Ending the First Day

Geology Station A

 

Wake-up and Preparations for EVA-2

Corrected Transcript and Commentary Copyright © 1995 by Eric M. Jones.
All rights reserved.
Scan credits in the Image Library.
Video credits in the Video Library.
Except where noted, MP3 audio clips by Thomas Schwagmeier and video clips by Ken Glover.
Last revised 16 May 2017.

[During the rest period, NASA Public Affairs passed on a report from the Flight Surgeon that Al went to sleep very quickly, at about 121:48, less than twenty minutes after Fullerton's last call at 121:41.]

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128:25:54 Shepard: Houston, Antares.

128:25:59 Fullerton: Antares, Houston. Over.

128:26:05 Shepard: Roger. Good morning, good morning. Reading you loud and clear. How me? (Long Pause) Well, we're reading you loud and clear, Gordo. How do you read us?

128:26:34 Fullerton: I read you loud and clear, Al. Good morning. We had a little mixup on whether we're configured properly or not. I guess we are. You're loud and clear.

[NASA photo 71-H-106 shows Backup Commander Gene Cernan and Gordon Fullerton in the MOCR early in the mission.]

[The first checklist page for this part of the mission is Sur 4-7.]

128:27:03 Fullerton: Roger, Al.

128:27:11 Shepard: We've had no medication and the shape of the crew is excellent. The PRD reading is as before: Commander, 16051; and LMP, 07049.

128:27:25 Fullerton: Roger. Copy that. (Pause)

128:27:37 Shepard: And any time you want to give us the lift-off update and the consumables update, we're ready to go.

[As indicated in the righthand column of Sur 4-7, Ed will copy the liftoff times into forms in the Data Book and into the Consumables table in the checklist.]

128:28:27 Shepard: Okay. Go ahead.

128:28:29 Fullerton: For a GET (Ground Elapsed Time) of 129:00 (128:20 transcript time); RCS A, 80 percent; B, 77 percent; Descent O2 is 66.7 percent; and Ascent N/A (meaning "not applicable") and slash 96 percent; Descent water, 40.7 percent; and Ascent (water) is 98.4/98.4 percent. (Pause) And the ... (Pause) Stand by one on the last. (Pause) The amp-hours (remaining) on the Descent Batts are 834; and, on the Ascent Batts, they're 572. Over.

128:29:43 Mitchell: Okay. I copy GET of 129:00; RCS of 80 and 77; O2, - rather, Descent oxygen, 66.7; ascent is N/A and 96; Descent water, 40.7; Ascent water is 98.4/ 98.4; ampere-hours remaining descent is 834; ascent is 572.

128:30:08 Fullerton: Readback is correct, Ed. Good morning.

128:30:17 Mitchell: Good morning, Gordon. How is it back in Houston this morning?

128:30:24 Fullerton: I'm not sure, Ed. I haven't been outside in quite a while. But we're wondering if you'd give us an estimate of your sleep there.

128:30:39 Mitchell: Well, not very much. I'd say four and one-half to five hours at the most. Been kind of dozing the rest of the time.

128:30:47 Shepard: And about four hours for the CDR.

128:30:50 Fullerton: Roger. (Pause)

[Shepard, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "I don't know what you can do to make that rest period more comfortable. There needs to be some place to rest your head. I didn't have a feeling I could put my head on anything."]

[Mitchell, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "I felt the same way."]

[Shepard, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "I think that, if there was some way you could make the head a little bit more comfortable, you'd probably be able to sleep a little better."]

[I was under the impression that the neckrings contributed to the feeling they couldn't position their heads comfortably. In March 2005, I asked Ed Mitchell if this was true. He replied, "Yes, the neck rings were part of the problem as they were big, bulky and clumbsy. But a pillow or something to support the head in a more natural alignment with the spine was needed and fill the space between the neck ring and the head."

128:31:31 Shepard: That's affirmative. We had the Teflon flow limiters on both.

128:31:36 Fullerton: Roger, Al.

[Comm Break. The flow limiters were added to the ECS design after Apollo 12 to prevent water accumulation in the suits. See the discussion at 121:36:14.]

128:33:28 Fullerton: Ed, you were cut out there by another conversation. Will you say again, please?

128:33:36 Mitchell: Roger. I'm going to Primary Power Amp and back to Primary Voice.

128:33:41 Fullerton: Roger, Ed. (Pause) We'd like you to stay in (garbled). (Burst of static)

[Comm Break]

128:35:46 Fullerton: Loud and clear, Ed.

128:35:51 Mitchell: Okay. There you are. We're ready to proceed with the IMU align (on Sur 4-8) if everyone's ready.

128:35:59 Fullerton: I'll check. Just 1 second. (Long Pause) Antares, Houston.

128:36:37 Mitchell: Go ahead.

128:36:38 Fullerton: We'd like you to hold off for about 5 minutes on that, until we can give you an uplink, and that will result in a much better alignment. Over.

128:36:51 Mitchell: Okay. (Long Pause) Rog. Houston, we better get the computer up and operating for you here. May we press on with that? (Pause)

128:37:26 Fullerton: That's affirmative, Ed. Go ahead.

[Long Comm Break]

[They are at 131:30 in the checklist, corresponding to 130:50 in transcript time. They called Houston an hour and 25 minutes prior to the scheduled end of the rest period but, obviously, had been up for a while prior to that.]

[Shepard, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "We decided that, since we'd gotten a little bit behind on the timeline on the first EVA, we'd probably better start the second EVA early so we wouldn't get hung up on (that is, concerned about) getting back in. We didn't want to be rushed for lift-off. I'm glad we did that. It enabled us to get a full EVA period in and still have plenty of time afterwards to get cleaned up and ready for lift-off."]

128:42:15 Mitchell: Go ahead.

128:42:16 Fullerton: We're seeing a fluctuating signal strength. Like to verify that you're at Primary Power Amp and on the erectable. Is that correct?

128:42:28 Mitchell: That's affirmative, but let me check just a second. (Long Pause) I'm sorry, Houston. Do you read now?

128:42:48 Fullerton: Roger. Loud and clear.

128:42:52 Mitchell: Okay. As I went from Secondary to Primary, I never got past Off on the Power Amp.

128:42:59 Fullerton: Roger, Ed.

[Comm Break]

[Mitchell - "It points out the absolute validity of everybody double checking with their telemetry. It was pretty impossible to make an error that somebody didn't pick up. It shows the validity of the old aircraft/spacecraft adage: you voice check, you double check, and you reconfirm. And we caught a simple little error there."]

128:44:25 Fullerton: Roger.

[Comm Break]

[They are now at the top of Sur 4-9. P00 (pronounced "pooh") is Program Zero-Zero which allows Houston to load data into the LM computer.]

128:46:23 Shepard: Okay.

[Long Comm Break]

128:50:18 Mitchell: Okeydoke. Thank you, Gordon.

[Long Comm Break]

[P57 is the program which allows them to re-align the inertial platform using gravity-vector determinations and star sightings.]

128:54:42 Mitchell: Roger. Stand by one. (Long Pause) Okay, Houston. I assume you mean the lift-off table. Go ahead.

128:55:17 Fullerton: Negative. I meant the time you need about three steps more in P57 (that is, the third line in the center column of Sur 4-9), (the) Rev 31, lift-off time. I do have the table, if you want that one first, too.

128:55:30 Mitchell: Oh, okay. All right, go ahead and give this one.

128:55:34 Fullerton: Okay. The one for the P57, Rev 31 lift-off, 142:25:33.82. Over.

128:55:51 Mitchell: Roger. 142:25:33.82.

128:55:56 Fullerton: That's right. And any time you get a chance, I'll give you the table. (Long Pause)

[Jones - "This P57 Rev time is basically updating the LM computer's current knowledge of the CSM orbit."]

[Mitchell - "Right. And then they gave us lift-off times for several additional revs in case of an emergency lift-off under comm failure conditions."]

128:56:26 Fullerton: Stand by.

[Verb 74 is at the top of Sur 4-9, on the left side. It is a data download to Houston, called an E-Dump or Erasable Memory Dump.]

128:56:32 Fullerton: No. Not yet, Al.

128:56:40 Shepard: Okay. I'll stand by. Do it again when you're ready.

128:56:46 Mitchell: And I'm ready to copy the lift-off table.

128:56:50 Fullerton: Okay, Ed. For Rev 26, lift-off at 132:36:23; 27 is 134:34:42; 28, 136:33:03; 29, 138:31:25; Rev 30, 140:29:46; 31 is 142:28:07. (Pause)

128:57:54 Mitchell: Okay. 26 is 132:36:23; 27, 134:34:42; 28, 136:33:03; 29, 138:31:25; 30, 140:29:46; 31, 142:28:07.

128:58:16 Fullerton: That's all correct, Ed. (Long Pause) All right, Al, this is Houston. I guess we got that first Verb 74 you gave us, so we won't need another one.

128:58:52 Shepard: Okay. Very good. We'll press on with P57.

128:58:58 Fullerton: Roger.

[Long Comm Break. This is an abbreviated P57, to make sure that the platform hasn't drifted out of alignment.]

129:07:04 Mitchell: Go ahead.

129:07:06 Fullerton: Couple of items. When you get to the point where you're cleaning and lubricating the PGA neckrings, wristrings, and so forth, we'd like to emphasize to you to take special care, especially with Ed's suit. Have you been briefed on the leak problem on Ed's suit?

129:07:28 Mitchell: We talked about it a little bit, but not in detail.

129:07:35 Fullerton: Okay...

129:07:36 Mitchell: Let us finish this P57 and then we'll talk about it, Gordon.

129:07:39 Fullerton: Okay. Fine.

[Comm Break]

129:10:04 Mitchell: You have it. (Pause; no answer) Houston, you have Down Voice Backup.

129:10:18 Fullerton: Roger.

[Long Comm Break. Gene Cernan, the backup Commander, takes over briefly as CapCom.]

129:17:13 Cernan: Ah, good morning, Antares. Or good evening. How are you doing?

129:17:20 Mitchell: Pretty good. How are you?

129:17:23 Cernan: Real good. What can we do for you, Ed?

129:17:28 Mitchell: We were supposed to be picking up a pre-EVA-2 briefing (at the bottom of Sur 4-10). We're standing by.

129:17:33 Cernan: Okay. We're working on it back here, Ed. And we'll be back with you here shortly. Tentatively, I think they're planning...

129:17:43 Mitchell: Okay.

129:17:45 Cernan: Okay, tentatively, I think we're planning on - towards the end of your EVA-2, prior to ingress, (and) you can be thinking about this - going back and taking a look at the ALSEP antenna, but other than that at this moment there looks like there are no major changes. We'll get to you shortly.

129:18:06 Mitchell: Okay, Geno. How are things going there?

129:18:09 Cernan: Real good! You guys did a super outstanding job yesterday. And I'll tell you, you took two of us (Cernan and the backup LMP, Joe Engle) with you on every step. (Pause)

129:18:27 Shepard: Geno, if we're going to re-align the (Central Station) antenna, I'd just as soon do it at the start of the EVA.

129:18:35 Cernan: Okay. We'll make that input. You got any more comments concerning that, Al? You'd rather get it at the beginning, is that correct?

129:18:47 Shepard: That's correct. I think if we have to do it at all, then we'll go ahead and get it done right away because Ed can be doing something else while I'm doing that.

129:18:59 Cernan: Okay. I'll make that input, directly.

[Long Comm Break]

[It is likely that Al and Ed started to clean and lubricate their neckrings, wristrings, and hoses connectors - as per Sur 5-1 - while they wait for Houston.]

129:22:11 Shepard: Go ahead.

129:22:13 Cernan: Okay, Al. We're just taking an overall look at your comm signal-strengths and what have you, and we'd like...

129:22:20 Shepard: Go ahead, Houston.

129:22:23 Cernan: How are you reading?

129:22:29 Shepard: We read you loud and clear.

129:22:30 Cernan: Okay, Ed...(correcting himself) or, Al. We're taking a look at your overall comm, matching signal strengths and what have you. We're interested in what Power Amp you're using right now. What's the position of your Transmitter/Receiver and what antenna you're on now. We'd also like you to give us what those positions were during your sleep period, if you remember.

129:22:56 Mitchell: Okay, Geno. We're on Primary/Primary Down-Voice Backup, and the only difference is we were on Secondary/Secondary Down-Voice Backup, I believe. Yeah, we've been on Secondary Transmitter/Receiver. It called for Secondary Power Amp; and we were on Down-Voice Backup. And we've just gone to Primary Transmitter/Receiver as per checklist, and Primary Power Amp, a few minutes ago.

129:23:33 Cernan: Okay. And you've been on the EVA antenna...

129:23:35 Mitchell: (Garbled).

129:23:35 Cernan: ...the whole time.

129:23:38 Mitchell: That's affirmative.

129:23:40 Cernan: Okay. Thank you, Ed.

129:23:43 Mitchell: Let's see if what I'm telling you is correct. Let me flip back here. (Long Pause) Okay, Gene. I was wrong on that. We went to Off on the Power Amplifier as per checklist when we went to Down Voice Backup during the sleep period and we came back up to Primary as per checklist this morning. I was thinking that we were in Secondary, but we did go by the checklist, so it had to be Off.

129:24:41 Cernan: Okay, Ed. We got that, now. And we'd like you to put your water Sep(arator) in at number 2 position, if you would please.

129:24:55 Shepard: Okay. Stand by.

[Long Comm Break.]

[Other than a note that the water separator was running faster than expected, there is no further discussion of the matter in the Apollo 14 Mission Report nor were any problems experienced with water in the suit-loop during this or the following missions.]

[Ed's next transmission indicates that they are ready to start checklist page Sur 5-2. They had planned to finish Sur 5-1 at 132:45, which corresponds to 132:05 in transcript time, so they are 2 1/2 hours ahead. On Sur 5-2, the first step is to set the Digital Event Timer (DET) to 0:30. It counts only minutes, and does not show hours.]

129:31:32 Cernan: Go ahead.

129:31:37 Mitchell: Okay. We're ready to start our timer up on the EVA-2 Prep.

129:31:45 Cernan: Okay. And we're pushing them to get an answer on this briefing real quick, Ed. I understand you're ready to push your timer up on EVA-2 Prep.

129:31:57 Mitchell: That's affirm. Of course, we can get that answer any time, Gene; as we go out the door even.

129:32:04 Cernan: Yeah. That's affirm. We're with you for pressing on at this time. And how's your neckrings and wristrings look? Were they in pretty bad shape, dirt-and-dustwise?

129:32:19 Mitchell: I don't think they were. My right wristring was a little bit dirty. The neckring didn't look bad. The left one wasn't bad. And Al's were in pretty good shape.

129:32:29 Shepard: Yeah. It was kind of a surprise. There was no visible grit to speak of at all. (Pause)

129:32:43 Mitchell: Okay. Mark. Start timing.

129:32:46 Cernan: Okay.

[Very Long Comm Break.]

[Having started the DET at 0:30, if they stay on schedule they will reach the next major section of the checklist, "PLSS Donning" at 0:57, at 129:59 in transcript time. Their next transmission indicates that they have lost two minutes, a trivial amount, out of their 2 1/2 hour margin. The reason for the extra time taken was probably a recurrence of the troubles they had in emptying the urine bag in Al's suit.]

[Shepard, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "Both times when we were scheduled to dump urine out of the UCTA (Urine Collection and Transfer Assembly) inside my suit into the little bags, we found that the hose leading from the UCTA to the suit fitting was a little too long and it was kinked. Consequently, I couldn't transfer urine out from the suit into the bags. We got around that by unzipping the suit and having Ed reach in there and straighten out the hose. It transferred that way. We used up every single one of those damn urine bags. We didn't have enough of those."]

[Mitchell, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "We could have used several more. (And) there's a problem in the stowage. The stowage of the urine bags on the right side is great when they're empty; but, when you fill them up, there's no place to put them. They're too big to fit into the stowage compartment, and there's just no other place to put them. We had them stuffed every place until we could put them in the contingency bag for jettison."]

130:01:03 Fullerton: Antares, Houston. Go ahead.

130:01:08 Shepard: Just to keep you advised, we're starting PLSS donning on EVA-2 Prep.

130:01:14 Fullerton: Okay, Al.

[Very Long Comm Break.]

[Fred Haise, the LMP on the aborted Apollo 13 mission, takes over as CapCom. He and Jim Lovell had trained for the Fra Mauro mission.]

[Jones - "Why did you have different CapComs for the two EVAs? None of the other landing crews did."]

[Mitchell - "Fred was the senior LMP and had done a lot more of the geology briefing than McCandless did. It's just the way chores were divided up. McCandless had worked with us on the lunar surface equipment. As a matter of fact, I think that was one of his technical responsibilities. So he knew the ALSEP and all of that equipment very well. And was in a better position to provide technical help from his own knowledge. But Fredo had worked with us more on the lunar geology, so he was in a better position to be helpful on the second EVA."]

[Jones - "And, in fact, he had trained for this site. Was it basically you and Al who picked the CapComs?"]

[Mitchell - "No. We had input to it and it wasn't a real controversy."]

[Jones - "It was pretty obvious to everybody who was appropriate."]

[Mitchell - "Now, Al might have had something to say about it that I wasn't aware of. And he got pretty much what he wanted."]

[Jones - "Charlie Duke has said that Neil asked him to be the 11 landing CapCom, which gave me the impression that the crews had a great deal to say about who served on support crews."]

[Mitchell - "Oh, yeah. We did indeed."]

[The following transmission indicates that they did the PLSS donning in only 16 minutes, rather than the 20 allotted in the checklist. They are now on Sur 5-3.]

130:17:11 Haise: Go ahead, Antares.

130:17:15 Mitchell: Okay, Fredo. We're at the PLSS comm check portion of our Prep-and-Post (Cue Card). We will follow checklist except we will reverse the LMP('s) and the CDR's audio panel like we did yesterday.

130:17:31 Haise: Okay. And, Ed, we're going to have to hold for about 3 minutes to make the checks here, because we need to do some reconfiguring.

130:17:44 Mitchell: Okay. Give us a call when you're ready. (Long Pause)

130:18:25 Haise: And, Antares; Houston.

130:18:31 Mitchell: Go ahead.

130:18:33 Haise: Okay. And while we got this little bit of wait-time here before you get on the PLSSs all the way, why don't I get you to get your map out and let me give you some changes on the task.

130:18:52 Mitchell: Okay. You want the EVA-2 map out, right?

130:18:54 Haise: That's affirm. (Long Pause) And, you still there, Antares?

130:19:22 Shepard: Affirmative. We're getting the map out now, Fredo.

[The map in question is 2-LS-1/EVA-2 and, in the collection of Apollo 14 LM Lunar Surface Maps, there is an accompanying task table. As Ed discusses below, the task list may have been laminated on the back of the map.]

[Jones - "What I'm hearing here is that what you were supposed to do at the sites was written on the map, as well as on the cuff checklists."]

[Mitchell - "No. The map had the traverse route drawn on it. (Looking at the checklist page for Station B) The only thing on the list is a pan and samples. When you take samples, that meant a documented sample. So I suspect what we did - although I don't remember it clearly - is simply on that page of the checklist, we might have just written "grab samples" (as opposed to documented samples). Or we might not have written anything, counting on them to prompt us on that as we got there. The checklists were covered, though, in plastic. I remember they were vinyl covered. So, if we wrote on them, it would have to be with some type of marker pen. We didn't have marker pens in those days. We had ballpoints. And that wouldn't have written on the vinyl."]

[Jones - "What happened to those checklists? Did they come back?"]

[Mitchell - "I don't think we discarded them. Those would have been nice little items. I'm sure we didn't throw them away. Now, I don't have mine. (Returning to the question of changing the checklist) Probably, here, we just noted it. We might have written it somewhere, but I'm pretty sure we didn't write it on the cuff checklist, because I don't know how we would have written it on the cuff checklist."]

[Jones - "It's puzzling that they had you get the map out."]

[Mitchell - "Let's see. The map was on one side. It could be that on the back of the map...but that was a vinyl covered thing, too...but there might have been a duplication of the checklist. As a matter of fact, I think there was."]

[See, also, Ed's comment following 130:28:13.]

130:20:12 Haise: Okay. I guess the rationale, Ed, was that it wasn't really felt that it would save that much time to do it there since y'all had been operating in parallel anyway and it alters our nominal. Plus, with respect to the priorities; it's just desired to save that until last in case we have to cut any more.

130:20:38 Shepard: Okay. Are you getting anything at all from the ALSEP now?

130:20:42 Haise: I guess they are getting signals but they're low signal strength, Al. And the only things that's going to help is if indeed an antenna lead (that is, one of the cables linking the experiment modules with the Central Station) or something physically jarred the Central Station so the antenna is offset from the way you left it.

130:21:06 Shepard: Okay.

130:21:09 Haise: They've already tried the switching on all the electronics they had.

130:21:17 Shepard: Okay. We're ready to entertain the changes for EVA-2.

130:21:22 Haise: Okay. At site B, that'll be a grab sample at that stop. (Long Pause)

130:21:50 Haise: Okay. At site F...

130:21:55 Mitchell: Okay. I've got a grab...Hold it. Fredo, we got a grab sample at site B now. Let's get straight on our term "grab sample." You want no photography at all. Is that affirmative? Or do you want some?

130:22:09 Haise: The photography there will be the pan, Ed. And that'll be it.

130:22:17 Mitchell: Okay. No documentation of the sample at all.

130:22:21 Haise: That's affirm.

130:22:26 Mitchell: Okay. Press on.

130:22:27 Haise: Okay. Now down to Weird. The same thing there. Grab sample.

130:22:37 Shepard: Okay. Grab sample at Weird.

130:22:43 Haise: Okay. And then basically I've written in here...It's actually what should be on your closeout part of the cuff checklist. But at that time the CDR will go to the ALSEP, and I'll have some instructions to follow on that, Al. And at that point, Ed would proceed to the boulder field - that's north (of the LM) - to take care of the weigh bags with documented samples from that area.

[This sample area will be called Station H.]

130:23:22 Haise: Okay. And that's about it. With respect to the nominal timeline.

130:23:31 Mitchell: Okay. That's simple enough. How many of those big boulders do you want, Fred?

130:23:38 Haise: How many can you fit into the weigh bags?

130:23:44 Shepard: (Garbeld) ...

130:23:46 Slayton: Don't put more than 10 pounds in that 1-pound bag.

130:23:51 Shepard: (Garbled). (Listens) (Garbled) to bring them back like a baby in his arms.

130:23:54 Mitchell: We'll have to pick up the LM and carry it over there.

130:23:58 Haise: How much you been eating lately, Ed?

130:24:03 Shepard: They're not really too bad. They're probably no more than 3 or 4 feet maximum dimension.

[Jones - "This is hilarious. You started it with 'how many of those big boulders do you want, Fred?' and even old Deke had to get in it. And what's this about 'how much have you been eating lately'?"]

[Mitchell - "Fred was always needling me about being a little chubby. I never was, particularly, but that's what he'd needle me about."]

130:24:22 Shepard: Okay. We're standing by and setting up for it now.

130:24:25 Haise: Roger, Al.

[Comm Break]

130:28:07 Mitchell: Okay. You'll have to remind us of that, Fred. It's on our checklist.

[Journal Contributor Thomas Schwagmeier notes that Fred has mispoken. The activity at EVA-2 close-out that Houston wants to eliminate is collection of a "Contamination Sample" from under the LM, which they planned to do during the EVA-2 close-out at 3+34 in both cuff checklists. As for the organic samples, Ed sealed one early in EVA-1 at 115:34:23 and Al is scheduled to do the same early in EVA-2. The subject of the organic sample versus the contamination sample comes up again at 131:28:02.

[This exchange suggests that they haven't actually written anything on the checklists.]

[Mitchell - "But it does suggest that we may have been able to write something on the back of that map. And that's most likely. Because now, as I recall, the map did have notations on the back about what was to be done at each of the stations."]

[Jones - "Was the map on what was called cronopaque? Kind of a non-glossy photographic paper, laminated."]

[Mitchell - "Right. And you could write on that."]

[Comm Break as they proceed with the PLSS Comm Check on Sur 5-3.]

130:30:47 Mitchell: Houston, Antares. How do you read now?

130:30:50 Haise: I read you loud and clear, Antares. We need you to go back to PM and go from Down-Voice Backup to Normal Voice and then start in again with the FM route.

130:31:05 Mitchell: Okay, I'm in PM now. I'll switch to Down-Voice Backup and back to Voice.

130:31:11 Haise: Okay. (Burst of static) Switch to Down-Voice and then back to Voice, good. (Long Pause)

130:31:31 Mitchell: (Static has cleared) Houston, how do you read now?

130:31:34 Haise: Loud and clear, Antares.

130:31:38 Mitchell: Okay, I'm going to FM and close the TV circuit breaker.

130:31:42 Haise: Roger. (Long Pause; static)

130:32:03 Mitchell: (Garbled, probably "Houston"). How do you read now?

130:32:08 Haise: Okay, Antares; Houston. Got a little bit of background static. Give me another check there. (Static clears; Long Pause)

RealVideo Clip (3 min 24 sec)

[The TV transmission resumes. The picture is much improved, with far less saturation, perhaps because of the higher Sun angle. However, in addition to the conversation between Houston and the crew, the TV audio track of the copy used in the preparation of this Journal also contains what may be a National Public Radio broadcast.]

130:32:50 Haise: Go ahead, Antares. I'm reading you about 3 by 3 now, Ed.

130:32:57 Mitchell: Okay, I'm on FM. The TV (circuit breaker) is closed. Prime-Prime and Voice. Okay?

130:33:05 Haise: Okay, you're coming in loud and clear now.

[Mitchell - "Those were old, old aviator voice signals. What the hell did it mean? 5 by 5 would mean loud and clear. And it was all on a scale of 1 to 5. The volume and the level of static."]

[They are near the bottom of the lefthand column on Sur 5-3.]

130:33:27 Mitchell: VOX SENS MAX. (Garbled) T/R, B Receive. Okay, Houston, I'm switching to Secondary now. Secondary Transmitter/Receiver.

130:33:49 Haise: Okay, Ed. (Static; pause)

130:34:00 Mitchell: (Very faint) Okay, how do you read now? (Pause; static clears) We're not transmitting. (Garbled). (Pause)

130:34:24 Mitchell: (Good comm) Houston, Antares. How do you read?

130:34:26 Haise: I read you loud and clear, Antares.

[Al is not on VOX through the following sequence.]

[Mitchell - "We're switching back and forth, broadcasting on different frequencies. The systems are redundant, and then you've got the interface with the LM. A person not knowing the procedures would be further confused because you get these periods where one guy's not configured exactly as the other guy."]

[Jones - "To summarize what you said, the complexity is because of the redundancy and the necessity of the two of you transmitting on separate frequencies. Each of you was transmitting and receiving on different frequencies."]

[Mitchell - "What I'm transmitting on, Al's receiving. And then the LM system funnels that all in so that Houston can hear both of us. We're broadcasting VHF and the LM system modulates it so that it goes out on the S-band. And it's complicated here a little bit more by the fact that we're on a backup mode in the PLSS, than what we normally are, because of that communications problem we had on the first EVA."]

[Thomas Schwagmeier has provided a diagram from the Apollo 14 Final Flight Plan.]

130:35:21 Mitchell: VHF A (garbled). (Momentary squeal) Your A, T/R, on? (Pause) Your PLSS, Off. (Pause) Okay, it says (garbled) right now. (Garbled).

130:35:59 Mitchell: Okay, (Tape) recorder, On; VHF Antenna to EVA. (Pause) All right, Houston, I'm going to PLSS comm.

RealVideo Clip (3 min 30 sec)

130:36:18 Haise: Roger, Ed.

[Comm Break. They are at the top of Sur 5-4.]

130:39:00 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause) Yeah, I'll pull mine. (Pause) Okay, they are off. (Long Pause)

[Next, they will get Al connected to PLSS comm. The unusual squeals and other aspects of this comm check may be due to the fact that they are relaying through the CDR's audio panel but hooked the LMP up to PLSS comm first.]

130:39:35 Mitchell: (No longer squealing) And I read you loud and clear.

RealVideo Clip (3 min 50 sec)

130:39:39 Shepard: Roger; and my PLSS O2 is reading eight-five percent.

130:39:42 Mitchell: (Now at the top of the right-hand column of Sur 5-4) Okay. I go B, you go A.

130:39:45 Shepard: Okay, now. (Brief squeal) How do you read?

130:39:52 Mitchell: Loud and clear. How me?

130:39:53 Shepard: Loud and clear. Okay, both AR. (Brief squeal) How do you read AR?

130:40:05 Mitchell: Loud and clear. How me?

130:40:06 Shepard: Read you loud and clear. And I have a tone.

130:40:08 Mitchell: And, Houston. How do you read Ed?

130:40:11 Haise: Okay, Ed. I read you loud and clear.

130:40:16 Mitchell: Okay, Fredo. (Pause) And I have a PLSS O2 quantity of (pause) eighty-seven percent.

[During the J-missions, the crews did a morning top-off of the PLSS oxygen tanks and, consequently, had 90 to 95 percent at this point in the EVA Preps.]

130:40:40 Haise: Roger, Al. We copied the quantity and you're coming in loud and clear.

[Since setting the DET at 129:32, they have completed tasks that were expected to take 57 minutes to complete. They have lost about 11 minutes out of their margin, mostly due to the fact that Houston wasn't ready with the EVA planning updates.]

130:40:54 LM Crew: Closed.

130:40:55 Shepard: Suit Fan Delta-P (and) Suit Fan 2, Open.

130:40:56 Mitchell: Okay.

130:40:59 Shepard: Okay; we got a (ECS) caution (light)?

130:41:02 Mitchell: Yup.

130:41:03 Shepard: We have?

130:41:04 Mitchell: No, wait a minute. We do not have a caution yet. (Pause)

[They are waiting for the ECS fan to slow down enough to activate a sensor which will turn on the caution light.]

130:41:21 Mitchell: Okay, Suit Gas, Pull-Egress.

130:41:24 Shepard: Cabin Gas Return (Valve), Egress; and Suit Circuit Relief (Valve), Auto.

130:41:31 Mitchell: Egress, and Suit Circuit Relief, Auto.

[Next, they will connect the OPSs as per Sur 5-5.]

130:42:15 Shepard: Snap. (Pause) Okay. All your flaps are snapped. No Irish pennants. And the actuator is on (pause) connecting it to the RCU. (Pause) It's connected.

130:42:35 Mitchell: Okay.

[Conrad, from the Apollo 12 Lunar Surface Journal - "'Irish pennants' is a navy term. It means that there are some loose ends hanging around. On a ship, if you have Irish pennants, that means lines aren't tended right. They're hanging over the side, they're not coiled correctly, whatever."]

130:42:47 Mitchell: Okay.

[Jones - "On the Suit Disconnect (Suit Isolation Valve), there were two settings: Suit Flow and Suit Disconnect. But there was a sensor that, if it was triggered and the valve was in Suit Flow, it would put it back in Suit Disconnect. That is, basically take you off of the ECS."]

[Mitchell - "As I recall, what you're describing is a lock-up position. What triggered in my mind when you said that was, if you got a leak in the LM O2, that diverter valve would automatically click off to Suit Disconnect. And that's to prevent loss of oxygen. In other words, this was a protection for loss of oxygen in the LM system, momentarily. It'd lock up your suit until you changed your source of oxygen."]

[Jones - "So it basically isolates the suit. You're getting oxygen from the ECS and something goes wrong somewhere in the system, it cuts the suit off. So it's basically to shut off the flow from the suit back into the ECS?"]

[Mitchell - "I think that's correct. I don't know why I'm saying that, but that sounds right. The Suit Disconnect position was, primarily, to keep the ECS isolated. And then you could disconnect from the ECS to go onto the PLSS. And you wouldn't lose oxygen for the ship's system. But I think it also had a function so that, if you lost pressure in the ship's system, it locked up the suit."]

[Jones - "And, in fact, there was a spring actuator to flip it back to Suit Disconnect."]

130:43:10 Mitchell: What's off?

130:43:11 Shepard: That is off. Okay, there's...

130:43:13 LM Crew: ECS (Caution light) and Water Sep(arator light) (have come on).

130:43:14 Mitchell: Okay.

130:43:15 Shepard: Okay, connect the OPS O2 hose. Blue to blue. (Pause) Blue to blue and locked.

RealVideo Clip (2 min 58 sec)

130:43:32 Mitchell: Okay. 130:43:35 Shepard: Okay. 130:43:36 Mitchell: The purge valve.

130:43:40 Shepard: Okay, I have one. (Pause)

130:43:44 Mitchell: Purge is (in) Low (flow).

130:43:47 LM Crew: Low.

130:43:48 Shepard: (Installing Ed's purge valve) And in you go. (Long Pause)

130:44:17 Shepard: Okay, you're locked.

130:44:19 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause)

130:44:25 Shepard: Okay. PGA diverter valves Vertical. Both vertical. Okay.

[As shown in Figure I-23 in the EMU Handbook, the diverter valve is part of the oxygen inflow connector and gives them the option of directing the PLSS oxygen flow entirely into the helmet (the vertical position) or partly into the suit torso (the horizontal position). Generally, the astronauts put the diverter valve to horizontal only when they were in the cabin and were trying to dry the suits out a little. In the hoizontal position, used in the cabin, all the incoming oxygen stream is divided between a duct leading to the helmet vent and a duct leading the vents in the torso. In the vertical position, used outside, all the oxygen goes to the helmet vent. Figure I-10 from the EMU Handbook shows the layout of the ducts.]

[Ed will now get Al's OPS hooked up.]

130:44:40 Mitchell: Unstow OPS O2 actuator. (Pause) (Un)stowed. Flaps are coming closed. (Long Pause) Connecting it. (Pause) Okay.

130:45:11 Shepard: Okay. Suit Isol(ation) Valve to Disconnect. I got it. Okay.

130:45:21 Mitchell: (Reading down the cue card to find their place) "Actuator to RCU...Suit ISOL valve."

130:45:22 Shepard: Got that.

130:45:23 Mitchell: (Dis)connect O2 hoses. (Pause) Ouch! (Pause) Okay.

[Ed is doing the fourth line in the OPS Connect paragraph on page 5-5. The "Dis" syllable in "Disconnect" may have been clipped by the VOX. Ed is disconnecting Al's O2 hoses and his "ouch" suggests he scraped his finger on one of Al's valves. He says it was easy to do. After spending more than four hours in the suit on EVA-1, their fingers are probably scraped, bruised and, generally, tender.]

[They are on the first line in the second paragraph under OPS Connect, which reads "Connect OPS O2 Hose to PGA B/B".]

130:46:06 Shepard: Locked and Low (flow).

130:46:07 Mitchell: Low. Okay; and locked. (Pause) Okay, it's locked. And the lock is lock-locked.

RealVideo Clip (3 min 01 sec)

130:46:26 Shepard: Okay. Diverter valves to vertical.

130:46:28 Mitchell: Vertical.

130:46:29 Shepard: Verify items prepared for jettison. ECS LiOH cartridge and (stowage) bracket - it's in there. Hammocks, PLSS batteries and LiOH cartridges. Waste bags. (Pause)

[For the trip out from Earth, a replacement for the ECS Primary LiOH caniter was secured in a bracket behind the ascent engine cover, just below the back corner of the ECS cabinet. See a detail from an Apollo 16 LM-close-out picture. As per page 4-7 in the LM Lunar Surface Checklist, they have removed the used canister, installed the replacement, and will jettison both the used canister and the bracket.]

[Ed is probably taking a drink of water before getting his helmet on.]

130:47:31 Mitchell: Descent Water Valve, Closed.

[They are now at the top of the righthand column on Sur 5-5.]

130:47:36 Mitchell: (Garbled) mikes set.

130:47:38 Shepard: Mikes are set.

130:47:40 Mitchell: And (Comm Carrier neck) strap's set. (Pause)

[Figure from the Apollo 14 edition of the Apollo Operations Handbook: Extra-Vehicular Mobility Unit shows that the Comm Carrier (Snoopy Cap) could be secure with either a neck strap or a chin cup. A photograph from suit-up for the Countdown Demostration Test shows Al with his Comm Carrier firmly fastened with a neck strap.]

130:47:51 Mitchell: Fan, On. (Pause)

130:47:56 Shepard: Vent flag, clear.

130:47:58 Mitchell: Vent flag, clear. (Pause)

130:48:04 Shepard: Okay, you ready for your helmet?

130:48:05 Mitchell: Yep. (Long Pause)

130:48:26 Mitchell: Get all the stuff up. (Pause)

[Ed wants to be sure nothing will be in the way of Al seating Ed's helmet on the neckring.]

130:48:39 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause) Okay.

130:48:47 Shepard: All righty. (Long Pause)

[Clacking sounds can be heard as they get Ed's helmet on.]

130:49:24 Shepard: Okay, I believe that's good.

130:49:26 Mitchell: (Garbled). (Pause) Locked?

130:49:30 Shepard: You're locked.

130:49:31 Mitchell: Great. (Long Pause)

130:49:54 Shepard: Okay, can you see your (RCU) controls?

130:49:55 Mitchell: Yup.

130:49:57 Shepard: (Garbled)?

130:49:59 Mitchell: Yup.

130:50:00 Shepard: Okay, your LEVA is installed. Check your drink bag position. (Pause)

130:50:13 Mitchell: Be easier pressurized. Okay, can you reach it?

130:50:18 Shepard: Yeah, I got it. (Long Pause)

[Mitchell - "With the suit unpressurized, the drink bag's way down low. When the suit pressurizes, it lifts the neckring up so that you can get to your drinking straw (also known as the drink valve) much easier."]

130:50:54 Shepard: Yeah. (Pause)

[Ed will now get Al into his helmet.]

130:51:22 Shepard: Sounds better. (Pause)

[Clacking sounds can be heard as they get Al's helmet locked.]

130:52:05 Shepard: Right here.

130:52:06 Mitchell: Let me look behind now. (Garbled) look at the other side. Yeah, I was afraid of that. (Pause) Okay, now you are all tucked down.

RealVideo Clip (3 min 38 sec)

130:52:23 Shepard: Okay; LCG is positioned as required; open the LCG Pump breaker.

130:52:27 Mitchell: Let's take a shot of cold air and chill down, if you don't mind. (Correcting himself) Cold water...(garbled)

[Ed wants to use the ECS water pump to cool themselves down before they disconnect. They won't have PLSS cooling until after they open the hatch.]

130:52:37 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause) Okay.

130:52:47 Shepard: Okay, go ahead. I'll just put these hoses in the back, here.

130:52:50 Mitchell: Okay. You're dragging this one. Why don't you hook it up while you're at it. (Pause) I'll hold it for you. Go ahead.

[Jones - "So, in this sequence, you were going to open the LCG breaker; but you decided you wanted to cool down a little bit, and he decided to go ahead and unhook his LM H2O hoses? If his hoses were long enough to reach him in the hammock, they must have been pretty long and difficult to keep out of the way."]

[Mitchell - "Yeah. I went ahead and left the circuit breaker in. That kept the LM suit system running. But he went ahead and disconnected himself."]

130:54:00 Mitchell: It went. (Pause) Can't do two things at once. (Long Pause) Get it locked?

[Other than the obvious fact that they are disconnecting Al's LM water hoses, getting them out of the way, and getting Al's PLSS water hooked up, the details are indecipherable.]

130:54:42 Mitchell: Sure? It didn't feel like it. Okay. (Pause)

[They are now finished with Al's water hoses.]

130:54:50 Mitchell: Okay, LCG Pump (circuit breaker). (I'm) opening (it).

130:54:53 Shepard: Okay. Here, I'll get this. (Pause)

130:55:01 Mitchell: Okay. (Garbled). (Long Pause)

130:55:36 Shepard: Here, I'll get them for you. (Pause) Okay, you're locked.

[Note that they have gotten Ed's water hoses hooked up quite quickly.]

130:55:54 Mitchell: Okay, verify (the following). Helmet and visor, aligned and adjusted. (Pause)

130:56:00 Shepard: (Garbled).

130:56:01 Mitchell: Okay. Torso tiedown adjusted. I'm going to pull it down a little bit more today. This stiff suit's (pause) not quite tight enough. (Pause) Okay. (Long Pause)

[Jones - "I gather that you're adjusting the torso tiedown."]

[Mitchell - "You pulled it down tighter because it was riding up too high. Until you pressurize, you pulled that down and the suit really cut into your shoulders and it was only when the pressure came on that it lifted that off of your shoulders and you started to feel a little comfort. An unpressurized suit squeezed down tight like it should, but it was a pretty miserable son-of-a-bitch to be in. So, we hesitated to pull down that torso tightener any tighter than you really had to because, for me, at least, it caused pain on the shoulders. But from the experience of the first EVA, I knew I should tighten mine down, because that kept the neckring from rising up too high."]

[Jones - "So you're compressing the upper part of the suit."]

[Mitchell - "And tilting the neckring forward, actually."]

[In the following sequence, Al will check Ed's hose connections, with Ed reading the checklist to him. In the checklist, "O2 Connectors (6)" means three connectors each.]

130:56:40 Shepard: Turn around. They're locked; red locked, blue locked.

130:56:46 Mitchell: (Reading page 5-5) Purge valves, one.

[Al and Ed each have a purge valve, as indicated by the line 'Purge Valves (2) - Locked'. However, Al is only checking Ed's purge valve which is probably why Ed uses the singular 'oneÕ. From here on, Ed uses only the singular, perhaps as a comment aimed at the checklist writers. Al does the same. By the time Apollo 15 flew, changes had been made in appropriate places such as checklist page 3-9.]

130:56:49 Mitchell: Water connector, one.

130:56:51 Shepard: Water connector's locked.

130:56:52 Mitchell: Comm connector, one.

130:56:54 Shepard: Comm connector's locked.

130:56:55 Mitchell: Okay; read them for me.

[Now, Ed will check Al's suit.]

130:57:02 Mitchell: Okay; I verify that.

130:57:03 Shepard: My torso tiedown is okay. Three O2 connectors.

130:57:09 Mitchell: Okay, three O2 connectors, verified locked and lock-locked.

130:57:14 Shepard: One purge valve.

130:57:15 Mitchell: One purge valve; in, and lock-locked.

130:57:18 Shepard: Water connector.

130:57:19 Mitchell: Water connector.

130:57:20 Shepard: And comm connector.

130:57:21 Mitchell: Locked and locked.

130:57:24 Shepard: Take a look at the EVA circuit breakers.

130:57:27 Mitchell: Okay. (To Al) Wait a minute. Hold it. We'll have to move the dispose-all container here. (Pause)

[Ed's tone-of-voice suggests that he has noticed that Al is getting hung up on the jettison bag as he turns to check his circuit breaker panel.]

["Dispose-All" was a brand of garbage disposal unit that could be attached to the drain of a home kitchen sink to grind up food waste - and the occasional fork. "Dispose-All" was a competitor of industry leader was "In-sink-erator" but, perhaps because "dispose-all" is easier to say, by the time of Apollo 14, it had become something of a generic term. Here, Ed is using "dispose-all container" instead of "jettison bag".]

130:58:07 Shepard: Okay; they're verified.

130:58:08 Mitchell: Mine are all verified. Let's don EV gloves.

130:58:17 Shepard: Okay.

[Comm Break]

[They are near the bottom of Sur 5-5.]

131:00:12 Shepard: Bring your (wrist)ring around a little bit. (Long Pause) I think that did it. Now try it.

131:00:50 Mitchell: No. There's something catching on it, Al.

131:01:00 Shepard: Take it off.

131:01:01 Mitchell: Huh?

131:01:02 Shepard: (Repeating himself) Take it off. (Long Pause)

131:01:15 Mitchell: Yeah. Try to go straight into it this time. (Long Pause)

131:01:35 Mitchell: That felt good. (Pause)

131:01:40 Shepard: Okay. (Long Pause)

131:02:13 Mitchell: (Garbled). (Pause)

131:02:23 Mitchell: Okay. Got it.

[Mitchell - "Apparently, I took the glove off and then put it back on and re-aligned the ring."]

131:02:25 Shepard: Okay. Four wrist locks locked. Glove straps adjusted. Verify PLSS Diverter in Min.

[They are now at the top of 5-6.]

131:02:36 Shepard: And then PLSS (LCG) pump On.

131:02:38 Mitchell: Pump On.

131:02:40 Shepard: Okay. Press Regs A and B to Egress. (Pause)

131:02:52 Mitchell: Okay. (Garbled). Press Regs A and B.

131:02:55 Shepard: Press Regs A and B to Egress.

131:03:00 Mitchell: Press, Egress.

[Next, they will perform a pressure integrity check. In the checklist, an hour and 22 minutes were allotted to the tasks they have done since setting the Digital Event Timer, which they did at 129:32 in transcript time. The actual elapsed time since then is 1 hour 31 minutes, which means that they have only lost 9 minutes of the 2 1/2 hours they were ahead.]

131:03:16 Mitchell: O2, On. There we go.

131:03:19 Shepard: Tone?

131:03:20 Mitchell: (Garbled)

131:03:21 Shepard: Flag O.

131:03:23 Mitchell: There's the tone. O2 flag O.

[They have just complete the first line under PRESSURE INTEGRITY CHECK in the righthand column. As indicated on page 2-77 in volume 1 of the Apollo 14 EMU Operations Handbook (2 Mb), when the flow of oxygen is 'high', the O2 window on the RCU shows an 'O' flag. As indicated on page 4-43 in volume 2 of the Apollo 12-15 EMU Operations Handbook (3.6 Mb), they hear a 10-second warble tone after the PLSS O2 shutoff valve is set to ON. The 'O' flag in the O2 window disappears (clears) when the suit pressure reaches the range 3.1 to 3.4 psid.]

131:03:33 Mitchell: Press, (garbled, possibly 'O'). (Long Pause)

131:04:08 Shepard: Press flag cleared (at) 3.1 (psi).

131:04:10 Mitchell: And mine's clear.

131:04:12 Shepard: Okay. (Pause) And I'm stable at 3.7 (psi).

131:04:22 Mitchell: I'm not quite there, yet. Okay. There it is.

131:04:29 Shepard: And the O2 flag is clear.

131:04:31 Mitchell: Mine's clear. My O2 is off.

131:04:33 Shepard: Okay. And we're stabilized at 3.7.

131:04:37 Shepard: And O2 coming Off.

131:04:38 Mitchell: 3.7, starting the check.

[Comm Break]

131:05:41 Mitchell: Okay. There's forty (seconds past the minute). I have about 0.22 (psi pressure change during the integrity check).

131:05:51 Shepard: Okay, Houston; 0.22 drop on the LMP, and 0.15 drop on the CDR. Okay. PLSS O2, On.

131:06:02 Haise: Okay. We copy.

MP3 Audio Clip by Ken Glover (6 min 51 sec)

131:06:07 Mitchell: Okay. PLSS O2 is On. (Pause) And O2 flag clear, tone is On.

131:06:18 Shepard: Okay. And the pressure is back up to 3.7.

131:06:21 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause) Houston, we're ready for Cabin Depress.

131:06:27 Haise: Okay. We're Go, Ed.

131:06:31 Mitchell: Okay.

131:06:32 Shepard: Okay. Okay. Circuit breaker ECS Cabin Repress, open. (Pause)

131:06:44 Mitchell: Cabin Repress breaker's open.

131:06:47 Shepard: And Cabin Repress valve, closed. (Pause)

131:06:55 Mitchell: It's closed.

131:06:57 Shepard: Okay. I'll get the...

131:07:01 Mitchell: Forward or the overhead (dump valve)?

131:07:03 Shepard: I'll get the forward.

131:07:04 Mitchell: Okay.

131:07:09 Shepard: Okay. Going down (to get the valve).

131:07:14 Mitchell: Okay. We're going to drop...Go to Auto at 3.5.

131:07:19 Shepard: Coming down.

131:07:21 Mitchell: Okay. There's 4.5. (Pause) 4. (Pause) 3.5.

131:07:31 Shepard: Okay. We're back in Auto. Cuff gauge reading 4.9.

131:07:35 Mitchell: And so is mine.

131:07:38 Shepard: Okay.

131:07:39 Mitchell: Okay.

131:07:42 Shepard: Cabin at 3.5.

131:07:43 Mitchell: That's verified.

131:07:44 Shepard: LM suit (circuit), 3.6 to 4.3.

131:07:46 Mitchell: It's at 4.5.

131:07:47 Shepard: And PGA is greater than 4.8, and it's coming down.

131:07:52 Mitchell: And mine's coming down. Okay.

131:07:55 Shepard: Start the wrist watch. Okay, Houston. Time zero. Mark.

131:08:01 Haise: Okay. We got a start.

[Each of them is wearing an Omega Speedmaster Professional on a long, sleeve strap and will use the stopwatch function to show them elapsed EVA time. They are near the middle of the righthand column on Sur 5-6.]

131:08:09 Shepard: Coming Open. (Long Pause)

131:08:22 Mitchell: There's two pounds.

131:08:24 Shepard: Okay. (Long Pause)

131:08:45 Mitchell: One pound. (Long Pause) Four-tenths.

RealVideo Clip (3 min 36 sec)

131:09:18 Shepard: Okay. (Long Pause)

131:09:32 Mitchell: Okay. (Garbled) give it a try. (Pause)

131:09:44 Shepard: Not yet.

131:09:46 Mitchell: Okay. (Pause) Water flag A. (Long Pause) Okay. Turn PLSS feedwater On. (Long Pause) Feedwater, On.

[Early in EVA-1, Al and Ed deployed the U.S. flag. Initially, they pointed the flag perpendicular to the line-of-sight to the MESA for 16-mm photography. This is the orientation seen in the tourist pictures, AS14-66-9231, 9232, and 9233. At 114:45:56, immediately after they finish the tourist pictures, Ed re-oriented the flag so that it was face on to the TV camera. Photo AS14-66-9324 shows the flag in this orientation as seen out Ed's window after EVA-1. The flag is pointed on an azimuth of about 120.]

[When Ed closes the TV circuit breaker at 130:31:38 and TV transmissions resume, the flag was still face on and has remained stationary.]

[During the current depressurization, at about 131:10:26, the flag suddenly moves out of the TV field-of-view and, as can be seen after 135:02:45 when Al gets back to the LM at the end of the traverse and re-aims the TV, it ends up pointing at the TV on an azimuth of about 045. A frame from Ed's Station H pan, AS14-68-9486 provides additional evidence.]

[Finally, we note that AS14-66-9338, a picture taken out Ed's window after the PLSS jettison, shows that the flag has moved again, undoubtedly as a result of the pre-jettison depressurization; ending up pointing at an azimuth of about 335.]

[As for the timing of the first flag motion - which is clearly a result of the EVA-2 depressurization - we note that the dump valve in the forward hatch was first opened at about 131:07:09 - with some timing uncertainty - and then closed at about 131:07:31 when the cabin pressure had dropped to 3.5 psi. Al and Ed then did a final suit integrity check and opened the valve a second time to start the EVA at very close to 131:08:01. With the exceptions of Apollo 11 which had a bacterial filter on the dump valve that slowed depressurization and Apollo 17 where Gene Cernan opened the overhead valve, cabin pressure dropped low enough for the crews to be able to open the hatch after almost exactly two minutes, which would have been at 131:10:01. In the present case, Al reported at 131:09:44 that he was unable to open the hatch and then doesn't report 'hatch coming open' until 131:12:32.]

[During the depressurization, the released oxygen flows out of the dump valve into the lunar vacuum and will tend to expand preferentially in the plus-Z direction. Thomas Schwageier has redrafted Figure 9-4 from the Apollo 14 Preliminary Science Report . The original shows the arrival of the released oxygen at the CCIG experiment, deployed at the ALSEP site 180 meters west of the LM. The first spike represents the arrival of oxygen released during the initial depressurization down to 3.5 psi and the second spike represents final depressurization. Available indications of the time the valve was first opened are imprecise; but the time of the second valve opening is known to a second or two. This time, 131:08:01 is equivalent to 08:11:03 GMT/UTC on 6 February 1971 and has been added to the figure.]

[The interval from the second valve opening to the corresponding arrival at the CCIG - 180 meters from the LM - is about 30 seconds. The time at which the flag moves, 131:10:26, is equivalent to 08:13:28 GMT/UTC and has also been added to the figure. This corresponds reasonably well with the third, small spike, which may represent an unannounced cracking of the hatch almost exactly two minutes after the start of the final depress. What seems to be required to explain the movement of the flag is that Shepard 'cracked' the hatch open - but without fully opening it - about 30 seconds before the third CCIG peak about 131:10:01; and that the resultant oxygen flow was far less directional than the flow out the valve, arrived at the flag before arriving at the CCIG, and imparted sufficient force on the flag to move it.]

[Association of the third peak (131:10:32) with an unannounced 'cracking' of the hatch 30 seconds earlier is supported by CCIG data from the pre-launch jettison depressurization discussed after 136:23;40.]

[Another example comes from CCGE (Cold Cathode Gauge Experiment) data for the Apollo 15 EVA-3 depressurization, recorded 110 meters northwest of the LM. The CCGE was co-located with the SIDE, which is shown in Figure 5-52 in the Apollo 15 Preliminary Science Report. As indicated in the Preliminary Science Report, "The CCGE (Cold Cathode Gage Experiment) was turned on at approximately 19:34 GMT/UTC on July 31, 1971. On initial activation, the gage indicated full scale; but, after approximately 30 minutes of operation, the output began to drop. The high voltage was then commanded off to allow the instrument to outgas. The gage has not been operated for prolonged periods during the lunar day because of voltage restrictions placed on the high-voltage power supply in the SIDE package. The experiment was operated four more times for periods of approximately 30 min each to observe the effects of the LM depressurizations for the second and third periods of extravehicular activity (EVA) and for the equipment jettison and to observe the effects of the LM lift-off from the lunar surface." CCGE data for the EVA-3 depressurization ( Figure 13-4 in the Apollo 15 Preliminary Science Report ) shows peaks at 'elapsed times' of 1:36, 2:17, and 5:38, corresponding to (1) the initial depressurization to 3.5 psi, (2) the second valve opening to complete depressurization, and (3) hatch opening. Although it is tempting to think that zero time corresponds to the reported time of the first valve opening, it seems unlikely that the flow would take 96 seconds to travel 110 meters in the Apollo 15 case versus 30 seconds to travel 180 meters in the case of the Apollo 14 EVA-2 depress. It seems more likely that zero time represents the start of data collection for this event. For the Apollo 15 EVA-3 depress, the relevant mission elapsed times are 163:17:32 for the first valve opening, 163:18:12 for the second opening, and 163:21:35 for hatch open. Dave and Jim did a good job of reporting what they were doing, and the uncertainties in the relative times seems small. The intervals are 40 seconds and 3 minutes 23 seconds, which compare well with the CCGE intervals of 41 seconds, and 3 minutes 21 seconds.]

[The limited availability of Apollo 14 data does not allow us to be very precise; and what is required to sort out what actually happened is a detailed numerical simulation and/or carefully designed laboratory demonstration.]

[Thanks to Journal Contributors Ian Regan, Harald Kucharek, Ken Glover and to members of the Bad Astronomy bulletin board for raising the issue of the orientation of the Apollo 14 flag and for helpful input. And to Thomas Schwagmeier for help with the discussion and for revision of the illustrations.]

131:10:50 Mitchell: Pardon?

131:10:51 Shepard: Can you reach the feedwater for me?

131:10:53 Mitchell: Yeah. Okay. Just a second. Let me...(Long Pause) Okay.

131:11:15 Shepard: Okay. Got a water flag A.

131:11:17 Mitchell: And mine is cleared.

131:11:20 Shepard: Already cleared?

131:11:21 Mitchell: Yep. Well, we used them yesterday. It shouldn't take too long.(Pause)

[Mitchell - "The sublimator didn't have to be completely refilled. It hadn't totally evacuated from the first EVA."]

[Jones - "So, it started out dry prior to the first EVA and had to fill up all the tubes with water."]

131:11:54 Shepard: Okay.

131:12:00 Mitchell: Oh, I think I see what my suit problem is, Al. (Pause) I've got a broken cable in my wrist.

131:12:12 Shepard: Oh, really?

131:12:13 Mitchell: Yeah. See, I can't control the right hand.

131:12:21 Shepard: (Garbled).

131:12:22 Mitchell: Keeps pulling back to the inside on me.

131:12:24 Shepard: Pull it there?

131:12:26 Mitchell: I can pull it, but I can't turn it this way and make it stay there. See, it's doing it by itself.

[Note that Ed may have first noticed the problem during glove donning or during the pressure integrity check.]

[Mitchell, from the 1971 Technical Debrief - "I discovered that my right glove wanted to move to the left and down whenever I relaxed pressure on it. In order to move it back to normal working position, it took a great deal of effort. Any time I'd relax, it would snap over to that position. It caused quite a bit of a problem during EVA-2. It limited, to a great extent, the amount of things I could do with my right hand without tiring. I could do almost anything, but it was slow and tedious to do it. Outside of that, there was no major effect of the glove problem. We brought back the glove. I didn't know what was happening to it, but it was not performing as it should have."]

[Note that Houston decides not to pursue the issue.]

[The following is taken from the Apollo 14 Mission Report. "After suit pressurization for the second EVA, the Lunar Module Pilot reported that his right glove had pulled his hand to the left and down and that he had not had this trouble during the first EVA...Initial indications from the Lunar Module Pilot were that a cable had broken in the glove (Fig 14_29). A detailed examination of the returned glove, together with (vacuum) chamber tests, have shown that there are no broken cables and that there is free operation of the glove wrist-control cable system. However, with the Lunar Module Pilot in the pressurized flight suit, the glove took the position which was reported during the mission. The wrist-control assembly provides a free-moving structural interface between the glove and the wrist disconnect so as to assure convolute action for wrist movement in the pressurized state. The design inherently allows the glove to take various neutral positions. This anomaly is closed."]

[We do not know if there were any design modifications made for the J-mission gloves, but no further problems of this kind were experienced. Readers should note that Ed is left-handed, so the malfunction of the right glove is somewhat less of a problem than it might have been.]

131:12:39 Haise: Roger, Al.

131:12:40 Shepard: And you want to get my (PLSS/OPS) antenna on the way out?

131:12:41 Mitchell: Yeah.

131:12:45 Shepard: Okay.