion about this unidentified 'helmet bag' at 139:05:34.]

139:08:48 Fullerton: Okay. We're just going around the room on that one. And we'll have an answer in a second here.

139:08:55 Scott: Okay.

[Very Long Comm Break]

[Scott - "We're asking these questions (about the LiOH can lids and the helmet bag) because of being in the environment, being there and being conscious of that stuff 'cause we're there. As opposed to being on Earth and not in the environment. Being there triggers your thinking."]

[Jones - "And it's not clear that Gordo, back here at 139:07:45, understood your question about the canister lids."]

[Scott - "Yeah. And, also, when I ask the question, they say they're going around the room! Obviously, nobody's sat down and thought about this, apparently; 'cause either it's a big question with no answer or they didn't think about it. And we're thinking about it 'cause we've got to open the door. And there's a vacuum out there."]

[Jones - "And the answer wasn't forthcoming in a second or two, and it wasn't forthcoming in 15 minutes! They had to find the helmet bag expert. I can imagine somebody was scurrying around trying to find a helmet bag so they could put some water in it."]

[Scott - "I'll bet they were!"]

[Jones - "But they were already lagging behind you. They weren't going to find out any faster than you were."]

[Scott - (Chuckling) "No; and we already had the helmet bag and the water. And we told them a lot earlier about the helmet bag and the water. Well, I guess everybody's focused on the EVA."]

[They will get an answer at 140:38:47, during the EVA-2 Preps.]

[Journal Contributor Mike Poliszuk, from a 10 October 2000 e-mail message - "This exchange made me think about the range of expertise of the people in Mission Control. They know the systems and operations of the spacecraft, but how much time do they spend in the spacecraft or simulator to know all the details of what is physically in the cabin? For example, I know information about the structural details and the difficulties in the hydraulic systems of the F-18 fighter - since I work in the (Naval Air Systems Command) program office for that aircraft - but I really don't know where on the aircraft the pilot stores his checklists or keeps his clothing for overnight trips. I'm not surprised that it would take a while to find the info on the helmet bag."]

139:23:46 Fullerton: Go ahead, Hadley; Houston. Over.

139:23:53 Scott: Okay, our little helmet bag is beginning to drip, so I guess it probably would be better to transfer that into the urine container, right?

139:24:02 Fullerton: Okay, we agree. In fact we were thinking about suggesting that, so you'll have the helmet bag to stow the visor in, later, for launch. Be easier than trying to tape it (meaning the visor) down. Go ahead and stick the urinal right into the bag, and it should suck it right out of there.

139:24:23 Scott: Okay, but we were talking about the helmet bag, not the LEVA bag. We weren't going to use the LEVA bags.

139:24:29 Fullerton: Oh, okay. (Long Pause)

[Dave and Gordo are havig a rare Apollo nomenclature problem. See the discussion at 139:05:34.]

[Jones - "I've never thought about the operation of the urine collection device. Is there a pressure differential across there?"]

[Scott - "You open it up to the outside. To the vacuum."]

[Jones - "And it's a small enough line that it's a reasonably slow flow. You've got some kind of a receptacle you piss into..."]

[Scott - "Yeah. A little yellow bag. And then you dump the yellow bag."]

[Jones - "So you hook the bag up to the line and then open up the valve and it sucks it out."]

[Scott - "Same way in the Command Module. Motorman's Helper. That's where that came from. Apparently the idea of the little urine bags that we wore, early on in the program, came from the San Francisco street-car conductors who apparently wore similar devices because they had to run the streetcar all day long and they couldn't take a break. My recollection is that the first time I saw one of those and heard about those, that was the explanation. Nothing in Apollo was really new. Somebody else had had a similar problem."]

[We then talked about the confusion between the helmet bags and the LEVA bags.]

[Scott - "This could be very complicated stuff - with all the equipment and the nomenclature and terminology - unless you work with it everyday, which Gordo didn't have a chance to do. He's probably not fully familiar with the designations of these things and what the things are. We had a big book where all this equipment was diagrammed out. There were a lot of different things in there to deal with, which you have to be proficient in to understand it."]

[Scott - "And this brings up the whole subject of communications and what things mean to different people. And, fortunately, within the program, the terminology was developed by the people who were going to use it - who, therefore, knew what was meant when something was said. The team, having worked together (in training and simulations), could work very well (during the flights). Here, there was a little disconnect; but that because Gordo wasn't able to participate all the time in all the things we were doing. You notice, there's (almost) never a disconnect with Joe Allen, 'cause Joe was there all the time. Because of all the effort that was put into communications, people knew what we meant in engineering and technical matters, and geologically they knew what we meant. Which is why you can't just assemble a bunch of people and put them in a room and say, 'Go to the Moon'. Because they won't understand each other, even if it's all in English."]

[Jones - "Which raises some interesting questions about computer-based information systems or expert systems for the Mars missions or the lunar base that could understand a question like 'Where's the framiss?' The more complex the system, the more you might need something like that which could understand the subtleties of the jargon."]

[Scott - "And we mean helmet bag, not LEVA bag. But they're stored somewhere, and it could be mis-interpreted."]

139:25:37 Irwin: Go ahead, Houston.

139:25:39 Fullerton: Jim, on the subject mentioned earlier about your PLSS being filled on a slant and causing the problem you had with the (RCU) flags, we don't think that's any real problem, but if you have concern about it, we think that refilling the PLSS in a vertical position - and we have a procedure that we feel will take about 10 minutes total to do - we're pretty sure will solve that problem. We don't think there's any danger in going ahead and getting the same symptoms as you did on the first EVA; but if you'd rather not (be bothered by the warning tone), we can do this procedure to get rid of that air bubble. Over.

139:26:26 Scott: Okay, Jim says he's not worried about it, as long as it's no real problem. We'll just press on.

139:26:31 Fullerton: Okay, Dave.

[Scott, from a 1996 letter - "This really shows confidence in the equipment - and in the people on the ground!"]

[Comm Break]